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SUMMARY
This report summarises a participatory technology assessment on transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops organised by the Research Unit, Standard Setting and the Environment, at the
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, between 1991 and 1993. The technology assessment was a ”round
table” involving some fifty representatives from industry, environmental groups, regulatory
agencies and science in more than ten days of controversial debate and analysis. The first part of
this summary report describes the methodology used applied in analysing the deliberations of the
technology assessment; the second part presents the empirical findings with respect to the
performance, the risks and the benefits of transgenic herbicide-resistant crops; the third part gives
an account of the ethical, legal and political discussions held in the technology assessment, as well
as the recommendations for regulation advanced by the participants.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Dieser Bericht ist die Zusammenfassung eines partizipativen Verfahrens zur Technikfolgen-
abschätzung von Kulturpflanzen mit gentechnisch erzeugter Herbizidresistenz, das von der Abteilung
”Normbildung und Umwelt” am Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin organisiert worden war. Das Ver-
fahren hat von 1991 bis 1993 etwa fünfzig Vertreter der Industrie, der Umweltgruppen, der
zuständigen Behörden und der Wissenschaft an einem ”Runden Tisch” versammelt, an dem die
Beteiligten insgesamt fast zehn Tage kontrovers miteinander diskutiert haben. Im ersten Teil dieser
Zusammenfassung wird das partizipative Verfahren beschrieben und erläutert, wie aus den Diskus-
sionen zwischen den Beteiligten Ergebnisse für die Technikfolgenabschätzung abgeleitet wurden. Der
zweite Teil enthält die empirischen Befunde zu den möglichen Risiken und zum erwartbaren Nutzen
transgener herbizid-resistenter Kulturpflanzen. Der dritte Teil stellt die ethischen, rechtlichen und
politischen Diskussionen dar, die zwischen den Beteiligten geführt wurden; er enthält außerdem die
Empfehlungen des Verfahrens zur Regulierung herbizid-resistenter Pflanzen.
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FOREWORD
Between February 1991 and June 1993, a technology assessment procedure on the cultiva-
tion of crop plants with genetically engineered herbicide resistance was carried out at the
Research Unit, Standard Setting and the Environment, in the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin
(WZB). The project was financed by the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology
(No. 0319481A); it was initiated jointly by Wolfgang van den Daele (WZB), Alfred Pühler
(Institute for Genetics at the University of Bielefeld) and Herbert Sukopp (Institute for
Ecology at the Technical University of Berlin).
Crop plants with genetically engineered herbicide resistance open up new possibilities for
chemical weed control. They extend the scope for application of herbicides with a wide
ranging effect (nonselective herbicides), which were not practicable for most farmers up to
now because they affect not only weeds but also conventional crop plants. This obstacle is
removed if a gene is inserted into the plant which induces resistance to the nonselective
herbicide. Herbicide resistance was one of the first projects to apply genetic engineering to
agriculture. The corresponding products are now coming to the market. They are still the
subject of heated public debate, concerning above all the possible risks associated with the
application and release of transgenic plants and the future role of chemical weed control in
agriculture.
These issues were central to the technology assessment. Taking the themes which provoked
public criticism as a starting point, we commissioned a total of 18 expert reports, two com-
mented reports and 18 commentaries on the various problem areas of herbicide resistance
technology. The technology assessment was organised as a participatory, discursive proce-
dure. It involved some 60 participants invited from scientific, business and environmental
groups and from public bodies who not only provided the reports and commentaries but
also discussed and evaluated them in a series of conferences. At the start of the last confer-
ence, at which the conclusions of the technology assessment were discussed and decided
upon, the official representatives of the environmental groups withdrew from the procedure.
These groups have not endorsed the final conclusions.
This report summarises the results of the technology assessment. It comprises three parts.
The first part describes the methodology which was applied in analysing the deliberations of
the technology assessment. It explains how the procedure was able to arrive at conclusions
even though the debate between the participants continued to the last which seemed rather
to indicate that the important issues remained a matter of controversy. We illustrate the
methodology taking a strategic question from the risk controversy as an example, namely
whether uncertainties with respect to the properties and behaviour of plants produced by
genetic engineering can be distinguished from uncertainties due to natural processes which
occur in all plants.
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The second part of the summary report presents the empirical findings from the technology
assessment. These findings relate to the performance and the possible impact and conse-
quences of transgenic herbicide-resistant crops. The third part contains the discussions of
the ethical, legal and political assessment of such plants; it also lists the recommendations
for regulation advanced by the participants.
The expert reports delivered in the technology assessment are only available in German.
They have been published, together with the commentaries and further written statements,
in a series of WZB discussion papers (see Appendix below). These papers also contain a
detailed overview of the range of arguments used by the participants with respect to the
various problem areas of herbicide resistance technology. In accordance with the method-
ology described in Part I below, key areas of controversy were identified and the respective
debates reconstructed as sequences of claims, objections, counter-claims, justifications, etc.
This material allows the reader to follow the course and the analysis of the discussions in
the technology assessment. It also makes it possible to check whether the conclusions pub-
lished here give a full and fair account of the results of the procedure.
Acknowledgements. The organisation and the analysis of the technology assessment proce-
dure involved the combined efforts of the project initiators and an interdisciplinary group
from the Wissenschaftszentrum (WZB) which included Alfons Bora (sociology), Rainer
Döbert (sociology), Susanne Neubert (agricultural science), and Viola Siewert (agricultural
science). We also received valuable scientific help from Inge Broer (genetics) and Ulrich
Sukopp (ecology). Finally, we would like to thank Mary Kelley-Bibra, Christa Hartwig,
Alex Sawyer and Axel Tröster-Grönig for their technical assistance.
Wolfgang van den Daele
Alfred Pühler
Herbert Sukopp
PART I: PARTICIPATORY TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT AS A POLITICAL EXPERIMENT
A technology assessment of crop plants with
genetically engineered herbicide resistance was
undertaken in the Federal Republic of Germany
between 1991 and 1993. It was organised by an
interdisciplinary group at the Wissenschafts-
zentrum Berlin (WZB) (Prof. Wolfgang van den
Daele) in cooperation with the Institute for
Genetics of the University of Bielefeld
(Prof. Alfred Pühler) and the Institute for Ecol-
ogy of the Technical University of Berlin
(Prof. Herbert Sukopp). This technology as-
sessment can be considered a political experi-
ment because various angles of embarking on
new procedural courses were tried. The key
words here are participation and discursivity.
The experiment fostered participation because it
was based on the notion that technology assess-
ment should be more than just a forum of ex-
perts at which the state of knowledge on the
possible consequences of a technology is pre-
sented and evaluated. Technology assessment
should, in addition, be a political ”arena” in
which the social conflicts related to the intro-
duction of a new technology can be articulated
and discussed in an exemplary manner. Conse-
quently, participants in the procedure were put
together so as to reflect all the interests and the
positions of the on-going political conflicts over
new technology in Germany and to include the
declared advocates and critics of the specific
technology under consideration. In this way, the
disputes that normally take place outside the
domain of technology assessment (and that often
become really heated when its results are made
public) were built into the procedure from the
very outset.
The experiment emphasised discursivity since
the whole procedure of the technology assess-
ment was organised as a social process of on-
going communication amongst those present, in
order to guarantee a dialogue between the repre-
sentatives of controversial positions. In a series
of conferences and workshops the participants
were to define the scope of studies to be carried
out for the technology assessment, to evaluate
the results of the expert reports that have been
commissioned, and to discuss conclusions to be
drawn as well as recommendations that should
be given. The understanding was that such a
process of on-going face-to-face communication
would promote discursive forms of debate,
increasing the likelihood that arguments from the
two sides would be heard, and critical appraisal
of the respective positions accepted.
The substantive results achieved in this technol-
ogy assessment are presented in subsequent
parts of this summary report. In the following
we give a more detailed presentation of the
organisation and the process of the technology
assessment. In particular, we want to explain
how results were achieved in a procedure of
participatory and discursive discussion.1
1 Representative participationand fair allocation of
resources
Which groups should be recruited into a partici-
patory technology assessment? The organisers
considered interest, political commitment and
competence as the decisive selection criteria.
Accordingly, at least industry and the environ-
mental groups, as the parties of social conflict,
and the regulatory authorities should be in-
volved. Furthermore, all the problem areas of
the specific technology to be investigated had to
be covered by experts from the relevant disci-
plines. This already led to such a high number of
participants that the idea was dropped of also
involving politicians from all factions and the
usual representatives of public life (trade unions,
churches etc.). Representation of the media was
offered through invitations to the press.
It cannot be taken for granted that opportunities
offered for participation in a field of political
conflict and controversy will readily be accepted
by the parties involved. It was not difficult to
assure the cooperation of scientists for the
procedure, from the relevant research areas, by
offering them lucrative contracts for expert
reports. However, all other groups had rather
mixed feelings about joining the procedure. The
regulatory authorities maintained a certain
                                                  
1
 More background information in van den Daele (1994).
Further analysis of the technology assessment procedure
is provided in Bora/Döbert (1993), van den Daele (1996,
1997), van den Daele/Döbert (1994), Döbert (1994,
1996), Gill (1993), Holzinger (1996), Neubert (1993),
and Saretzki (1996).
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distance by sending individuals
who did not then appear as official
representatives of their agencies.
Both German industry and the
environmental groups had
fundamental political reservations.
Their ”coalition against participa-
tion” was certainly founded on
opposing assessments of the
situation. Industry was suspicious
about being publicly ”chastised”.
The environmental groups were
apprehensive that their involvement
would sap protest potential and
would lend legitimacy to the
technology investigated. In the end,
however, both sides decided to
participate despite their
ambivalence. The organisers tried
to make it clear that the procedure
was open with respect to its approach and
composition, and that it did not favour any side.
The question is whether that convinced the
environmental groups in particular. What
probably also played a role in overcoming
resistance to participation was that it is not easy
to publicly justify refusal to participate. In
addition, anyone who refuses runs the risk of
watching the procedure take place without them,
i.e. with the participation of the ”other side”
only.
At the first conference, opposing parties criti-
cised the composition of the participants as
being imbalanced. In many cases, the calls for
changes contradicted each other, for instance,
both more scientists and fewer scientists were
requested. Hence, there was little room for
compromise. After all, there was apparently no
real need for action. The divergent demands
could be seen as an indication that those present
represented the various positions in this contro-
versial area. The coordinating committee (see
below) prepared a proposal to solve the issue,
which was submitted to the participants after the
first conference for comment. No response was
taken to mean tacit approval. Taking up a
demand from some participants, an attempt was
made to involve farmers in the technology
assessment. This attempt failed, however, de-
spite considerable efforts. A breakdown of
participants in the first conference of our tech-
nology assessment, according to institutions and
groups, is shown in the table above.
The number of participants in the procedure
ranged from 50 to 60 persons (not including the
WZB group). There were particularly high
fluctuations among the representatives of envi-
ronmental groups and their associations. Scien-
tific experts were contractually bound to regular
attendance. The coordinating committee supple-
mented the groups accordingly, without being
forced to arithmetic precision, in such a way that
the level of participation remained more or less
constant for the various groups.
What is more significant when assessing the
representativness of the composition, is the
attitude of the experts to the technology under
review. Of the 42 experts and commentators
who participated in at least one assessment
conference, a slight majority was probably in
favour of transgenic herbicide-resistant crops.
According to an internal rating by the WZB
group, 29-48% of the participants were in
favour of the technology at the beginning of the
procedure, 33-43% were against it and 15-43%
were neutral2.
The technology assessment procedure consti-
tuted a major burden for all the participants—a
burden which for many could not simply be
tackled during their paid work. There were
various kinds of problems with resources.
Whereas time was probably the critical point for
the participants from industry, participants from
environmental groups, consumer organisations
and the associated research bodies often faced
financial difficulties when they were obliged to
work on an honorary or self-employed basis, or
were financed through donations. In the proce-
dure, an attempt was made to compensate for
                                                  
2
 The fluctuations in the rating by the WZB group did not
correlate with the raters’ own political preferences; they
highlight the difficulty of an (external) assessment of
attitudes towards herbicide resistance technology. For an
evaluation of self-assessments by the participants in the
procedure, cf. Bora/Döbert (1993).
%5($.'2:1 2) 3$57,&,3$176
Technology Assessment of Herbicide Resistant Crops
Governmental agencies 1991: 7 (1993: 10)*
Research institutions (not including insti-
tutions associated with nongovernmental
organisations)
1991: 20 (1993: 25)
Nongovernmental organisations (envi-
ronmental and consumer groups, repre-
sentatives of organic farming, research
institutions associated with nongovern-
mental organisations)
1991: 11 (1993: 12)
Industry and trade associations 1991:10 (1993: 13)
*Figures in brackets show the distribution just prior to the final conference in 1993.
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this to a certain degree by ensuring that the
experts from these groups were adequately
considered in the commissioning of expert
reports and commentaries. This was necessary
in any case for reasons of equal participation.
The following table gives a breakdown of the
resources allocated to the various groups:
What adequate consideration actually means
may be a matter of argument. The fact is that in
this technology assessment DM 124,000
(roughly 30%) of the expert fees went to scien-
tists from the environmental groups or their
associated research institutes. This sum does not
reflect the overall volume of resources which
were allocated to the critics of transgenic herbi-
cide-resistant crops. If we include those univer-
sity scientists who, according to the rating by the
WZB group, were to be assigned to the group of
critics at the beginning of the procedure, then
this figures must be increased to DM 185,000
(45% of the total fees). The question of distri-
bution of resources was not problematic in the
procedure up to the final conference.
2 Steering of the procedure:participants, coordinating
committee, WZB working
group
The central steering body for the procedure of
the technology assessment was a ”coordinating
committee” which was set up at the first confer-
ence. In addition to the three organisers, it
included three people from the side of the regu-
latory authorities, the environmental and con-
sumer organisations and industry. The decisions
of the coordinating committee were submitted to
all participants in the procedure for final com-
ment. Only rarely, however, were there any
reactions. With few exception, the decisions by
the coordinating committee were approved
unanimously, which made it difficult for other
participants to break out of this consensus later.
As a result the participants were more informed
of the decisions of the coordinating committee
rather than really called upon
to have a final say on them.
The participants exerted
influence mainly by contrib-
uting substantive arguments
to the discussions, but not by
formally steering the proce-
dure.3 More than 40 partici-
pants were already involved
in shaping the contents
through the expert reports
and commentaries commis-
sioned. Moreover, all the
other participants were also
entitled to submit written
comments, criticisms and
evaluations. These were then
to be discussed at the confer-
ences and published in the
technology assessment
documentation. The organisers also exercised
this right during the final phase of the procedure
by submitting ”provisional conclusions” on the
various problems, in order to focus the assess-
ment discussion at the final conference (see
below).
The WZB working group had not been formally
given the remit of steering the procedure, but it
did have real influence. All organisational work
was undertaken by this group, from the recruit-
ing of participants to the commissioning of
expert reports to the planning of the conferences
and the preparation of the assessment documen-
tation. For a period of more than two years, an
average of three persons were fully occupied
with this organisational work. This extended
greatly into the structuring of the contents of the
discussions on the procedure. In formal terms,
the WZB working group acted as the planning
staff who continued to be dependent on the
coordinating committee and who prepared and
executed the latter’s decisions. But this cannot
conceal the fact that an ”apparatus” of this kind
                                                  
3
 Only at the first conference did procedural matters play
a central role but it was not possible to find a binding
solution at that time. It is just not feasible for some 50 to
60 persons with, in some cases, diametrically opposed
interests to jointly conduct a technology assessment
procedure on the basis of self-organisation—at least not
within an acceptable period of time.
%5($.'2:1 2) 5(6285&(6 LQ '0
Expert
Reports
Com-
men-
taries
Total
Research Institutions (not including insti-
tutions associated with nongovernmental
organisations)
220.000.- 5.000.- 225.000.-
Industry and trade associations 30.000.- 3.000.- 33.000.-
Nongovernmental organisations (environ-
mental and consumer groups, represen-
tatives of organic farming, research insti-
tutions associated with nongovernmental
organisations)
120.000.- 4.000.- 124.000.-
Governmental agencies 20.000.- 3.000.- 23.000.-
Total 390.000.- 15.000.- 405.000.-
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can exert considerable influence. A certain
degree of internal control was ensured by the
fact that the WZB group itself had been put
together to reflect the various disciplines and
political orientations pertinent to the controver-
sial technology.
All strategic decisions in the course of the
technology assessment procedure were taken
unanimously in the coordinating committee. This
was the case for
• the composition of the participants,
• selecting the subjects for the expert reports,
and the subsequent commissioning of the reports
and the comments requested thereon,
• the form of publication of the materials and
the results of the technology assessment, in-
cluding the depiction of the various positions of
the participants and consideration of these
positions in the final synthesis report by the
organisers,
• the sequence of colloquia and assessment
conferences,
• the way in which preliminary results of the
technology assessment should be presented for
discussion among the participants in the final
conference.
 
In the coordinating committee (contrary to the
situation in the plenary assembly of the partici-
pants) conflicts were settled through negotiation.
All members of the coordinating committee had
a factual right of veto. The remit for the steering
of the procedure was subject to the condition
that the decisions at the ”round table” had to be
taken jointly. This did not exclude situations in
which people occasionally let themselves be
outvoted.
 3  Selection of the subjects forthe expert reports
 
The selection of the subjects for the expert
reports to be prepared in the technology assess-
ment and of the individuals from whom the
reports should be commissioned were dealt with
at the first conference. To this end, the WZB
working group proposed a provisional pro-
gramme structure which was the result of nu-
merous discussions with potential experts con-
ducted over a period of several months. The
declared goal was to cover, if possible, all the
problems associated with transgenic herbicide-
resistant crops raised in the scientific literature
and the public debate. The experts we consid-
ered were invited to present an outline of their
reports for discussion at the first conference.
 
The programme proposal was criticised from
various sides. On the one hand, the broad range
of topics was criticised, that often did not reveal
a specific link to transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops. This argument was raised in particular
against plans to have the problems of nonselec-
tive herbicides examined in detail. On the other
hand, the spectrum of subjects was criticised as
being too narrow. Additional reports were
solicited by the representatives of nongovern-
mental organisations: for instance, on soil ero-
sion, on the patenting of genetic resources from
the Third World by companies from the indus-
trialised countries, and on the power and inter-
ests of the groups involved in the technology
assessment, with special reference to a compari-
son of industry and the environmental organisa-
tions.
 
Final agreement on the programme structure
was not reached during the first conference. The
question was delegated to the coordinating
committee which took two meetings to draw up
a final programme proposal. The proposal was
presented in written form to all participants for
comments and was then taken as accepted as no
further objections were raised.
 
The final programme structure contained two
decisions concerning the strategy of the tech-
nology assessment. First, it adopted a technol-
ogy-induced approach; second, it rejected
proposals to have expert reports on political
issues, such as the power structure of the con-
flict over new technology, or the interests and
objectives of major actors in that conflict,
because such questions have a strong normative
touch and can only be dealt with empirically to a
limited degree. It was decided that an expert
report on ethical issues be commissioned, but
that was expressly limited to the moral questions
of plant manipulation. A proposal to
commission a comprehensive ethical report to
assess all the value judgements brought forward
in the technology assessment was also rejected.
In general, these programme decisions reflected
the understanding that value judgements cannot
and should not be relegated to experts. Moral
and political evaluation is the proper domain of
lay citizens. This means that in our technology
assessment the competence for value judgements
rested with all the participants as a group. While
these decisions appeared adequate, in principle,
they added to the underestimation of normative
and political issues in our technology
assessment; they ruled out that these issues be
put automatically on the agenda through the
critical discussion of the respective expert
reports.
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 4  The approach: technology-induced versus problem-
induced assessment
 
Two criteria were applied by the organisers in
drafting a preliminary list of the substantive
issues to be investigated in the technology
assessment: (1) all the arguments advanced in
public for and against transgenic herbicide-
resistant crops must to be dealt with in the
technology assessment; (2) the technology
assessment should address the possible conse-
quences of herbicide-resistant crops, not the
possible options for weed control in agriculture.
 
While it would have been difficult not to agree
with the first of these criterion, the second
evoked considerable criticism from the side of
the nongovernmental organisations in the first
conference of the procedure. These participants
had fundamental reservations about the narrow
approach of the technology assessment which
was ”technology-induced”. This approach takes
the emergent technological option of transgenic
herbicide-resistant crops as the starting point; it
focuses on the analysis of possible consequences
of such crops and on the political actions that
might be necessary to cope with those conse-
quences. What the nongovernmental groups
called for instead was ”a problem-induced”
technology assessment. This approach addresses
the underlying problem the technology is sup-
posed to solve and compares alternative options
for tackling that problem. In the case of herbi-
cide resistance, the starting point would then
have to be the agricultural problem of weed
control and a comparison made of the options
offered, on the one hand, by industrialised,
intensive farming and, on the other, by organic
farming. The decisive questions would then have
been whether we really need transgenic herbi-
cide-resistant crops and whether they fit into a
system of agriculture that is socially desirable
and ecologically sustainable.
 
A ”problem-induced” technology assessment
allows the discussion of broad and fundamental
political issues, but, at the same time, it inflates
the scope of technology assessment to issues of
political planning in the broadest sense and to
scenarios of desirable futures for social
development. While this may be a necessary
input into the public debate, it cannot be a
reason to forego the more modest efforts of a
technology-induced assessment. In fact, had the
participants of our procedure come out in favour
of a comparative analysis of weed control
techniques that fit alternative systems of
agriculture (intensive versus organic farming)
none of the issues raised in the technology-
induced assessment of transgenic herbicide-
resistant crops would have been invalid. Rather,
additional and corresponding questions would
have had to be addressed for organic farming as
well. The programme of the technology
assessment would then have been doubled at
least.4
 
The dispute about the proper approach in tech-
nology assessment is as old as technology as-
sessment itself. The more such assessments were
seen as a vehicle to revise in principle the de-
pendence of modern societies on technological
dynamism, the broader became the horizon of
problems to be considered. Thus technology
assessments have regularly proceeded from the
analysis of the consequences to the analysis of
the origins of the technology in question, moving
from control to design and from technical op-
tions to social needs. Equally regularly, how-
ever, political and pragmatic constraints im-
posed a return to more conventional types of
assessment which focus on the control of the
consequences of new technology. Perhaps the
optimum would be to pursue the different ap-
proaches in parallel or in cooperation. However,
most of the studies which bear the title of tech-
nology assessment apply the technology-induced
approach.
 
In the end, this approach was adopted in our
technology assessment, with a minor modifica-
tion: In order to guarantee that the perspectives
of broader technological and agricultural alter-
natives were represented in the procedure, a
special expert report on weed control in organic
farming was commissioned. The environmental
groups (temporarily) accepted this arrangement.
The working programme of the technology
assessment was approved in consensus and
ceased to be a subject of dispute until directly
prior to the final conference.
 5  Issues considered: risks,benefits, and alternatives to
transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops
 
In the working programme that was determined
for the technology assessment, the possible risks
of transgenic herbicide-resistant crops became
the central theme. Discussion of the possible
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 The evidence, too, that a problem can be solved with
conventional, technological resources does not mean that
it is no longer necessary to examine new technologies. A
new technology could bring with it a major improvement.
Studies of alternatives place symmetric demands on new
and old technologies—unless there are reasons why new
technologies would, in principle, be less favourable than
old ones.
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benefits was of far less importance and the
alternatives to herbicide-resistant crops played
only a limited role.
 
Of the twenty expert reports commissioned for
the procedure, six dealt more or less exclusively
with the risks of genetically modified plants;
seven dealt with the toxicological and ecological
risks of nonselective herbicides which will be
applied in conjunction with the resistant crops.
The expert report of the Öko-Institut Freiburg
constituted a kind of reference report summa-
rising all the relevant risk arguments. The other
expert reports were related either directly as
commentary reports or indirectly by way of
parallel questions to that report. The paramount
issues that emerged from the discussion were
whether the risks of transgenic plants differed
from the risks of new plants that have been
altered through conventional breeding tech-
niques, and how the hypothesis that there are
special risks for genetically modified plants
could possibly be justified.
 
The predominance of the risk aspect in the
technology assessment procedure had a whole
series of consequences: First, it turned the
technology assessment into a kind of prior
examination of all the issues which had to be
tested in any case for the approval of transgenic
herbicide-resistant plants and nonselective
herbicides. Sometimes it was difficult to com-
prehend why the problems had to be settled in a
technology assessment and could not be left to
the competent authorities. This applied more to
the potential risks of nonselective herbicides
than to the risks of transgenic plants because,
for the latter, tests and procedures for approval
appeared to be less well-established. Second,
issues of judgement and valuation were given
less emphasis than empirical aspects. In most
cases the factual preconditions of risk claims
were controversial, i.e. the causalities, the
probability and the scale of potential damage.
The normative reference points of risk assess-
ments, by contrast, were often uncontroversial:
When toxic plant ingredients develop, approval
will be denied. Third, the technology assessment
implicitly accepted the fact that new technology
is evolving in a social process that largely
evades political control as the starting point. The
hidden premise of all risk discussions is a distri-
bution of the burden of proof which favours
innovation: Special justification is required if a
new technology is to be restricted or banned, not
if it is to be invented or propagated. In line with
this rule, many of the discussions in the technol-
ogy assessment followed a pattern in which the
critics had to make claims of risk and, when
faced with objections, were forced to substanti-
ate these claims with further argument.
 
The preoccupation with risks can probably not
be avoided in any technology assessment. In a
society in which technical innovation is built into
the structure of science and industry, and an-
chored in the constitution by a guarantee of
individual rights, opposition to innovation is
bound to resort to risk arguments. Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, the main criticisms of genetic
engineering in public speak the language of risk.
And, as long as this is the case, risks must also
be the main subject of a technology assessment.
It would seem to be a minimum requirement of
any technology assessment that it examine the
legitimacy of the concerns and arguments which
the people raise in public debates.
 
Benefit analyses in our technology assessment
procedure concentrated on the claims of the
advocates of transgenic herbicide-resistant crops
that nonselective herbicides implied clear eco-
logical and agronomic advantages. Here, differ-
ent assessment frameworks were taken as the
basis. On the one hand, even small ecological
and economic improvements were chalked up as
progress vis-à-vis the status quo. On the other
hand, it was criticised that the improvements
claimed did nothing to alter the fundamental
problems of intensive farming; they were simply
variations of a trend which had to be seen as
mistaken development and did not, therefore,
constitute real benefit.
 
In claims of benefit, the advocates of a technol-
ogy have the burden of proof. However, ac-
cording to the legal principles that apply in most
industrialised countries, this does not establish
any symmetry to the burden of proof required of
the critics with respect to the risks of the tech-
nology. If critics fail to provide evidence of
relevant risk, the technology cannot be banned.
If the advocates fail to provide evidence of
relevant benefits, the technology still cannot be
banned. At best, public support of the technol-
ogy can be withdrawn. What ”society” needs is
normally decided on the markets. It is not the
subject of political regulation. In our technology
assessment, reference to this regulatory structure
took the sting out of the debate over whether we
actually need transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops. There was, however, no necessity to abide
by the limits of existing law, since it is within
the scope of a technology assessment to investi-
gate more issues than can be politically regu-
lated. Whether there is an acceptable demand for
herbicide-resistant crops is a legitimate question,
even when the answer can only have an impact
on public awareness and level of consciousness,
and may not, in itself, constitute sufficient
reason to impose legal restrictions on the tech-
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nology. Furthermore, it is also a legitimate
matter for discussion whether socioeconomic
need could be made a precondition for the
approval of a new technology, even if that would
imply a revision of constitutional law.
 
Within the framework of our technology as-
sessment fundamental questions of this kind
were scarcely touched upon (but see section III,
D below). Probably, because of the otherwise
missing regulatory relevance, questions of need
were mostly referred back to discussions of risk.
The thrust of the argument was that uncertain-
ties about risks that might be hidden in a new
technology should not be offloaded onto society
unless there is a real need for that technology.
 
Discussions of alternatives to transgenic herbi-
cide-resistant crops were largely confined to the
level of technical details. Comparison with the
potential and problems of mechanical weed
control was repeatedly brought forward, but
even then the established system of intensive
agriculture was taken as the frame of reference.
Organic farming was covered in an expert report
on nonchemical methods of weed control; it was
not, however, a subject-matter for investigation
in the technology assessment.
 6  Reference to scientificknowledge and the role of
experts
 
The final stage in every technology assessment
is a political evaluation of the technology under
consideration; the main strategy is, however,
scientific investigation. Evaluations are based on
reasons which have empirical references, that is,
they refer to statements on causal mechanisms,
facts and phenomena which are (at least in
principle) verifiable or refutable. Whether
unintended metabolic changes justify a ban on
transgenic plants or whether increases in yield
through the use of herbicides are useful, is a
value judgement. Whether metabolic changes do
occur and whether increases in yield can be
expected is something one can investigate and
know. And even if we determine that we do not
or cannot know it, we still refer to the domain of
knowledge; establishing the limits to knowledge
is a matter of knowledge.
 
The commitment to knowledge and information
inherent in the notion of technology assessment
seems to be the basis for the broad political
consensus which supports that notion in our
society. Were political interests the only aspect
that really mattered, then technology assessment
would be a waste of both time and money. The
interests are, in general, known in advance. The
important point is that the interests participants
pursue when they enter a technology assessment
procedure must be sifted through the filter of
information orientation and, so to speak, expose
themselves to the risk of information. The very
idea behind technology assessment is that it
involves the possibility that handy claims, by
means of which one can beat the drum for a
technology in public or provoke resistance to it,
can be shown to be unprovable, poorly justified
or simply wrong. This does not mean that
political interests or goals can themselves be
”refuted”, but they can lose their favourite
legitimation. To justify them, new reasons must
then be provided. This risk can only be
circumvented by circumventing technology
assessment altogether; once you participate, you
are automatically exposed.
 
Commitment to information imposes limits on
the function of the technology assessment proce-
dure to provide a forum for the political conflict
over technology. Despite this, or perhaps be-
cause of it (depending on the political stance
adopted), this commitment was accepted as the
working basis by all those involved in our
procedure. The Gene-Ethical Network (a leading
group of activists campaigning against genetic
engineering) declined to participate precisely
because the procedure seemed incompatible with
the straightforward goal of political mobilisation
of the general public. This abstention was
declared to be a matter of political ”division of
labour” among the critics of the technology. It
was not (at that time) considered a fundamental
rejection of the technology assessment. It is very
possible that the ”virtualisation” of political
aspects through the information orientation of
the technology assessment was only reluctantly
accepted and viewed as a concession by the
social movements. For industry and many
scientists it was an essential precondition for
their participation; they would have declined to
”just talk politics”. Compromise was necessary.
Within the framework of a voluntary procedure
of technology assessment, the conditions for
participation must be symmetrical. Unequal
distribution of power and resources in the soci-
ety must not affect the position in the procedure.
Fair and equal treatment must be guaranteed. On
the other hand, symmetrical participation also
means, that oppositional groups cannot expect
that the disadvantages they face in politics in
general will be compensated for by preferential
treatment in the technology assessment.
 
There was consensus in our procedure that
expert reports were to be a main element in the
technology assessment. However, there was also
general agreement that the expert reports should
not be its only result. They were to provide the
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basis for the political evaluation of transgenic
herbicide-resistant crops. Furthermore, it was
agreed that issues of information were first and
foremost the competence and responsibility of
the experts from the relevant scientific and
technical disciplines. The very fundamental
political criticism sometimes waged against
expert knowledge and expert cultures, both in
the social movements and in the social sciences
during the last 20 years, did not have any role in
our procedure.5
 
Perhaps the competence and responsibility of the
experts were less contested in our technology
assessment because greater transparency was
guaranteed here than in other contexts of scien-
tific advice for public policy. The role of the
experts was modestly defined, and exaggerated
claims or ”technocratic arrogance” were effec-
tively excluded. It was clear from the beginning,
therefore, that the knowledge of experts is
inherently limited. Every expert report had the
explicit task of presenting what was known
about a specific problem, what could be known,
and what was not known. The bringing together
of experts with different political convictions
guaranteed that the unavoidable ”softness” of
expert opinions became a matter of discussion,
and that scientific controversies, where they
existed, would be brought to light. The partici-
pants in the technology assessment agreed that
forecasts on the basis of theory are never abso-
lutely certain, that the examination of empirical
claims depends on the methods adopted, and that
science can only depict complex realities in a
limited manner.
 
It was equally clear in the procedure that experts
are not truly ”disinterested”; they do indeed
have interests and make value judgements. The
experts were even asked explicitly (although in
most cases in vain) to make clear value judge-
ments at the end of their reports, to trigger
political discussion. Within such a setting, it was
not very cogent to propagate the notion that
experts are politically ”neutral”. This did not
mean that the reverse conclusion was drawn that
experts were merely the representatives of
interests. The participants in the procedure, as a
group, were able to distance themselves from the
value judgements of the experts, to differentiate
between facts and evaluations, and to establish
what the experts knew and what they wanted in
political terms or thought was right.
 
Thus, the politicisation of the experts in the
technology assessment was within bounds.
Legitimate room for political judgement was
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 See van den Daele (1996).
provided in the selection of the questions to be
addressed in the expert reports and in the
evaluation of the findings. The findings, them-
selves, were supposed to be science not politics.
They were a matter of knowledge, not of inter-
est.
 7  Assessment conferences:science-based discussions
 
For the evaluation of the expert reports prepared
in the technology assessment, discussion among
participants was the decisive ”arena”. Discus-
sions were held at two (two-day) conferences
which had been prepared in three (one-day)
colloquia. All participants had previously re-
ceived the expert reports and a short five-page
summary. In order to guarantee the active
involvement of as many participants as possible
and to foster controversial discussion, commen-
taries were commissioned for each report from
participants of the ”other side”. The commen-
taries were supposed to point out:
• whether the central findings of the report were
substantiated,
• whether important aspects were not covered,
• whether the report was based on implicit or
unusual premises,
• whether the conclusions were plausible.
 
The members of the coordinating committee
took turns acting as moderator at the confer-
ences. They were not responsible for summaris-
ing the findings of the discussions, but rather,
ensuring that no points or contributions were
omitted. It was their task, from time to time, to
pool the arguments in order to structure discus-
sion. The WZB working group was to support
the coordinating committee in this respect.
Discussions at these conferences presumably
suffered less than is normally the case from time
pressure; but they had other characteristics
which were also constraining: the discourse was
scientific rather than political; it was process
rather than result-oriented.
 
The relative ”reticence” of participants with
respect to normative and political questions
could perhaps be attributed to a certain pread-
justment to the timetable of the technology
assessment, which assigned the complete last
conference to the discussion of these questions.
On the other hand, it had never been the inten-
tion to postpone political questions to the last
conference. It was far more the case that the
coordinating committee had expressly indicated
that the expert reports and commentaries should
contain conclusions based on value judgements,
which should be seen as the starting point for
political discussions. This was only done to a
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very limited degree, however. With the exception
of the expert report on the ethics of plant ma-
nipulation, which was explicitly oriented to-
wards value judgements, all the other expert
reports and commentaries confined themselves
to empirical, scientific arguments. One explana-
tion could be the commitment to ”neutrality”
associated with the role of expert. What proba-
bly had more of an influence was the fact that
the participants, themselves, defined their con-
troversies mostly as debates about empirical
findings and not about values and goals. What
was to be classified as damage was less a sub-
ject of controversy than whether the damage
could possibly occur and how likely it was.
 
No one argued that the problems dealt with in
the technology assessment were not empirical
but political in nature, and that everything
depends on what you want or find acceptable.
With this argument the whole debate over the
alleged special risks of transgenic herbicide-
resistant crops would have been beside the point.
Participants adhered to the relevance of empiri-
cal questions for various reasons. First of all,
they agreed on many normative questions which
meant that there was little room and little need to
introduce completely new arguments with re-
spect to valuation. Furthermore, the political
force of nonconformist normative arguments is
probably rather limited, because they may be
relegated to the sphere of pluralism or outvoted
by majority decisions. As a strategy of political
critique, therefore, it is often more effective to
attack factual claims that are based on agreed
valuations than to call for alternative values. In
any case, at the assessment conferences lengthy
normative and political discussions were the
exception.
 
The discussions worked through central claims
in the expert reports, i.e. they called for sub-
stantiation and proof, raised objections, formu-
lated and examined counter-arguments. Al-
though the arguments went back and forth or in
circles (in line with the sequence of requests to
take the floor), they often accumulated as far as
contents were concerned. However, this accu-
mulation rarely led to a declared convergence of
positions or to settlement of dispute. In individ-
ual cases, arguments were explicitly withdrawn
and replaced by arguments on a different level.
Sometimes there was a call for the assembly to
record the result of discussions as a declared
consensus or dissent. This call was not followed
by most participants. In addition, the moderators
intimated that it would not be possible to sum-
marise ad hoc, in a reliable manner, the non-
transparent state of discussion. The dynamics of
the assessment conferences were, therefore,
process rather than result-oriented. In a way, the
discussions were deliberations without conclu-
sions or, in legal language: the taking of evi-
dence without a final decision. How can one then
derive conclusions from such a procedure? The
final conference was designed to solve this task.
 8  The use of argumentation:How conclusions were derived
through discourse
 
The final conference of the procedure had two
functions. It was to bring to the fore the political
problems of transgenic herbicide-resistant crops
which had not been discussed extensively up to
then. And it was designed to do what the as-
sessment conferences on the expert reports had
not done, namely, to draw conclusions about the
empirical findings from the deliberations among
the participants.
 
Political problems relate to the question, ”What
should be done?” For instance, should trans-
genic herbicide-resistant crops be approved or
banned? Are the risks of genetic engineering
acceptable? Should new technology be regulated
stricter than old technology? Throughout the
technology assessment all participants proceeded
from the premise that political questions were to
be distinguished from empirical questions, and
that the finding of facts must be prior to the
moral and political evaluation—both in time and
in logical order. Before we ask whether a risk is
acceptable we have to ask whether the risk
exists. It may, of course, be the case that no
answer can be given because the requisite
knowledge is lacking or the matter is controver-
sial. But this, too, would then be part of fact
finding (or evidence taking), and it must also be
recorded before political judgement can refer to
it.
 
But how can empirical results be recorded in a
participatory procedure, when the participants
merely discuss an issue without determining
whether consensus has been reached or not?
After all, our technology assessment was set up
as a discursive procedure with no third instance,
that is, no one who acts as judge and who, after
listening to the evidence from all parties present,
is competent to take a final decision. In such a
discourse it is up to the participants themselves
to judge.
 
The WZB working group which was assigned
the task of preparing the final conference pro-
posed a methodology for summarising the
empirical findings of the technology assessment.
The methodology was approved by the coordi-
nating committee. It involved three steps:
• giving an overview of all the arguments
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presented by the participants with respect to the
issues of debate,
• reconstructing the state of argumentation
reached in the debates which were particularly
controversial,
• formulating ”proposed conclusions” which
were then to be considered and decided upon by
the participants.
 
There were arguments in the working group
about this methodology. It was generally agreed
that first of all an overview should be presented
of all the arguments advanced in the procedure
(in the expert reports, in the commentaries and
discussions). To this end, argument trees were
developed for the various questions that had
been discussed, in which statements for and
against were put together visually in a kind of
synopsis. What was controversial was whether
the next step should be taken and the arguments
classified according to content, i.e. whether they
should be reconstructed as a sequence of claims,
counter-claims, substantiation, objections,
counter-objections, etc. It was criticised that a
reconstruction of this kind could be biased by
value judgements from the side of the working
group, and that it could put the statements of the
participants into contexts which they may not
have intended. Against this criticism it was
pointed out that such a reconstruction was
necessary to truly reflect the course of the
procedure. The undifferentiated block apposition
of arguments pro and con would merely stress
the divergent nature of the positions. The par-
ticipants had, however, also produced con-
vergence between these positions.
 
In fact, the participants did not merely express
opinions. They continuously argued with one
another (i.e. against each other). The procedure
prompted discursive communication, that is, in
the actual dialogue, substantiation of claims was
requested and provided, objections raised and
countered, evidence offered and examined.
Hence, the communication between the partici-
pants differed greatly from the usual ”public
discourse”, which seldom moves beyond the
repeated announcement of positions. When
people engage in real discursive deliberations
they cannot but open their positions to debate. In
a true discourse, the participants do not have
complete control over their arguments. The
arguments have a life of their own; they may run
contrary to the intentions of those who state
them. What results after discourse as ”the state
of argumentation” can be far more than the
simple collection of all the statements the par-
ticipants have put on the agenda. It was reason-
able, therefore, that in a participatory technology
assessment an attempt should be made to iden-
tify such results—if there are any.
 
For that reason the WZB working group decided
to reconstruct the arguments in the procedure
into controversial strategic positions and to add
this reconstruction to the documentation for the
final conference (see next paragraph for an
example). Whether the working group did this in
an arbitrary manner was something which had to
be examined by the participants. They were
explicitly invited by the coordinating committee
to exert such control:
 
”The reconstruction of arguments orders
the statements of the participants with
reference to the contents; it does not re-
flect the actual order in time (in what se-
quence they were said) or in place (where
they were said in reports, commentaries
or discussions). The reconstructions ex-
plicate the state of argumentation which
was achieved in the discourse with re-
spect to controversial issues. They repre-
sent the taking of evidence, in which the
participants had been engaged. Whether
they really provide evidence, that is,
whether the state of argumentation the
participants have produced, is complete
and conclusive, is another question. Any
participant may, at any time, point out
that relevant arguments are missing or
that the objections and counter-objections
reconstructed here are unproved or false.
 
The reconstructions are nevertheless
useful. With them it is no longer possible
just to disagree without stating to which
point exactly it is that one objects and
without giving further reasons for the
objection. This procedure ensures that
there is progress in the discussion, even if
controversies remain unresolved. It be-
comes clear where and why disagreement
exists. Hence external observers of the
technology assessment would be in a
better position to evaluate the discussions
and draw their own conclusions.” (Cir-
cular letter no. 13, May 3, 1993)6
 
Even when all the arguments have been summa-
rised and ordered, there are still no conclusions
as to the results. The state of argumentation
does not formulate the results. However, it does
make the step to formulation of the results
transparent and comprehensible. This step is not
a logical derivation which could be left to the
computer. It is an act of cognitive evaluation
which must weigh the arguments advanced
against one another. Different evaluations may
be possible, but these are in any case subject to
two conditions: (1) no new arguments may be
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 Reprinted in van den Daele (1994: 49).
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added; (2) no assessment should be made of
whether something is politically desirable or
defensible but only, in the words of Ludwig
Wittgenstein, whether it actually is the case. Has
the claim been proven? Has the objection been
refuted? Is the hypothesis substantiated? Is this a
scientific controversy? The conclusions are
cognitive evaluations, not political or moral
ones.
 
Conclusions of these kinds were formulated by
the organisers of the technology assessment and
presented to the participants in the final confer-
ence. This was in line with a decision by the
coordinating committee that the organisers
present a draft of the final report on the technol-
ogy assessment, that they intended to deliver.
The proposed conclusions were presented as
provisional; the participants had the right to
declare consensus or dissent.
 ”It seems necessary to make precise pro-
posals for how the results of the technol-
ogy assessment should be formulated,
regarding the controversial issues sur-
rounding transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops. In view of such proposals con-
sensus or dissent will also be precise and
remaining conflicts can be better under-
stood. It would be highly unsatisfactory
merely to convey as a result that opinions
continue to be divided over all major
points of debate. In this case, the whole
participatory procedure could have been
spared, because that was known before.
 A crucial question is, of course, which
conclusions should be presented to the
participants to solicit their assent or dis-
sent. The answer can only be: the most
plausible ones, given the state of argu-
mentation in the procedure. While such
conclusions cannot be derived with pure
logic, they are also not arbitrary or
merely a matter of subjective feelings.
The organisers claim that the conclusions
they propose have been suggested by the
arguments which have been advanced.
These conclusions are more plausible
than others. This is why the organisers
think that the final conference should
discuss and examine these conclusions
rather than others.” (Circular letter
no. 13, May 3, 1993)
 
This methodology put the participants under
great pressure either to admit consensus or
justify dissent. This was criticised. However,
pressure for consensus was only exerted with
respect to the empirical aspects of the problems
related to transgenic herbicide-resistant crops.
The very notion of a technology assessment is
based on the premise that judgements on
empirical issues are neither arbitrary nor merely
matters of interest. Otherwise attempts to take
evidence on these issues by consulting experts
would be beside the point from the outset and,
consequently, one would also have to desist from
claiming that arguments presented in the public
debate are substantiated by scientific knowledge.
 
Pressure for consensus does not mean that at all
costs there must be a result and that this must be
accepted without opposition. It means that the
result can only be rejected with a growing
burden of substantiation. One can no longer
simply point out that one is of a different opin-
ion. Goals may be simply rejected, because they
are a matter of choice; but not empirical find-
ings—they are (at least in principle) a matter of
knowledge. The true domain of irresolvable
dissent is politics, not science. And, with respect
to the political evaluation of transgenic herbi-
cide-resistant crops, it was indeed the intention
not to press for consensus in the final confer-
ence, but rather to provide open opportunity for
diverging judgements.
 9  Example: Conclusionsconcerning specific risks ofgenetically engineered plants
 
The question whether there are specific risks
involved in transgenic plants, that do not occur
in plants modified by conventional breeding
techniques, was a central issue in our technology
assessment.7 The report by the Öko-Institut
argued that there was at least an increased
probability of unexpected side-effects with
transgenic plants. One reason for this was that
the insertion of transgenes would disturb the
genomic context of the host plant and induce
positional effects (insertional mutations). The
counter-argument was that insertional mutations
also occur when transposable elements (jumping
genes) which are naturally contained in plant
cells move around; therefore, disturbances of the
genomic context could not be considered as a
risks that is in any way specific to transgenic
plants. The Öko-Institut defended its position by
claiming that transgenes and transposons cannot
be compared. This point prompted a lengthy
discussion in one of the assessment conferences.
The arguments were summarised for the partici-
pants in the following reconstruction:8
                                                  
 
7
 The final conclusions with respect to this issue are pre-
sented in, section II A5
 
8
 For a full documentation of this controversy see the
material in (Weber 1994: 215); see also van den Daele
(1996).
  Controversial issue (claim by the Öko-Institut):
 Transgenes induce disturbances of the genomic context which are different from
those induced by the insertion of transposable elements which are endogenous in
the plant. Therefore gene transfer cannot be compared with changes in the plant
genome which occur naturally.
 
 Arguments:
    1. That context relations in the host genome
are disrupted is nothing which is specific to
genetic engineering. The transfer of genes
is, in this respect, comparable to the
insertion of mobile DNA sequences (trans-
posons). Such insertion, too, separates
neighbouring genes.
  2. Transgenes and transposons may be
comparable as far as the disruption of the
sequence of genes is concerned. They are,
however, significantly different in other
respects.
  
 
 Transposition is a rare event; transgenic plants are frequent.
  3. Natural changes of the genomic context
through the insertion of transposons will sel-
dom give rise to new plants, whereas trans-
genic crops will be grown in large quantities.
  
    4. Transgenic crops must be compared with
other crops, not with wild plants. Transpo-
sons play an important role in breeding
corn. The resulting cultivars (sweet maize,
for example) are grown in equally large
quantities. There is no difference here to
transgenes.
 
 Transposons do not transfer dominant genes.
  5. In contrast to transgenes, transposons
cannot transfer dominant genes which will
be expressed; they can only switch off exist-
ing, recessive genes.
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    6. Transposons also transfer an active gene
(coding for transposase). In addition they
contain regulatory sequences which can
activate silent genes. This also leads to the
formation of a new protein in the plant.
  7. New plant properties may be possible
through transposition, but dominant genes
cannot be transferred. This remains a differ-
ence.
  
    8. The point is whether this makes a
difference with respect to possible changes
in the genomic context. In this respect, the
effects of jumping transposons and the
integration of transgenes are comparable.
  9. Transposons do not transmit genetic
information that is new to the plant. Trans-
posase is not an ”alien” gene product; it is
already known in the plant.
  
    10. The fact that genetic information is
”alien” to the plant may be relevant for the
possible consequences of the gene product
(coded by the gene). It has no relevance,
however, for the question of how the
genomic context will be changed by the
integration of the gene.
  11. It is conceivable that new information
could also make a difference with respect to
the genomic context.
  
 
 Integration of transposons is regulated by the plant; transgenes insert at random.
  12. The integration of transgenes cannot be
controlled. It is random. There is no fitting
site for transgenes in the host genome. In
contrast, transposons jump (at least in part)
to specific sequences.
  
    13. The current state of knowledge is that
transposons are inserted at random. They
move through the genome in a stochastic
process without preferring certain sequen-
ces or chromosomes.
  14. Earlier studies (Saedler et al.) have
found homologies between transposons and
sequences at the site of integration. It was
suggested that this indicates that integration
is sequence-specific.
  
    15. This hypotheses was withdrawn by the
authors. It could never be shown that trans-
posons use homologous sequences for inte-
gration. The homologies occur by chance—
which is to be expected according to
statistical rules.
14 Herbicide-Resistant Crops
  16. The thesis withdrawn is still upheld in
other work (e.g. Fedoroff, 1991) as repre-
senting the state of knowledge in science.
  
    17. Fedoroff (1991) only refers to the regu-
lation of the frequencies of transposition.
  18. Transposons are switched on and off
according to regulation by the developmen-
tal cycle of the plant. For instance, it has
been demonstrated that the frequency of
transpositions in maize depends on the
stage of growth of the plant.
  
    19. With respect to the possible changes in
the genomic context, the relevant question
is whether the site of insertion is regulated,
not the frequency of insertion. There are no
indications, however, that the site at which
transposons are inserted is in any way
regulated by the plant.
  20. The frequency of changes induced in
the genomic context (activation and deacti-
vation of other genes) is also regulated by
the development of the plant. This does not
apply to transgenes.
  
    21. If this applies, it can only relate to the
time of the context changes not, to the type
and the consequences. The consequences
of changes in the genomic context because
of the insertion of a transposon cannot differ
from the consequences of the integration of
a transgene (at the same gene locus).
  22. Apparently transposons only jump to
sites at where sequences have been
duplicated before. So, they do not integrate
at random.
  
    23. Preinsertional duplications are not
known. Duplications occur in the process of
insertion. They are a consequence, not a
presupposition of insertion.
  24. Transposons exhibit homing tendency;
they jump primarily on their own chromo-
some.
  
    25. There is a certain tendency for transpo-
sons to be integrated on the same chromo-
some. However 50% of the insertions occur
on other chromosomes. In principle, any
chromosome can be the target of insertion.
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 Integration of transgenes is irreversible; insertion of transposons is reversible
  
26. Mutations through the insertion of trans-
posons are reversible; the integration of
transgenes is irreversible.
  
    
27. It is possible to stabilise the insertion of
transposons to the same degree as the inte-
gration of transgenes, through changes in
the transposon or the outbreeding of gene
sequences which are necessary for transpo-
sition.
    
    
28. Reversibility of transposition means that
transposons pose a higher risk of unex-
pected side-effects than transgenes.
Transposons can change the genomic
context again when they leave the site of
insertion. Frequently they leave ”footprints”,
i.e. mutations and changes in the pattern of
gene regulation, at the site where they
insert. This may change gene functions, for
example, in mutations of the flower colour.
  
29. Mutations which can be induced by
insertion of transposons will mostly concern
recessive genes; far-reaching mutations are
likely to be eliminated immediately.
  
    
30. Transposons can induce mutations
which lead to dominant alleles; they can, for
instance, enhance the rate of reproduction.
  
31. The differences between transposons
and transgenes must be assessed in
totality. Transposons are reversible and the
frequency of transposition depends on the
developmental stage of the plant. This
warrants the conclusion that transposons, in
contrast to transgenes, have a function for
the plant and are regulated by the plant.
  
    
32. It has never been shown that the activity
of transposons, except for the frequency of
transposition, is regulated by the plant itself.
 
 
This was the reconstruction of the state of
argumentation with respect to the comparison of
transposons and transgenes. This reconstruction
was presented to the participants of the
technology assessment for examination. It was
the basis the organisers used to derive tentative
conclusions which they proposed at the final
conference. In these conclusions, they first
emphasised that, of all the differences which
were claimed to exist between transgenes and
transposons, only reversibility and site-specifi-
city of integration could have any bearing for the
question whether context disturbances (inser-
tional mutations) and hence the risk of
unexpected side-effects were comparable for
transgenes and transposons. With respect to
reversibility, it was concluded that the integra-
tion of transposons is in fact reversible; but this
means that transposons are likely to have more
rather than less side-effects on the host plant
than transgenes, because they can induce muta-
tions both at the site to which they move and at
the site where they leave. With respect to site-
specificity, it was concluded that the claim was
wrong: transposons do, in fact, integrate at
random. The representative from the Öko-
Institut tried to make the case that there was a
controversy in science over this question, by
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referring to Fedoroff (1991) for support in this
respect (see statement 16, above), and she did
not seem to be convinced by the end of the
discussions. Therefore, to clarify the issue
further, the organisers offered to contact
Fedoroff and have her expert statement included.
However, the Öko-Institut did not want to use
that offer. Accordingly, the organisers then felt
that it was legitimate to propose the following
summary of the conclusions:
 ”There is neither empirical evidence nor a theo-
retical model to show that transgenes could in-
duce more disturbances of the genomic context,
or a different kind of disturbance, than transpos-
able elements which move around in the plant
genome naturally. The gene locus in which trans-
posons are integrated, is not regulated by the
plant. There is no controversy in science with re-
spect to this finding.”
 
This conclusion settled the issue and the contro-
versy was put at rest within the technology
assessment procedure. At the final conference,
even the critics admitted that transposons and
transgenes are comparable with respect to the
impact they might have on the genomic context.
They merely pointed out that this finding is valid
”as far as we know today”. This proviso was
accepted by all, because it is evident and applies
to everything we know.9
 10  The closure of theparticipatory procedure
 
When the final conference convened in June
1993, the representatives from the environmental
groups and their associated research institutions
declared that the participatory approach of the
technology assessment had failed, in their view,
and they withdrew from the procedure. The main
reasons they gave for this action were that:
• honorary involvement in the procedure took
up too many of their resources,
• the industrial companies and scientists in-
                                                  
 
9
 See section II A5 below. Even the representatives from
the Öko-Institut among whom the drafts of final conclu-
sions had been circulated, did not come back to their
original claim. They instead demanded a shift in the
burden of proof: The assumption that the consequences
(of transgenes an transposons) are different had been
classified as speculation, ”although no ‘proof’ against
this hypothesis has been found” (letter from March 16,
1994 (see van den Daele 1994: 52). In the political debate
outside the technology assessment procedure the Öko-
Institute continued, however, to repeat the original claim
that transposons have different impacts on the genomic
context than transgenes—even with reference to the same
literature (Fedoroff); thus, they were completely unim-
pressed by the arguments in the technology assessment,
see Weber (1996).
volved in the procedure had created a fait ac-
compli by applying for the release of transgenic
herbicide-resistant plants without informing the
other participants or presenting their plans for
discussion in the procedure,
• the volume of information and time pressure
made it impossible to examine the documents
prepared for the final conference and to formu-
late adequate responses to the proposals made,
• the influence of the WZB working group was
too strong and there were doubts as to the fair-
ness and impartiality of the summary of re-
sults.10
 
At this conference the conditions for the further
participation of the environmental groups were
discussed with them. It was pointed out in
particular that the final conference was designed
explicitly to hear any criticism they might have
with respect to the substance of the results
presented so far, and to allow for further
substantiation of dissenting opinions. The envi-
ronmental groups then offered to continue to
participate under the condition that roughly 20%
of the final synthesis report be allocated to them
to present a dissenting opinion, and that
DM 50,000 be made available to prepare this
opinion. These conditions could not be met
because the funds for the procedure had been
exhausted. The demands were subsequently
withdrawn, and the environmental groups con-
firmed their decision to leave the final confer-
ence. Their positions were still represented in the
conference, however, because these views were
also held by a number of participants from
universities and (albeit in fewer cases) from
governmental agencies.
 
The argument that industry had undermined the
basis of participation by going ahead with
applications for the release of transgenic herbi-
cide-resistant crops is a serious one. A parti-
cipatory technology assessment requires that
cooperation be stabilised and that participants
develop some kind of trust among themselves
and that they remain loyal to the procedure. On
the other hand, given the divergent interests no
excessively high loyalty can be demanded,
especially not with respect to the behaviour of
the participants outside the procedure. In
general, it would seem unrealistic to require that,
in the course of a (voluntary) technology assess-
ment, a moratorium on the technology it
investigates be upheld. No company could
afford to participate if the condition were that it
stop developing or using the technology during
the period of assessment (which could be years).
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 See also Gill (1993).
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The coordinating committee faced this problem a
year before the final conference took place,
when it became known that one of the
participating industrial firms was going to sub-
mit an application for field tests with genetically
modified sugar beet and a herbicide resistance
gene as the marker. The majority of participants
in our technology assessment felt that the
application would jeopardise the whole
procedure, but a formal decision in the coor-
dinating committee was blocked by a veto. The
problem ”disappeared” because the firm agreed
to postpone their application until after the final
conference. Unfortunately the problem came
back because the final conference was postponed
for half a year.11
 
The argument that the methodology applied by
the WZB working group in preparing the final
conference placed constraints on the autonomy
of the participants is correct. The participants
were required to work their way through a more
or less predefined agenda. Those who prepare a
draft conclusion have some power to define and
select. On the other hand, draft conclusions are
indispensable in a meeting of fifty or more
persons if nonconclusiveness of the deliberations
is to be avoided. So the only way out, it seemed,
was to prepare drafts and have the participants
check whether the WZB working group and the
organisers had used their power justly and
impartially.
 
The participants had the opportunity to criticise
the drafts submitted, and to revise or replace
them, both at the final conference and in writing
thereafter. Written exchange was also the form
by means of which the participants continued to
be included in the preparation of the final ver-
sion of the material to be published from the
technology assessment. All such drafts were
circulated among the participants. Commentar-
ies, unless incorporated, were also published.
This rule entitled all the participants to publish
their own opinions and evaluations together with
the results of the procedure. However, it had
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 It should be mentioned that the environmental groups,
too, showed limits in their loyalty with the technology
assessment. They presented their version of the findings
of the assessment in a press release before the discussions
in the technology assessment had been finalised. The
coordinating committee again refused a formal verdict,
remarking only
 
”that it neither wishes nor is it empowered to control
public statements on transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops by participants in the procedure” (Minutes of
February 5, 1993).
 The majority of the coordinating committee merely
criticised the fact that the statement to the press created
the impression that the procedure had been terminated.
been decided by the coordinating committee very
early in the procedure that uncommented, dis-
senting opinions, merely to be tacked on to the
final synthesis report, were not admissible. The
fact that the environmental groups came back to
this issue in the negotiations over their with-
drawal from the final conference showed that
they had not really accepted this rule as justified.
Apparently, the environmental groups had
ambivalent feelings about being involved in a
procedure in which they could not control the
findings. On the other hand, it was probably this
very rule which ensured that all the participants
committed themselves fully to the dynamics of
argumentation and resisted the temptation to
downgrade the technology assessment from the
outset to just another public forum where all the
groups again just display their differences of
opinion. With these procedural rules, ”the last
word” in the technology assessment was, to a
certain extent, reserved for the organisers.
Further criticism could then only come from
”outside”, after the final synthesis report had
been published. What this means for the concept
of participatory technology assessment requires
further analysis.
 11  Some structural problemsof participatory technology
assessment
 
It is certainly not enough to attribute the deci-
sion of the environmental groups to leave the
technology assessment in the final phase solely
to the historical, contingent circumstances of this
particular procedure, that is, to the constellation
of actors involved and to mistakes in the steering
of the procedure. Participatory technology
assessment, as such, is a politically ambivalent
structure, the stability of which always remains
precarious. To this end a few final remarks
follow.
 
Participation in the technology assessment
procedure does not mean that the opposing sides
will always have control over the entire proce-
dure, nor can they make it dependent on their
factual consensus. The participants have control
over the process but not over the results.
 
Technology assessments are essentially investi-
gatory strategies which aim to produce informa-
tion. This sets them apart from purely political
dialogues in which discussions take place pri-
marily over the goals and criteria for the desir-
able development of society. The validity of
information produced in this kind of procedure is
not conditioned by the acceptance of the partici-
pants. In terms of social theory, the medium of
social integration in this case is not social but
18 Herbicide-Resistant Crops
cognitive. The participants are not really in a
situation wherein consensus can be deliberately
granted or withheld. Consensus becomes irrefu-
table because what is viewed as knowledge in
society and what corresponds to generally
shared valuations cannot be deliberately dis-
missed.12
 
Discursive procedures trigger an argumentation
dynamic which can neither be contained nor
controlled by any individual participant. A
frame of argumentation is also used in public
communication, for example, in the media, when
opposing sides take up controversial positions.
But the truth is that the parties seldom really
argue. Recourse to proof and reason serves only
to present one’s own position more convincingly.
In our technology assessment, by contrast, since
it was organised as an on-going dialogue among
those present, argumentative debate is unavoid-
able. The individual positions must be defended
against the on-going emergence of counter-
arguments. Whether a position proves to be
viable under these circumstances can neither be
predicted nor controlled.
 
Information orientation and discursivity preclude
a complete control of results through participa-
tion. Despite this, the strategy of information
seeking remained undisputed to the end. There
seems to be no alternative, because the public
controversy to which the technology assessment
refers is a debate about empirical arguments,
above all, a debate about the potential risks and
expected advantages of the technology. The
opposing sides in the procedure continue to be
bound to the framing they have chosen for the
contested issues in the public debate. If they give
the impression that empirical information does
not really matter for them, they not only exclude
themselves from the discursive procedure, they
also lose face in public. Anyone who indicates
that he or she is not interested in arguments, but
simply in interests and power, can neither stake
claim to participation in the technology assess-
ment nor expect, through such participation, to
gain political profit for his or her own campaign.
 
In controversies about empirical questions, and,
therefore, in arguments about the consequences
a technology might have and about what we
know or do not know of such consequences,
recourse to science is compelling. One cannot
present one’s position in public as scientifically
substantiated and then cast fundamental doubt
on science as a neutral third instance in a tech-
nology assessment procedure. Participation in
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 Georg Simmel talks about ”intellect” as the medium of
social coordination; cf. details in Döbert (1994).
the procedure implies the readiness to submit
oneself on empirical issues to the judgement of
science 13.
 
Participation offers options to influence the
formation of judgement in a procedure, but it
does not call on the conflicting parties to sit in
judgement on themselves. This is ruled out in
any case, because the conditions for participa-
tion are, in principle, symmetrical, i.e. the
parties must have equal rights. Where consensus
cannot be achieved the final judgement must be
left to neutral observers of the procedure. The
fact that a group or party did not agree to the
results proves nothing more than lack of consen-
sus. It may, of course, be taken by the public at
large as an indicator against the fairness of the
procedure or the viability of the results. An
increase in rational conflict management can
only be expected of a technology assessment
procedure if it at least offers an opportunity for
the public not to rely solely on indicators of this
kind, but to examine the matter at hand by
themselves.
 
It is doubtful whether, in a participatory proce-
dure, the rule should be that no one is allowed to
occupy the role of a neutral third instance, which
to a certain extent was taken, in our case, by the
WZB working group and the organisers. The
consequence would be that we would have to do
without presenting results whenever an issue
remained controversial; the presentation of the
controversy would then be the only result. This
would be in contradiction to the declared politi-
cal aim of a technology assessment. Political
controversies about technology are the starting
point and subject of technology assessment. The
public has a right to efforts at least being made,
in procedures of this kind, to determine the state
of knowledge on controversial subjects. A
technology assessment must give an answer to
the question whether risks that are publicly
decried actually exist, or whether the technology
is likely to provide the benefits claimed. Criti-
cism of the methods through which the proce-
dure arrives at conclusions must also be sub-
mitted to the scrutiny of the general public.
 
Of course, it is conceivable that a never-ending
dispute will prevail in society, concerning what
organisations or individuals could represent the
neutral instance of science. But even then, the
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 In our technology assessment, the validity of scientific
findings was not an issue of debate. Nor was any role
played by the epistemological metatheories by means of
which sociologists sometimes play down scientific claims
to validity as ”social constructions” and instead claim a
pluralism of social forms of knowledge which are mutu-
ally incompatible but supposedly all equally valid.
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opposing sides could not demand that they
themselves be given this responsibility. In that
case, information and technology assessment
would no longer be credible at all as a means of
conflict resolution. However, it should be noted
that the radical dismantling of science as an
ideology would be politically dysfunctional, too.
If one really could argue that whoever speaks in
the name of science is in fact only presenting
political interests, then only power counts, and
votes could and would have to be taken immedi-
ately. There would be no point in commissioning
expert reports (not even by ”critical” experts). If
the results only reflect the interests of the re-
spective parties then, for the public at large, it
would be cheaper for it to inform itself directly
about these interests.
 
A participatory technology assessment commits
the parties of the political conflict over new
technology to cooperation in a procedure with an
uncertain outcome. From the angle of the ob-
serving public (including parliaments, courts,
etc.) this is an advantage. Through their partici-
pation the parties lend legitimacy to an attempt
in which they control the process but not the
result. Whether participation is politically
attractive under these conditions will depend on
how high the normative expectation is that
conflicts will be dealt with in discursive form,
i.e. in the form of argument. If these expecta-
tions are high, conflicting parties will not be able
to withstand the demand for new discursive fora,
or reject participation without ensuing political
costs.
 
Procedural fairness is the essence of participa-
tory technology assessment. If this principle is
violated then withdrawal from the procedure can
be expected and is legitimate. However, one
cannot legitimately withdraw from a fair proce-
dure simply because the emerging results con-
tradict ones own strategic interests. Neverthe-
less, in terms of ”Realpolitik”, withdrawal must
be expected in such a case, too.14 It must also be
expected that arguments refuted in a participa-
tory technology assessment will nevertheless
continue to be used outside and after the tech-
nology assessment, as long as these can still
impress the public. Such inconsistency may be
criticised; it should not be taken as a proof,
however, that, in principle, participation in
discursive procedures is not a suitable form of
political conflict resolution.
                                                  
 
14 And it can be a ”rational” move in terms of calculation
of political costs; see Döbert (1994), Holzinger (1996) for
an explanation of why the environmental groups with-
drew from the technology assessment before the final
discussion of the conclusions.
 
  PART II: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS —
IMPACTS AND CONSEQUENCES
 Throughout the technology assessment, empiri-
cal questions about the possible consequences of
transgenic herbicide-resistant crops were kept
clearly separate from normative questions about
assessing these consequences. Contrary to the
relativist rhetoric often exposed in the social
sciences that facts are irresolvably confounded
with values, the participants in our technology
assessment treated questions of fact as categori-
cally distinct from and logically prior to ques-
tions of value.15 Thus empirical questions such
as: Does a risk or a benefit exist? What can
possibly happen? How likely is it to happen?
What is the causal mechanism? Are the conse-
quences of genetic engineering comparable to
the consequences of classical breeding? were
always distinguished from normative questions
such as: Is the risk acceptable? Is the benefit
appreciable and worth the risk? Who shall bear
the burden of proof in the case of uncertainty?
Are the alternatives to genetically engineered
crops preferable?
 Empirical questions can, in principle, be an-
swered scientifically and are a proper domain of
experts. Consensus on these questions must
(given the requisite knowledge) be possible.
Normative questions involve moral and political
judgement, and are the domain of lay persons as
citizens. These questions may reflect legitimate
differences of values and preferences, and must
then be dealt with in their variety and contradic-
tion. The following sections summarise the
empirical findings of the technology assessment
first. The starting point is the examination of
possible risks from the genetic modification of
crop plants.
 A  BIOSAFETY ASPECTS OFTRANSGENIC PLANTS
 The assessment of technology is not the regula-
tion of technology and cannot, therefore, be
confined solely to issues of safety. It must
extend into broader issues of social and political
implication, namely, benefits and uses, available
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 The reference to objective knowledge in the technology
assessment by both advocates and critics of transgenic
herbicide-resistant crops is further analysed in van den
Daele (1996).
alternatives, and cultural meaning of the tech-
nology, and into visions of the future develop-
ment of the society. In many respects, such an
assessment will go beyond the existing law, or
even beyond the political mandate of the modern
state. In public debates, however, there is a
prevailing tendency to concentrate discussions
on the safety aspects of new technology. This is
probably due to the fact that diffuse anxieties
about new developments can easily crystallise
around risk scenarios, and that the latter are at
the same time a powerful operationalisation of
the criticism of new technology because they fit
into the established frameworks of restrictive
political regulation.16
 Concerns about risks to human health and the
environment also dominate the debate over
transgenic herbicide-resistant plants. A main
report of our technology assessment was, there-
fore, commissioned from the Öko-Institut,
Freiburg, which has been the most outspoken
and articulated source of criticism of genetic
engineering in Germany during the last decade.
Thus it was guaranteed that the best available
counter-arguments were placed on the agenda.
Geneticists were invited to comment on these
arguments.17 Additional reports were commis-
sioned to examine in detail the biosafety issues
associated with the possibility
• that unexpected and undesirable physiological
changes (pleiotropic effects) occur in transgenic
herbicide-resistant plants,
• that the transgene (and the trait of herbicide
resistance) is propagated to unrelated organisms
(such as soil bacteria or other plants) via hori-
zontal gene transfer,
• that the transgene ”escapes” from cultivation,
either in feral populations of the crop plants
themselves or through hybridisation with wild
relatives.
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 Cf. van den Daele (1993).
 
17
 Expert report commissioned from Dr. B. Weber (Öko-
Institut, Freiburg): ”Evolutionsbiologische Argumente in
der Risikodiskussion am Beispiel der transgenen herbi-
zidresistenten Pflanzen”; commentary by Dr. A. Heyer*,
Prof. H. Saedler** and Prof. L. Willmitzer* (*Max-
Planck-Institut für molekulare Pflanzenphysiologie,
Golm; **Max-Planck-Institut für Züchtungsforschung,
Köln), in: Materialien zur Technikfolgenabschätzung,
Heft 5
 (see appendix).
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We summarise the conclusions from the discus-
sions among the participants in the technology
assessment. At the heart of these discussions
was the question of whether there are specific
risks implied in genetically modified crops,
which would not occur were the crops modified
through techniques applied in conventional plant
breeding. For the details of the expert reports we
must refer the reader to the materials published
in the WZB discussion paper series (see appen-
dix). Some additional references to recent devel-
opments and findings are added in footnotes.
The discussions in the technology assessment
raised questions which follow closely the themes
of the public debate. We organise the summary
of conclusions for each topic around these
questions.
 1  Physiological side-effects andfood safety: Are toxic or aller-genic substances to be expec-
ted in transgenic plants?
 Lines of consensus and dispute
 
Transgenic herbicide-resistant plants are sup-
posed to express the product (enzyme) of the
transferred herbicide resistance gene in the
metabolism of the plant cells. The intended
effect is that the plant will become herbicide-
resistant. However, the gene transfer can have
unintended side-effects on the plant metabolism,
through which other properties of the plant may
be altered.18 In some cases, it will be possible to
anticipate potential side-effects using the infor-
mation on the transgene and its gene product,
and on the properties of both the donor and the
host organism. It can, for instance, be tested
whether proteins produced by the inserted trans-
gene are toxic or allergenic for humans. It can
be tested whether the transgene inadvertently
transmits the allergenic potential of the donor
organism or enhances the allergenic potential of
the host organism.19 One can, however, only test
for known allergies. There is no way to predict
whether a new protein from a donor organism
which has no history as a known allergen (and
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 Expert report from Prof. B. Böger (Lehrstuhl für
Pflanzenphysiologie und Biochemie der Pflanzen, Uni-
versität Konstanz): ”Mögliche pflanzenphysiologische
Veränderungen in herbizidresistenten und transgenen
Pflanzen und durch den Kontakt mit Komplementär-
herbiziden”; commentary by Prof. R. Weidhase, Halle, in:
Materialien zur Technikfolgenabschätzung, Heft 2 (see
appendix).
 
19
 Thus, tests revealed in a recent case that the transfor-
mation of soybeans with a transgene from paranut can
confer the known allergenic potential of the nuts to the
soybeans; Nordlee et al. (1996).
has perhaps never been part of our food) might
induce allergies in some consumers.20 In many
cases, therefore, the possible side-effects of gene
transfer on the metabolism might in fact be
completely unpredictable.
 
In the technology assessment, four mechanisms
which could lead to unintended physiological
changes in transgenic herbicide-resistant plants
were discussed:
 1. Effects of the nonselective herbicide. A
number of herbicide resistance genes transfer
mechanisms through which derivatives, conju-
gates etc. of the herbicide are formed in the
plant. These substances may be toxic. They may
also interact with other substances and influence
secondary metabolic processes in unforeseen
ways.
 2. Effects of the transgenic gene products. The
herbicide resistance gene introduces a new gene
product into the metabolism of the host plant.
Interactions between this new product and
substances which already exist in the plant can
only be predicted to a limited extent. This will,
above all, be true when the transgene encodes a
resistance mechanism which is completely new
in the metabolism of the host species. In this
case the gene product will hit upon metabolic
substrates which are different from those in the
donor organism. It could interact with such
substrates and form new and unexpected meta-
bolic products.
 3. Effects of the locus of transgene insertion on
the expression of the transgene. Gene transfer
techniques do not, as a rule, allow a site-specific
integration of transgenes in the host genome.
Transgenes may be inserted at frequently ex-
pressed sites, but also at inactive ones. The
locus of insertion can therefore influence the
expression of the gene product (positional
effect). Variations in expression, and in par-
ticular over-expression, could lead to unexpected
changes in the plant metabolism.
 4. Effects of the locus of transgene insertion on
the expression of endogenous plant genes. The
metabolism of the host plant can be affected by
the insertion of the transgene as such, independ-
ent of the gene products. If the transgene is
inserted into an active plant gene then this gene
will be interrupted (insertional mutation). As a
result, its gene product may not be produced at
all or to a different degree. In addition, the
regulation of neighbouring genes may also be
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 Cf. Frank-Oberspach and Keller (1996: 55).
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influenced.21 These variations in gene expression
can also lead to unexpected and unforseeable
changes to the plant’s metabolic pathways.
 
Side-effects of herbicides on the metabolism of
resistant plants are a standard problem in the
regulation of herbicides, they will be discussed
below.22 Side-effects of the gene transfer play a
key role in many debates over the possible risks
from transgenic plants. They are the hypotheti-
cal starting point for a number of risk scenarios.
This section deals with impacts of the gene
transfer which might affect the food safety of
transgenic plants. The following sections discuss
possible environmental consequences.
 
The participants in the technology assessment
agreed that metabolic processes in plants are, in
general, quite variable. They vary with changing
environmental conditions and as a result of
modifications caused by breeding techniques.
Pleiotropic effects through uncontrolled interac-
tions in the plant metabolism are abundant in the
practice of breeding and have in many cases led
to ”bad surprises”, e.g. unforeseen and unin-
tented morphological changes, yield losses, new
substances or new levels of expression of sub-
stances in the plants. In some cases, such effects
have been shown to be toxic or allergenic.23
 
That physiological side-effects are in fact a real
problem has been illustrated throughout the
technology assessment with examples from the
history of traditional breeding. Quite plausibly,
therefore, the main controversy among the
participants focused on the question, whether
there was a special risk of unintended physio-
logical changes in the case of transgenic plants.
Should we expect more or more dramatic side-
effects in the metabolism of transgenic plants
than in the metabolism of plants modified by
conventional breeding techniques?24 Discussions
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 Effects of the locus of transgene insertion have been
discussed in the technology assessment as ”disturbance of
the genomic context”; see also below section II A5.
 
22
 Cf. section II B2.
 
23
 For instance, hybrids between established potato
varieties and related wild types have shown excessive
(toxic) concentrations of glycalcaloids (van Gelder 1991:
121); the allergenic potential of apples became clinically
visible only after the breeding of new varieties in the
1960s (Aulepp and Vieths, 1992). Frank-Oberspach and
Keller (1996: 43/51) refer to these examples.
 
24
 ”Conventional” here refers to all methods of breeding
currently used and accepted that do not involve genetic
engineering. These methods include far more than merely
the crossing of individual plants of the same species,
through which nearly identical genes (alleles) of closely
related plants are mixed. In a number of cases crossing
between different species has been possible; mutagenesis
dealt with the comparability of side-effects in
general (question 1 below) and with three
mechanisms why side-effects might be more
likely in transgenic plants: nontarget or pleio-
tropic effects of the transgenic gene product
(change of substrates), instability of transgene
expression, and effects of the insertion of trans-
genes at the DNA level (positional effects and
insertional mutagenesis) (questions 2-4).
 Question 1: Can unintended physiological
side-effects in transgenic herbicide-resistant
plants lead to the formation of toxic or aller-
genic substances? Are such side-effects more
likely to occur in transgenic than in nontrans-
genic plants?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
1. In the case of transgenic herbicide-resistant
plants, new substances are introduced into the
plant metabolism: the gene product of the trans-
ferred herbicide resistance genes and also (de-
pending on the resistance mechanism) the trans-
formation products, conjugates etc. of the non-
selective herbicide. The new substances can
enter complex interactions with the host cell
metabolism which may give rise to unexpected
and unforeseeable phenotypic consequences.
This includes the possibility that plant sub-
stances may be formed which are toxicologically
significant (or which are carcinogenic, muta-
genic or allergenic).
 
2. Shifts in plant metabolism and new plant
substances also occur as a result of conventional
breeding or fluctuations in the plants’ natural
environment, such as climate variations or
attacks by pests. In the latter case it has been
shown that new, humano-toxic plant substances
are induced.
 
3. It is plausible to assume that different tech-
niques to modify plants might have different
side-effects. Genetic engineering has the poten-
tial to transfer genes (and gene products) from
distant, nonrelated species, which could not be
introduced by conventional breeding techniques.
Side-effects on the plant metabolism resulting
from such transfers represent a specific risk
from genetic engineering in the sense that with-
out genetic engineering, the transfer would not
be possible and therefore the side-effects could
not arise. In this sense, however, the various
techniques of conventional breeding (such as
mutagenesis or intergenera crossing) would also
represent specific risks, since the side-effects
they could have on the plant metabolism would
                                                                          
can be used to alter existing genes so that new gene
products are formed.
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not occur if the techniques were not applied.
 
4. There is up to now no evidence that the
technique of gene transfer can cause metabolic
side-effects in transgenic plants, which are of a
different type or quality than those occurring in
nontransgenic plants. Any scenario that has been
devised to anticipate possible damage from
unexpected physiological changes in genetically
engineered plants applies equally to plants which
have been created by conventional breeding.
With either technique, risks must be expected
whenever a problematic trait (or gene product) is
transferred. Whether the trait is transferred
through gene transfer or through breeding does
not seem to make a difference.
 
5. The claim that transgenic plants involve
specific physiological risks was defended in the
technology assessment as a hypothesis. A num-
ber of reasons were offered to account for the
possibility that gene products encoded in trans-
genes might have more (or more undesirable)
side-effects on the plant metabolism than are to
be expected either from fluctuations of the
natural environment or from modifications
through conventional breeding:
• because of evolutionary adaptation (co-
evolution) plant substances that occur naturally
in food plants are likely to be nonharmful to
human beings;
• the toxic/mutagenic potential of natural sub-
stances is neutralised by synergistic effects in
the plant metabolism;
• in conventional breeding, unexpected side-
effects are limited by regulatory cycles within
the plant;
• since transgenes introduce gene products
which were never in the plant metabolism be-
fore, they will lead to more and qualitatively
different side-effects;
• the insertion of transgenes disturbs the geno-
mic context of the host plant and will, therefore,
induce more and different kinds of side-effects.
 
The last two points are dealt with in questions 2
and 4 below. Consideration of the first three
points yields the following:
 
6. Co-evolution. The reference to co-evolution
of human beings and their food plants is unclear.
Humans have adapted to their food plants by
selecting those plants which they found edible.
Co-evolution may help to explain why the
human genome encodes basic metabolic mecha-
nisms for detoxification and immune reaction
which ensure that plants are edible. However,
many plants still remain toxic for humans, and
in these cases, by definition, there has been no
adaptation through co-evolution. On the basis of
evolution theory, there is no reason to assume
that substances which are naturally formed in
plants are in general less problematic in terms of
toxicity than substances which might be newly
induced in transgenic plants.
 
7. Synergism. There are some indications (al-
though disputed in science) that a mutagenic
potential found for isolated plant substances can
be neutralised by synergistic effects within the
plant as a whole. These substances would then
be harmless, as long as they remained integrated
in the metabolism of the plant. If this were really
the case it would also be true for transgenic
plants. It is inconceivable that synergism should
only operate to neutralise problematic sub-
stances formed as a result of natural fluctuations
or metabolic interactions in conventional crop
plants, and not substances occurring as side-
effects in transgenic crop plants.
 
8. The Öko-Institut argued that the neutralisa-
tion of problematical substances through syner-
gism may depend on a ”balance” within the
plant, and that the gene transfer technique may
be particularly prone to jeopardising this bal-
ance. Whether or not evolution theory is com-
patible with assuming such a ”balance” of sub-
stances in natural plants (which after all would
be defined in terms of advantages for human
consumers of the plant and not of advantages for
the reproduction of plant itself) need not concern
us here. It certainly cannot be assumed to exist
for the combination of substances possible in the
domesticated plants we use for cultivation. It is
incomprehensible that there could be a natural
balance in plants guaranteeing that, for example,
combinations of plant substances with new gene
products induced by mutagenesis, transposons
or additive lines are not toxic to humans.
 
9. Regulatory cycles. It is plausible to assume
that plants rely on regulatory cycles to limit
fluctuations in their metabolic processes and
exclude the formation of new substances that do
not fit the species. Transgenes may escape these
cycles. The same, however, may also be true for
products of conventional breeding. In the case of
cross-breeding between closely related plants
which are almost identical, the metabolism will
remain under the effective control of the regula-
tory cycles of the species—although even then a
wide range of surprises are possible. However,
in the case of mutagenesis, for example, com-
pletely new substances may be produced which
do not fit the plant’s own regulatory cycles.
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 Question 2: Is there a special risk of unex-
pected side-effects in transgenic plants due to
the fact that gene products can be introduced
which have never been in the metabolism of
the host plant and which might find other
metabolic substrates than in the donor organ-
ism?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
10. In theory, unforeseen metabolic side-effects
are more likely to occur in transgenic than in
nontransgenic plants, if new metabolic pathways
are transferred which are not naturally estab-
lished in the host plant species. In this respect, it
is unimportant whether the transgenes originate
from bacteria or plants. In either case, the gene
product can end up in a metabolic context which
is very different from the one in which it had
operated in the donor organism, and it can
interact with new substrates.25
 
11. This additional risk factor is absent when
transgenes confer metabolic pathways which
have already been established in the host plant.
However, the potential of genetic engineering
lies exactly in the transfer of genes from distant,
nonrelated organisms. Transgenic products will,
therefore, quite often involve metabolic path-
ways which are new to the host plant and could
not have been introduced by traditional breeding.
 
12. Chemical tests can, to a certain degree,
control whether or not the transgenic gene
product is likely to switch to new substrates.
Substrate specificity in vitro does not, however,
prove that unexpected substrates will in fact not
be found in vivo, i.e. in the plant. Not all plant
substances are known, nor would it be possible
to test for all of them in advance.
 
13. A comparative assessment of the probability
of physiological side-effects in transgenic and
nontransgenic plants would actually have to take
into account two countervailing factors: On the
one hand, side-effects are theoretically more
probable in the case of transgenic plants, be-
cause (and insofar as) new metabolic pathways
are introduced which have not yet been estab-
lished in the host plant. On the other hand, side-
effects are theoretically more probable in non-
transgenic plants because (and insofar as)
conventional breeding techniques reshuffle many
different genes (alleles) and modified gene
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 Regal (1994: 11) assumes that pleiotropic expression
may be enhanced when a ‘foreign’ gene product from
unrelated species is transferred, because studies showed
”that certain types of molecular cross reactions between
an enzyme and tRNAs are stronger when the molecules
come from more distantly related species”.
products in a quite uncontrolled manner, any of
which has some chance to interact in unexpected
ways with existing metabolic processes. In
contrast, gene transfer only introduces a single,
clearly defined gene product. It is nonetheless
impossible to say how these two factors weigh
against each other in the final analysis. We are
dealing with side-effects which are conceivable,
but undetermined and unforeseeable. For such,
no quantitative estimate of the probabilities
involved is possible.
 
14. In sum, the hypothesis that more physiologi-
cal side-effects will occur with transgenic than
with nontransgenic crop plants is neither more
nor less plausible than the converse hypothesis,
that there will be fewer side-effects in transgenic
than in nontransgenic crop plants. Neither of
these statements can be proved or disproved.
Theoretically, one can derive that fewer side-
effects can be expected in transgenic crops than
in nontransgenic crops in cases where metabolic
pathways are transferred which have already
been established in the host plant species.
 Question 3: Do instabilities in the expression
of transgenes entail specific risks of physio-
logical side-effects for transgenic crop plants?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
15. Variations in the expression of genes are a
normal phenomenon of plant metabolism. They
are not a problem specific to transgenes, but
occur equally in nontransgenic plants and in
response to fluctuations in the natural environ-
ment of the plant, such as climate changes or
attacks by pests.
 
16. Variations in the expression of transgenes
are certainly not in a meaningful way controlled
by the normal regulatory mechanisms of the
plant. However, this is not a problem of
transgenes alone. Full regulation of gene
expression by the plant itself can only be pre-
supposed for wild plants, at the most. Such
plants may be programmed to switch genes on
and off in response to natural environmental
factors in a way that is physiologically and
ecologically useful (i.e. reproductively advan-
tageous) to the plant. Whether the same holds
for crop plants with genes which have been
selected by breeding to optimise agricultural
utility, is already doubtful. The regulation is
certainly lacking for genes which have been
modified by mutagenesis. Such genes will still
be subject to plant regulation, as long as the
mutation is confined to nonregulating sequences.
However, the altered code area of a mutated
plant gene is of just as little physiological and
ecological ”meaning” to the plant (adaptive
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value in evolutionary terms) as a gene from a
bacterium introduced by gene transfer.
 
17. Conversely, the fact that regulatory plant
mechanisms operate does not indicate that the
risk is smaller. Variations of gene expression
which are ”meaningful” for the plant in evolu-
tionary terms, may nevertheless induce meta-
bolic changes which are not safe in terms of the
human uses of the plant. The normal responses
of plants to external stress often involve the
production of humano-toxic substances.
 
18. Even if it were shown that transgenic herbi-
cide resistance genes are more frequently
switched off under stress conditions than the
plant’s own genes, this would still not mean that
there was an additional physiological risk.
Resistance genes which are switched off will not
be able to affect the plant metabolism. What will
happen is that the plant dies when the nonselec-
tive herbicide is applied.
 
19. Herbicide resistance transgenes (for in-
stance, PAT genes in the case of resistance to
glufosinate) that are switched off may have an
increased mutation rate. This does not imply that
they are more likely to induce unexpected meta-
bolic side-effects. Theoretically, mutations of
nonexpressed (methylated) genes will be more
frequent, exactly because they have no impact
on the plant metabolism and therefore are not
subjected to selection pressure. The mutation of
cysteine to thymine, which is possible for meth-
ylated PAT genes, can at the same time switch
the gene on again. So, metabolic effects become
possible; they can, however, be assessed if the
sequence of the mutated gene is known.
 Question 4: Does the insertion of transgenes
represent a disturbance of the genomic context
which could lead to unexpected and unforsee-
able changes in the plant metabolism? Are
disturbances of the genomic context a risk
which is specific to transgenic plants?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
20. Since the available gene transfer methods do
not, as a rule, allow the gene locus to be tar-
geted, at which the transgene is inserted, unfore-
seen insertional effects at the DNA level are to
be expected. The locus of integration can influ-
ence the expression of the transgene itself
(positional effect), and the intermittence of the
transgene can alter the expression of plant genes
at or near the locus of integration (insertional
mutagenesis, termed ”context disturbances” by
the Öko-Institut). In both cases, the result could
be that respective gene products are either not
formed at all, or not at required or normal levels
and the plant metabolism is changed.
 
21. However, positional effects and context
disturbances (insertional mutations) do not arise
solely as a result of gene transfer. They also
occur in conventional breeding, for example, in
the case of chromosome breaks and transloca-
tions during meiosis. They can lead to unex-
pected changes in the metabolism and the phe-
notype of the plant. Occasionally positional
effects and context disturbances (e.g. from
transposons) have been used by breeders as a
source of genetic variation for the development
of new plant varieties.
 
This conclusion was contested in the technology
assessment. The Öko-Institut argued that due to
the ”special quality” of genetic engineering,
unexpected effects at the DNA level (distur-
bances of the genomic context) should be differ-
ent in transgenic and nontransgenic plants. Since
this argument played a key role in the debate on
both food safety and environmental safety, it
will be considered in detail in section II A5
below.
 2  Horizontal gene transfer:probability and possible
consequences
 
Horizontal gene transfer means the transfer of
genetic material between organisms from differ-
ent species which otherwise cannot be crossed.
Such a transfer is possible in nature. As a rule,
however, it should be a rare event, because of
the boundaries which have been established
during evolution prohibiting the exchange of
genetic material between noncrossing species.
 
Horizontal gene transfer seems to occur fre-
quently between prokaryotes (mainly through
conjugation), but only in a few cases has it been
shown to operate across kingdoms of organisms,
for example, from bacteria to plant or animal
cells. Our technology assessment had to examine
whether herbicide resistance genes from trans-
genic crop plants could be spread to soil bacteria
or to other plants through horizontal gene trans-
fer, and whether this represented a specific risk
from transgenic plants.26 Discussions concen-
trated on two questions: How probable is the
horizontal transfer of the herbicide resistance
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 Expert report commissioned from Dr. I. Broer and
Prof. A. Pühler (Institut für Genetik, Universität Biele-
feld): ”Stabilität von HR-Genen in transgenen Pflanzen
und ihr spontaner horizontaler Gentransfer auf andere
Organismen”; commentary by Dr. B. Tappeser (Öko-
Institut), in: Materialien zur Technikfolgenabschätzung,
Heft 3
 (see appendix). See also Schlüter et al. (1995),
Sandermann et al. (1997).
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genes? What effects could such a transfer have
in a worst case scenario?
 
Discussions of the first question were mainly
about whether and under what conditions geneti-
cally modified plant genes are more likely to be
propagated through horizontal transfer than
unmodified (endogenous) plant genes. Natural
transfer rates served as a frame of reference.
These included not only the transfer rates for
endogenous plant genes, but also those for
bacterial genes. The latter are considered as the
appropriate reference in cases where herbicide
resistance genes originate from soil bacteria. In
those cases the direct transfer of such genes
from the donor organisms to other soil bacteria
should be more likely than the indirect transfer
via transgenic plant cells.
 
Discussions of the second question focused on
the effects horizontal gene transfer might have
on the biodiversity of microfloral populations in
the soil, and on the chemistry and hence func-
tions of the soil. Participants agreed that such
effects are possible. They disagreed, however,
about whether horizontal gene transfer should in
fact be counted as a significant cause of such
effects, since comparable effects can or will be
produced at the same or greater levels (or with a
higher probability) by common agricultural
practice, such as the use of herbicides, plough-
ing, or crop rotation.
 
The counter-argument to this comparison was
that the ”special quality” of the techniques of
genetic modification might also involve a special
quality of consequences of these techniques. For
that reason it was assumed that horizontal
transfer of transgenes could lead to changes in
bacterial metabolism (and thus also to changes
in the chemical and dynamic processes in the
soil) which were different to those caused by
other practices which also modify soil processes.
 Question 1: Is it to be expected that herbicide
resistance genes will spread from transgenic
crop plants to bacteria and to other plants
through horizontal gene transfer? Does such
transfer represent a specific risk from trans-
genic plants?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 (a) The probability of gene transfer to soil
microorganisms
 
1. Horizontal gene transfer is not a specific
feature of genetically modified plants. Trans-
genes coding for herbicide resistance can only be
transferred from transgenic crop plants by the
same mechanisms which operate for horizontal
gene transfer in nature anyway. These mecha-
nisms can just as well propagate endogenous
genes from plants which have not been geneti-
cally modified; or they can propagate genes
directly between soil bacteria without transgenic
plants as an intermediary.
 
2. Horizontal gene transfer will, in general, be a
rare event in nature. Otherwise, the clear differ-
entiation of species, as we observe it, would not
exist. Low transfer rates must also be assumed
to account for the limited distribution of resis-
tance to antibiotics in the soil. A number of soil
bacteria have resistance genes producing antibi-
otics to attack other microorganisms. The resis-
tance genes have not, however, spread to the
attacked microorganisms in the course of evolu-
tion. Transfer of these genes between soil bacte-
ria has only been observed under laboratory
conditions. (Transfer rates of the resistance
genes are also high under the special selective
conditions of clinical applications of antibiotics.)
 
3. The natural rate of gene transfer is unknown.
It will, however, by no means be high enough to
warrant the assumption that every gene has
probably already been tested and selected for in
every possible environment. Whether natural
gene transfer is frequent enough to say that any
further increase of the transfer rate which might
result from transgenes would be negligible,
cannot be decided.
 
4. The probability that transgenes for herbicide
resistance might be propagated through hori-
zontal gene transfer depends on the information
of the transgene and the character of the gene
construct. It must be assessed case by case for
each herbicide-resistant plant.
 
5. When transgenes contain major sequences
which are homologous to bacterial sequences
and are coupled with promoters which also
operate in bacteria, then a higher rate of hori-
zontal gene transfer to soil bacteria must be
expected than for natural (endogenous) plant
genes. This applies, for example, to resistance to
glufosinate (phosphinothricine) and to resistance
to glyphosate induced by an athrobacter gene.
Herbicide resistance genes isolated from bacteria
or bacterial sequences (e.g. T-DNA) transferred
together with resistance genes isolated from
plants facilitate integration in the host genome.
Promoters which operate in bacteria lead to the
expression of the herbicide resistance genes and
allow the selection of the transformed bacteria
under the pressure of herbicide application.
 
6. On the other hand, even when herbicide
resistance genes are isolated from bacteria, the
transfer rate for them is not likely to be higher
than for endogenous plant genes if they are
coupled to a promoter which is only effective in
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plants. Such constructs are feasible. Nor are
increased transfer rates to be expected when
herbicide resistance genes isolated from plants
do not include bacterial sequences (this applies
to glyphosate resistance induced by genes from
maize or petunia).
 
7. When herbicide resistance genes have been
isolated from soil bacteria then direct transfer
between soil bacteria is much more probable
than indirect transfer through the biomass from
plants which have been genetically modified
with such genes. This is, however, only the case
if the herbicide resistance genes are from en-
dogenous bacteria and, in fact, already abound
in the soil where the transgenic plants are culti-
vated. For example, the bacteria which provided
the gene for resistance to glufosinate (PAT gene)
has not yet been demonstrated to exist in the soil
of our region.
 
8. No increase in the rate of horizontal gene
transfer is to be expected with transgenes con-
ferring resistance against herbicides which
specifically attack metabolic pathways in plants
(this applies, for example, to bromoxynil). Such
genes, even if they are occasionally picked up by
bacteria, could not offer any selective advantage.
 
9. Since there are numerous strains of soil
bacteria which carry natural resistance to non-
selective herbicides, the use of these herbicides
may by itself increase the probability that the
resistance is propagated to other soil bacteria.
However, the mechanisms involved in the natu-
ral resistance are still largely unknown. Thus, it
is unclear how frequently the resistance is based
on genes which can be passed on by transfer, or
how frequently it is due to mutations. It is
therefore not possible to estimate whether or not
the rate of direct horizontal gene transfer from
naturally resistant soil bacteria will be higher
than the rate of transfer from transgenic plants.
 (b) The probability of gene transfer to other
plants
 
10. The horizontal transfer of herbicide resis-
tance genes from transgenic plants to other
plants is not impossible, but extremely unlikely.
Theoretically, transgenes which are more likely
to be transferred to soil organisms than natural
plant genes are also more likely to be transferred
back to other plants. However, the complete
chain of the implied transfer events, each of
which is relatively improbable, has an extremely
low overall probability.
 Question 2: What are the possible harmful
effects of a horizontal gene transfer of herbi-
cide resistance genes from transgenic plants?
 
Conclusions from the discussion
 (a) Possible harmful effects of a transfer to soil
bacteria
 
11. Horizontal gene transfer to soil bacteria will
lead to the selection of a new herbicide-resistant
bacterial population, when the herbicide is
applied. If the emergence of this new population
is not, in itself, regarded as a harmful effect,
then only further consequences of it could con-
stitute a harm. So far, however, all the conse-
quences which have been identified or proposed
already arise with conventional agricultural
practice, quite independent of the introduction of
transgenic crop plants. These consequences are
neither specific to genetically modified plants,
nor have they necessarily been regarded in the
past as representing any damage.
 
12. One consequence of the selection of trans-
formed, herbicide-resistant bacteria may be
fluctuations or shifts in the composition and
population dynamics of soil microorganisms.
Such fluctuations or shifts are quite common
anyway. Herbicide-resistant populations will
grow whenever herbicides are applied—either
due to the bactericidal side-effects of the herbi-
cides, or due to the unavoidable selection of
spontaneously resistant bacteria. In general,
major changes in bacterial populations occur as
a result of conventional farming practices such
as ploughing, fertilising, or crop rotation.
 
13. The selection and growth of transformed,
herbicide-resistant bacteria can lead to changes
in soil chemical processes due to the release of
metabolic substances not previously found in the
soil. The same situation can also arise if new
chemicals are introduced for crop protection, or
if a crop species is cultivated which had not
previously been grown in the area, or if a com-
mon plant variety is replaced by a new one.
 
14. It is conceivable that ”new” metabolic
products which are introduced to the soil by
transformed herbicide-resistant bacteria could
disturb soil functions (e.g. soil respiration). This
would no doubt constitute a harmful effect.
However, such an effect is also conceivable with
any other technique which influences chemical
processes in the soil by introducing new sub-
stances or changing the quantitative relations of
existing substances. It is much more probable
that soil functions would be disturbed by the
impact of herbicides directly, than by the impact
of metabolic changes in bacteria expressing
herbicide resistance genes which they picked up
28 Herbicide-Resistant Crops
from transgenic plants through horizontal trans-
fer.
 
15. It is not possible to either confirm or refute
the idea that the ”new quality” implied in bacte-
ria which have been transformed through hori-
zontal gene transfer from transgenic herbicide-
resistant plants will also involve some new form
of harm. The transformed bacteria may bring
metabolic products into the soil which are
”new” in a different way than the new qualities
which have up to now been brought in by known
agricultural techniques. In theory, it is conceiv-
able that they therefore have different effects
than the known techniques. Although it may not
be possible to describe these effects, nor to
indicate a mechanism which explains how they
could lead to appreciable damage, it is also not
possible to exclude with certainty that they
occur and could lead to damage in an unpredict-
able way.27
 (b) Possible harmful effects of a transfer to other
plants
 
16. In agricultural habitats horizontal transfer of
herbicide resistance genes to weed plants could
lead to the formation of new herbicide-resistant
weeds when selective pressure through the
respective herbicide is exerted. Consequently,
the effectiveness of the nonselective herbicide
would be diminished. However, resistant weeds
are a common risk anyway; they are likely to
emerge when the same herbicide is continuously
applied, due to the selection of spontaneously
resistant mutants. Horizontal gene transfer
between plants, on the other hand, is extremely
unlikely; it will, therefore, not be significant as a
possible source of resistant weeds.
 
17. In natural habitats horizontal transfer of
herbicide resistance genes to a wild plant ge-
nome would (under optimal conditions) give rise
to nothing more than a single transformed herbi-
cide-resistant plant within the wild population. It
cannot be assumed that this plant could possibly
outcompete its untransformed rivals in a natural
habitat (i.e. without the selective pressure from
herbicide applications) and become the origin of
a new population.
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 Whether assumptions of hypothetical risk warrant
regulation, if they can neither be substantiated or theo-
retically refuted, was a major point in the normative
discussions of the technology assessment, see section III
C7 below.
 3  Can feral populations oftransgenic herbicide-resistant
crops become obnoxious
weeds or invade natural
ecosystems?
 
Feral populations are formed when crop plants
or their genes ”escape” from cultivation and
establish themselves outside their agricultural
target sites. They may either become a weed in
cultivated areas or invade natural ecosystems.28
 
There was agreement among the participants of
the technology assessment that it is, in principle,
to be expected that crop plants can escape from
cultivation and form feral populations. The
mechanisms through which this may happen—
mainly hybridisation with related weeds or wild
species—do, however, apply to transgenic and
nontransgenic crops alike (in exactly the same
way). Discussions in the technology assessment
therefore concentrated primarily on whether it is
reasonable to assume that transgenic crop plants
will more easily lead to feral populations than
plants produced by conventional breeding
methods. In this connection it was also examined
whether the cultivation of transgenic plants can
legitimately be compared with the introduction
of nonindigenous species. Such species are often
ascribed a higher risk to escape because they are
released from the natural ecological controls of
the areas in which they have originally evolved.
Critics of genetic engineering use the ”exotic
species model” to justify their assumption that
transgenic plants pose a higher risk as well.
 
Another line of discussion considered the possi-
ble consequences of feral populations from
transgenic herbicide-resistant crops. It was
agreed that they could invade agricultural sites
as (herbicide-resistant) weeds. This would
aggravate the technical problems of weed man-
agement and possibly result in financial loss to
the farmers. Doubts were raised, however, about
whether herbicide-resistant plants would actu-
ally be able to invade natural communities and
impair natural ecosystems. For the annual and
biennial crop plants discussed in this technology
assessment (in particular, sugar beet, potato,
maize, and oilseed rape) such damage scenarios
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 Expert report commissioned from Prof. H. Sukopp and
U. Sukopp (Institut für Ökologie, Technische Universität
Berlin): ”Ökologische Langzeiteffekte der Verwilderung
von Kulturpflanzen”; commentary by Prof. H. Scholz
(Botanischer Garten, Berlin), in: Materialien zur Tech-
nikfolgenabschätzung,
 
Heft 4
 (see appendix). Cf. also
Sukopp and Sukopp (1993); Symposium (special issue of
Molecular Ecology) (1994), Ammann et al. (1996), Keller
et al.
 (1996).
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were not regarded as realistic by most partici-
pants. The situation might be different, if com-
petitive crops with a wide ecological range were
considered (particularly woody perennials), or if
properties were transferred which increase
fitness (such as virus resistance) and give the
plant a competitive advantage.
 
Other participants, however, insisted that feral
populations from transgenic crop plants must in
principle be expected to have a more serious
ecological impact than feral populations from
conventionally bred plants. They justify this
assumption by pointing out that the genetic
modification will have side-effects which might
also influence the ecological behaviour of the
engineered plant. Therefore, at least the uncer-
tainty about its consequences must be greater
than with conventional plants.
 Question 1: Are transgenic crops more likely
to escape from cultivation and form feral
populations than conventionally bred crops?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
1. Generally speaking, it is to be expected that
cultivated plants (i.e. plants which have acquired
genetically fixed domestication traits as a result
of breeding) can form feral populations; the
plants may themselves escape from cultivation
or propagate their genes through hybridisation to
closely-related wild species.29
 
2. The probability that a feral population will be
formed is low if the cultivated plant is highly
domesticated and has no wild or weed relatives
in the area where it is grown. These conditions
are not, however, met in the case of every crop
plant in Central Europe. There are a number of
highly domesticated crop plants for which
crossing partners exist in the wild flora of
Central Europe. In addition, breeders also use
less highly domesticated and even wild plants.
Facultative cultigens (i.e. wild plants which are
used as crops in agriculture just as they are) can
usually spread spontaneously without restric-
tions. Therefore, the risk that a new crop could
escape from cultivation and form a feral popu-
lation varies considerably and must be assessed
on a case-to-case basis.
 
3. The ecological behaviour of a plant has to be
judged on the basis of its phenotype. When it
comes to the question whether a crop which is
herbicide-resistant is more likely to form feral
populations than a nonresistant crop, it is irrele-
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 The plant may also escape (without gene flow) by
surviving over winter and appearing as a volunteer in the
next crop.
vant whether herbicide resistance has been
acquired through conventional breeding, genetic
engineering, or natural processes (mutations).
 
4. A genetically engineered crop only differs
from the initial nontransgenic variety by a few
genes. If the initial plant is native to the area
where it is grown, then the same also applies for
the transgenic variant. The fact that genes from
organisms other than plants (e.g. from bacteria)
may have been transferred, does not turn the
transgenic plant into an organism which is
nonnative in ecological terms. It is a mistake to
consider transgenic crops as ”exotic species”.
Plants do not evade the ecological controls
which have evolved with them just because they
are genetically engineered.
 
5. Data collected on the introduction and estab-
lishment of nonnative species can be used to
infer quantitative statements about how likely it
is in general that cultivated plants form feral
populations and that these will have undesirable
ecological effects. Such use of the so-called
”exotic species model” will, however, yield
statements which apply equally for transgenic
and nontransgenic crops. If a reference case is
needed to assess the risks of a specific trans-
genic crop plant, then the only correct compari-
son is with the nontransgenic variety from which
that plant has been derived. Moreover, even if
the comparison of transgenics with exotic spe-
cies is conceded, it does not necessarily support
the conclusion that transgenics pose higher risks
than nontransgenics. Nonnative crops may not
be riskier than native ones since they frequently
lack suitable partners for cross-fertilisation in
their new environment.
 
6. Any form of developing a new crop variety,
be it conventional breeding or genetic engineer-
ing, can lead to unexpected and unwanted
changes in the phenotype of the plant, which run
counter the breeder’s plan. Such changes could
possibly also increase the ecological range of the
crop in question, and thus increase the probabil-
ity that the plant (or its genes) become estab-
lished in feral populations. Such changes are
not, however, a specific risk of transgenic
plants.
 
7. The claim made in the report of the Öko-
Institut, that transgenic crops are in general
more likely to escape from cultivation and form
feral populations than nontransgenic crops, is
based on hypotheses for which there are as yet
no supporting evidence. Thus it is assumed that
plants which have been genetically engineered
are susceptible to more and wider-ranging
unexpected phenotypic changes than plants
which have been conventionally bred; or that
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transgenic crops are more likely to undergo
evolution towards increased fitness. To justify
these assumptions reference is made to the
”special quality” of genetic engineering (in par-
ticular to disturbances of the genomic context
and positional effects). This justification is
invalid, however, if the postulated ”special
quality” of genetic engineering cannot in fact be
substantiated.30
 
8. For the case-to-case examination of the risks
which may be associated with the herbicide-
resistant transgenic crops discussed in this
technology assessment, the following conclu-
sions can be drawn:
• For the cases of herbicide-resistant maize and
potatoes, the risk that the plants (or their genes)
escape from cultivation in Central Europe can
be practically excluded. Both crops are highly
domesticated, and there are no related species
with which they could cross-fertilise among the
Central European flora.
• In the case of herbicide-resistant sugar beet,
the risks depend on where the beets are grown.
In coastal areas hybridisation with wild beet is
possible and has to be expected. Away from the
coast, the development of feral populations is
improbable.
• In the case of herbicide-resistant oilseed rape,
there is a clear risk that the herbicide resistance
is propagated. Spontaneous crossing occurs
between a number of related cultivated species
(Brassica napus, Brassica rapa, and Brassica
juncea). Geneflow to closely related wild species
is likely (in particular to Brassica nigra and
Sinapis arvensis).
 
To date, research in ecological risk assessment
seems to support the view that transgenic crops
do not pose specific risks; they are not more
likely to develop into feral populations solely
because they have been genetically engineered.
However, the results of this research may still be
considered inconclusive, since the experiments
have only been in progress for a few years.31
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 Mikkelsen et al. (1996) found hybrids of transgenic
oilseed rape and weedy Brassica campestris; see also
Jorgensen et al. (1996). The question is, how often do
hybrids with wild relatives occur with nontransgenic rape
varieties? Dale emphasises the need to investigate this to
establish baseline data against which the possible impact
of particular transgenes can be assessed (1994: 35).
 Question 2: Must we expect changes of natu-
ral ecosystems in case that transgenic herbi-
cide-resistant plants (or their genes) escape
from cultivation?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
9. The most common effect to be observed when
crop plants (or their genes) escape from cultiva-
tion and become established in feral populations
is the development of crop-weed complexes.
Feral crop plants can invade agricultural habi-
tats (fields, pasture) as weeds or spread to
ecosystems which are highly disturbed by human
activity (such as roadsides, wasteland, or indus-
trial sites). As weeds they can lead to problems
in land management and inflict financial losses
on farmers (e.g. in terms of lower yields).
 
10. As far as the annual and biennial crop plants
considered in this technology assessment are
concerned, no effects on natural ecosystems
resulting from invasions by feral populations (of
nontransgenics) have been observed up to now.
An exception to this is constituted by some
hybrid forms of beets in coastal areas. In the
case of transgenic herbicide-resistant crop
plants, the transgene would not have any selec-
tive advantage outside areas where the respec-
tive herbicide is applied. So even if the transgene
is dispersed to related wild species it would not
enhance the ability of these species to invade
natural ecosystems.32
 
11. On the other hand, it can also not be
assumed that herbicide resistance genes which
have been transmitted to a wild population
through hybridisation will definitely disappear
again from the gene pool of this population. The
transgenes do not increase fitness, but neither do
they necessarily involve fitness costs. Therefore
some genes for herbicide resistance may become
established in wild populations. This would,
however, also be the case if herbicide resistance
that has been acquired naturally (through
mutation) or through conventional breeding was
crossed out to related wild plants. There is no
way to predict what the possible consequences
of such genes in a long-term evolutionary
perspective could be; any statement in this
respect would be purely speculative.
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 There may be some open questions as to whether the
transfer of herbicide resistance could at the same time
increase the resistance of the host plant to draught
(Sandermann 1997: 215) or to cold (IHE 1994: 46).
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 4  Evolutionary aspects: Cantransgenic plants change the
course of natural evolution?
Will they obstruct existing
differentiation of species?
 
The Öko-Institut claims ”evolutionary risks”
assuming that a massive release of transgenic
herbicide-resistant crop plants could have nega-
tive effects on the biodiversity of natural species
and communities in the very long term, i.e. over
centuries or even millennia. The key mechanism
for such effects is held to be the spread of trans-
genes to wild species, this amounts to a
 ”change of the parameters for future spe-
cies formation.”33
 
On the other hand evolutionary risks are linked
in various ways with a process of ”de-differ-
entiation” which, according to the Öko-Institut,
is involved in gene transfer between distant
species: The transfer of bacterial genes to plants,
for example, is seen as involving both a de-
differentiation of the genome organisation of the
transgenic plant and a de-differentiation of the
existing species. The term ”de-differentiation” is
meant to indicate a retrograde step or a loss in
the structure or diversity which has been
achieved through natural evolution up to now.34
 
The concept of ”evolutionary risk” is not
common. Whether or not it can be defined
clearly remained a moot point in the technology
assessment. It was agreed that the effects
transgenic crop plants might have on natural
evolution in the distant future cannot be
described or predicted in any way. Therefore,
statements about such effects were regarded by
some of the participants as completely futile. In
addition, it remained unclear as to what extent
possible influences on future processes of
species formation should actually be counted as
damage.35
 
Discussions in the technology assessment con-
centrated on whether it is at all possible to find a
difference between transgenic and nontransgenic
plants with respect to the effects such plants
could conceivably have on natural evolution.
Another point of discussion was whether gene
transfer between distant gene pools could trigger
the evolution of new species which would break
through the reproductive barriers established by
natural evolution. This discussion did not refer
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 Weber (1994: 29/51/103). Materialien zur Technikfol-
genabschätzung, Heft 5 (see appendix).
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 Weber (1994: 33/36).
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 Cf. section III A2 below.
to claims made in the report by the Öko-Institut,
but rather to speculation in the public discourse
that genetic engineering could destroy natural
distinctions between species.
 Question 1: Should we expect that the release
of transgenic herbicide-resistant crop plants
will influence the evolution of species and
natural communities in the distant future? Is
it possible to distinguish effects transgenic
plants might have from effects nontransgenic
plants might have?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
1. The effects which the introduction of trans-
genic herbicide-resistant plants could possibly
have on evolutionary processes in the future are
unpredictable and indeterminate. The formation
of new species, changes in the composition of
plant communities, in the interaction between
plants and other organisms, and in the structure
of ecosystems are all conceivable and cannot, in
any case, be excluded with certainty. Such
effects are also conceivable, however, when new
plants are introduced which have been modified
using traditional breeding techniques.
 
2. It is questionable whether the chance that the
introduction of new crop plants in agriculture
might lead to the formation of new species in
nature in the long run can be considered a
”risk”. In any event, such a ”risk” would not be
specific to transgenic plants. As yet, there is no
reason to assume that, in general, genetically
engineered plants could more easily or more
quickly induce evolutionary processes of species
formation than conventional crops. There is also
no reason to suppose that the evolution of a new
species derived from transgenic crop plants is
more likely to reduce biodiversity or disrupt the
organisation of ecosystems than the evolution of
a new species derived from nontransgenic crops.
 
3. Certain indicators for assessing possible
evolutionary consequences of new crop plants
can be inferred from the traits added to such
plants, which would eventually escape to wild
populations. In accordance with this, the possi-
ble consequences from herbicide-resistant plants
should be negligible, since herbicide resistance is
not an adaptive trait and provides no selective
advantage in natural habitats. If, however, novel
adaptive traits are added (resistance to draught
or freezing, or improved photosynthesis, for
example) then the effects could conceivably be
greater, since such traits do represent a selective
advantage.
 
4. This assessment holds irrespective of whether
such novel traits are conferred through genetic
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engineering or conventional breeding. The only
mechanism for the escape of such traits from
cultivation is cross-breeding with related wild
species, and this mechanism propagates not only
transgenes but also endogenous plant genes and
the respective traits. (Horizontal gene transfer is
not relevant for the gene flow from crop plants
to wild species. ) It is, on the other hand, true
that phenotypes with novel traits transferred
from nonrelated, distant species will, in many
cases, only be possible through genetic engi-
neering. Evolutionary consequences which might
be associated with such phenotypes would then
constitute a problem which is specific to trans-
genic plants. But even here, the fact that a
phenotype is based on genetic engineering does
not, as such, imply that the phenotype is danger-
ous in ecological or evolutionary terms. A case-
by-case assessment is necessary.
 
5. The evolution of new species will have some
influence on existing natural communities; the
effect will depend on the phenotype of the spe-
cies. It does not make sense to assume that every
change which might be induced in a community
necessarily represents a ”disruption”. In any
case, the suspicion that transgenic species are, in
general, more likely to give rise to ecological
disruptions than nontransgenic species is un-
founded. On the basis of our current knowledge,
the potential damage new species can cause is
probably limited. Taking as a comparison the
long-term ecological impacts of invasions of
crop plants into natural habitats, what could
happen is that undesirable, ”weed-like” feral
populations could be formed, which could
jeopardise certain human uses of ecosystem
functions, or could conflict with the goals of
nature conservation by changing the regional
spectrum of species. The idea that the spread of
transgenics could lead in the long run to a disor-
ganisation of ecosystems which would threaten
the survival of humanity is mere speculation.
 
6. The statement that genetic engineering
”accelerates” evolution is confused. What is
actually accelerated is the breeding process, i.e.
the construction of crop plants adapted to and
grown on agricultural land. Here genetic engi-
neering makes combinations feasible which
could not be achieved (or not as quickly) by
conventional methods. Whether the possible
impacts of these plants (or of their genes) on
wild populations would actually ”accelerate”
evolution in natural habitats is quite another
matter.
 
7. Theoretically, every increase in genetic vari-
ability and every change in selective conditions
can trigger evolutionary changes. In this sense,
human activities ”accelerate” natural evolution
mainly by changing the environmental condi-
tions, in particular by extending anthropogenic
locations, and by exploiting and polluting natu-
ral ecosystems.
 Question 2: Is it conceivable that large-scale
releases of genetically engineered organisms
cancel naturally evolved differentiation
between species and produce mixtures of
species?
 Conclusions form the discussion
 
8. When genes from widely different species are
engineered into the genome of transgenic plants,
this may be called, appropriately, ”de-
differentiation”. In this case, the term would be
used in a purely descriptive way, characterising
the gene transfer as such, but not indicating any
problem or loss associated with the transfer. The
description would then also apply to certain
crops that resulted from conventional breeding,
for example, inter genera hybrids like triticale (a
combination of rye and wheat).
 
9. However, the term ”de-differentiation” is not
appropriate if it is used to convey that a problem
is implied in genetic engineering, namely the loss
of structure or diversity due to gene transfer.
Such loss cannot be demonstrated, either at the
level of the plant genome or at the level of the
community of species.
 
10. At the level of the plant genome the inclusion
of transgenes from other species does not repre-
sent a structural loss from the point of view of
evolutionary biology, but rather, a gain. The
genetic pool of the host plant population is
expanded; genetic diversity (variation) within the
species increases.
 
11. At the level of the species community there
is a purely theoretical chance that the release of
transgenic plants might initiate the evolution of
new (transgenic or nontransgenic) plant species.
If such species were to originate, they would
possibly display combinations of traits hitherto
excluded due to the reproductive separation of
the species. Nevertheless, this would not consti-
tute de-differentiation, but rather, differentiation
of the spectrum of species. A new species does
not replace the original species which contrib-
uted to their genome: it is added to them. On the
level of the community the new species consti-
tutes a gain in structure; its direct and primary
effect is an increases in biodiversity.36
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 It is quite another question whether the introduction of
herbicide-resistant crops could lead to a loss of biodiver-
sity in agricultural habitats, see section II C1 below.
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12. The transfer of genes between different
species does not lead to the disappearance of
natural differences between these species. Al-
though such fears have played a role in the
public framing of the risks genetic engineering
might involve, they are without basis in science.
Species are defined as interbreeding communi-
ties (producing joint offspring). Gene transfer
does not, however, create an interbreeding
community between donor and host organism,
and the transgenic does not become an
”intermediate” species between the original
species. A transgenic potato with a herbicide
resistance gene from a bacterium or a petunia
will evidently continue to be a potato, and not a
species half-way between a potato and a bacte-
rium or petunia.
 
13. Transgenic plants which could be crossed
with both the donor and the host organism are
only conceivable in the case of gene transfer
between relatively closely related plant species.
Theoretically, in this case, an evolution might be
possible during which the two originally
separated species converge into a new ”inter-
mediate” form. This would, however, only be
possible, if one makes a further (improbable)
assumption: namely, that this new form is fitter
than the two original species and is able to
outcompete them on a large scale. If one accepts
this scenario for transgenic plants, then it must
also be accepted as valid for the products of
conventional breeding in which new varieties are
produced by crossing related species.
 
14. In contrast to conventional breeding, genetic
engineering can transfer genes between species
which are widely different in evolutionary terms.
However, the greater the evolutionary distance
between the species, the lower the probability
that they will somehow converge. Therefore, the
further genetic engineering moves beyond the
limits of traditional breeding, the less reason is
there to fear that it could trigger evolutionary
processes which end up in species mixtures and
a loss of differentiation in the species spectrum.
 5  The ”special quality” ofgenetic engineering
 The strategic uses of ”context distur-
bances” and ”positional effects”
 
The argument that the insertion of transgenes
will disrupt or disturb genomic contexts in the
host organism and cause positional effects plays
a prominent role in the criticism of genetic
engineering in the report by the Öko-Institut and
in the German discussion in general. It is seen as
proof that the techniques of genetic engineering
do indeed represent a novel or special quality
which warrants the hypothesis that they might
involve specific risks which do not occur when
organisms are modified through traditional
breeding techniques.
 
Risk debates in our technology assessment
repeatedly ended up at a point where the conclu-
sion seemed inevitable that it is not possible to
distinguish the risks of transgenic plants from
the risks of nontransgenic plants. Deliberations
among the participants tended to ”normalise”
risks by comparison.37 Against this tendency the
”special quality” of genetic engineering was
brought forward: Disturbances of the genomic
context and the possibility of positional effects
constitute a difference on the molecular level
between genetically engineered and convention-
ally bred plants. Such differences therefore
justify the assumption that the possible conse-
quences of gene transfer are (in the words of a
representative from the Öko-Institut)
 ”fundamentally different to what can
happen with a nontransgenic plant.”38
 
In particular, the Öko-Institut referred to the
”special quality” of genetic engineering to
justify the assumption of increased risks in the
following cases:
• because of context disturbances and positional
effects the genetic engineering of plants might
involve more and different side-effects on the
plant metabolism than are known from the
history of conventional plant breeding;
• because of context disturbances and positional
effects horizontal transfer of transgenes from
plants to soil bacteria might have particularly
serious and unexpected effects on the soil; the
comparison, therefore, to agricultural practices
which also severely affect soil may not be le-
gitimate;
• because of context disturbances and positional
effects transgenic crop plants might inadver-
tently achieve increased ecological fitness, thus
enhancing their ability to invade agricultural or
natural ecosystems as weeds.
 
There was agreement in the technology assess-
ment that context disturbances (insertional
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 See sections III B1-2 below.
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 Alternatively, the hypothesis that genetic engineering
involves unique risks has been justified by reference to
the fact that genes from distant, nonrelated species can be
transferred which may inadvertently change the plant
metabolism (see section II A1 above). According to this
argument the constitutive difference is on the level of
gene products, rather than on the level of molecular
structure of the genome. However, both lines of argument
converge in the conclusion that, because of the difference,
more severe side-effects must be expected with trans-
genic plants than with conventional plants.
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mutations) and positional effects do occur.
Thus, the statement, ”It is the gene that mat-
ters!” which is part of the basic philosophy
underlying common safety regulations, must
indeed be qualified. The possible effects of gene
transfer on the host organism cannot be derived
completely from the information which is en-
coded in the transgene, nor from the function of
the gene in the donor organism. To some extent
these effects also depend on where and how the
transgene becomes inserted in the genome of the
host plant. In this sense, the statement ”It is the
context that matters!” is also true.39 There was,
however, agreement in the technology assess-
ment that the effects of changes in the genomic
context are quite limited. They can influence
levels of gene expression, but they cannot
change the type of gene product which is added
to the host organism (the possibility of fusion
proteins being an exception).
 
Extensive discussions in the technology assess-
ment concerned the question whether context
disturbances and positional effects are in any
way specific to genetic engineering and trans-
genic plants. Do they also occur in conventional
plant breeding? What is the difference with
natural recombination events, for example the
insertion of mobile DNA elements (transposons),
which take place in all plants anyhow? The
debate of these questions in a way repeated the
same arguments which had already ensued in
discussion of the functional consequences of
gene transfer. In both cases comparison with
conventional breeding and natural processes was
the test of whether genetic engineering is really
new.
 Question 1: Are disturbances in the genomic
context caused by the insertion of transgenes
(insertional mutations) comparable to distur-
bances which may occur, when plant genomes
are modified through conventional breeding
methods?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
1. Disturbances in the genomic context do not
only occur when new genes are transferred
through genetic engineering. A number of natu-
ral processes, e.g. chromosomal translocations
during meiosis, and conventional breeding
practices, such as intergenera crosses or chemi-
cal mutagenesis, also imply rearrangements in
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 The term ”context” refers to the molecular level of the
genome in this section. It may also refer to the level of the
gene product. The latter context, too matters as is demon-
strated by pleiotropic effects. For the controversy over the
appropriate ”safety philosophy” cf. section III B4 below.
the context of the plant genome. The possibility
of side-effects from such rearrangements is not
specific to transgenic plants and thus is not
sufficient to establish the ”special quality” of
genetic engineering.
 
2. In the case of fusion proteins gene transfer
leads to a new gene product which is not en-
coded in the transgene. Fusion proteins are
formed when the transgene is incompletely
integrated and its loose end happens to fall into
the transcriptional frame of a neighbouring plant
gene; then the transgene and the plant gene can
together form a new gene product. Fusion pro-
teins seem to be a good example that the geno-
mic context (where and how a transgene is
inserted) really matters. But again, fusion pro-
teins are nothing which is specific to gene trans-
fer; they can also result from conventional
breeding processes which use chromosome
breaks, translocations or mutagenesis as sources
of genetic variation.
 
3. The hypothesis that changes in the genomic
context by the insertion of transgenes could be
different and hence have different consequences
than changes which may be caused by conven-
tional breeding techniques requires substantia-
tion if it is to be more than mere speculation.
The Öko-Institut has argued that there might be
a ”gene balance” in the plant genome which is
more likely to be disturbed by the insertion of
transgenes than by modification through breed-
ing techniques. It gives, however, no reason why
such a balance, if it exists, should be less com-
patible with transgenes than with the various
changes breeding can imply. The very fact that
genetic engineering of plants is possible and
successful seems rather to suggest that the
integration of transgenes is compatible with the
balance of plant genomes and the proper func-
tioning of plants. It remains an open question
whether more failures and nonviable variants are
to be expected in the construction of transgenic
plants than in conventional breeding.
 
4. Strictly speaking, it is also unwarranted to
claim negatively that there are no differences
between context effects in transgenic and non-
transgenic plants. All what we can say is that no
such differences can be recognised. Whatever
we claim is valid only relative to the state of our
current knowledge, and no level of knowledge
will be sufficient either to prove that the sus-
pected differences definitely do not exist or to
exclude their possibility with certainty. This
does not, of course, mean that we could just as
well stop the systematic search for such differ-
ences—for example by comparing the effects of
transgenes and transposons on the genomic
context at identical gene locations (if the respec-
 Part II: Empirical Findings—Impacts And Consequences 35
tive experiments become feasible).
 Question 2: Can changes in the genomic
context which are caused by the insertion of
transgenes be distinguished from changes
caused by the insertion of transposons from
the plant?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
5. Both transposons and transgenes interfere
with the existing genomic context; the sequence
of genes on the chromosome is altered in both
cases.
 
6. To challenge the comparability of context
effects from transgenes and transposons, it is not
sufficient merely to cite any differences between
transgenes and transposons. The differences
must relate to the rearrangement of the genomic
context. Various differences between transgenes
and transposons have been claimed by the Öko-
Institut; only two of them relate to the genomic
context: the reversibility of transposon insertion
and the regulation of the insertion site by the
plant itself.
 
7. The following differences have no relation to
possible changes in the genomic context:
• The number of plants. Given the large-scale
cultivation of transgenic crops, plants with
context effects from the insertion of transgenes
may be much more frequent than plants with
context effects from the insertion of transposons.
This does not mean that the effects are different
in both cases or have different consequences for
the plant. Furthermore, new plant varieties
which are based on transpositions could also be
grown in large fields.
• The content of genetic information. Transpo-
sons can, like transgenes, add new phenotypic
traits to the plant; but only transgenes can
transmit genetic information which has never
been in the plant gene pool from nonrelated
organisms. The content of the genetic informa-
tion is relevant for the gene product and its
consequences. It does not, however, determine
the effect of the transfer on the genomic context.
• The frequency of transposition. The fre-
quency is regulated by the plant. This suggests
that transposons have a definite function in the
developmental programme of the plant. Fre-
quency has no implications for how the insertion
of transposons will change the genomic context.
This change depends on the site in the genome to
which the transposon moves, not on the fre-
quency with which it moves.
 
8. Gene transfer aims at the stable integration of
a transgene into the plant genome. For transpo-
sons it is, in contrast, quite normal that they
frequently and spontaneously move out of the
gene locus into which they have jumped. Trans-
position is reversible. This does not mean that its
effects on the genome organisation are negligi-
ble. Transposons which move out not only leave
behind changes in the place where they have
been, but they also induce further changes in the
place to which they jump. If the frequency of
insertions indicates the amount of side-effects
involved, then more side-effects have to be
expected from a transposon than from a trans-
gene.
 
9. The real test whether context changes through
transgenes and through transposons are compa-
rable lies in what determines the locus of inser-
tion. Genetic engineering cannot yet control the
exact locus on the host genome to which a new
gene is transferred. Transgenes are inserted at
random. If the gene locus at which transposons
are inserted were regulated by the plant itself,
then transpositions would indeed be different.
There is, however, no evidence for such regula-
tion. Transposons are also inserted at random.
This is the current state of our knowledge, and
there is no controversy in science over this fact.
 
10. Data suggest that there are similarities
between the transposons and the gene sequences
at the locus at which they integrate. It would be
a misinterpretation to conclude from such data
that the insertion of transposons is regulated by
the plant. If for chemical and physical reasons
certain sites on the genome lend themselves more
for the insertion of transposons than others, then
the distribution of transposons over the genome
would not, in fact, be completely at random.
Nevertheless, it would not be controlled by a
regulatory programme of the plant itself. And,
such deviances from random distribution could
then also be expected for the integration of
transgenes.
 
11. As a general comment to the whole debate it
can be added that transposons are but one
example of random processes in plants which
influence the genomic context. One could also
point to mutations which insert or delete genetic
information. These mutations also refute the
thesis that disturbances in the genomic context
are a unique and specific risk factor of genetic
engineering. In the final analysis it seems
difficult to uphold this thesis in view of the fact
that natural evolution presupposes random
change in genomic contexts. It is unlikely that a
”special quality” of gene transfer can be
established at the level of organisation of the
genome; one will have to look for it at the level
of the gene product.
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 B  BIOSAFETY ASPECTS OFNONSELECTIVE HERBICIDES
 
With the construction of transgenic herbicide-
resistant plants, broad spectrum, nonselective
herbicides (which normally affect all or nearly
all plants) can be used widely in agriculture for
the first time. This raises further issues of
biosafety for such plants: What risks are
involved in the use of nonselective herbicides,
both with respect to the consumers’ health and
to the integrity of the environment?
 
These risks are examined extensively within the
established procedures for approval before
nonselective herbicides can be placed on the
market for agricultural application. They are
nevertheless critical points of public debate.
 
In our technology assessment, the biosafety
aspects of nonselective herbicides were dis-
cussed mostly in a comparative way: Do these
herbicides change the present situation to the
better or to the worse? A number of participants
continued to argue, however, that these herbi-
cides would still be unacceptable even if they did
improve the status quo. This group considered
any use of herbicides unacceptable.40
 
It was agreed that the question whether the
amounts of herbicides applied in agriculture
would increase or decrease once transgenic
herbicide-resistant crops were introduced, is a
key issue for assessing the impacts of nonselec-
tive herbicides, not only with respect to possible
risks, but also with respect to possible benefits
and changes in agricultural practice. Our sum-
mary, therefore, starts with the discussion of this
issue.
 1  Will greater or lesser amountsof herbicides be applied when
transgenic herbicide-resistant
plants are grown?
 
Opinions are divided over this question.
Whereas critics of herbicide-resistant crops
warn that farmers will use more herbicides than
they have up to now, supporters of the technol-
ogy claim, to the contrary, that farmers will use
significantly smaller amounts of herbicides.41
                                                  
 
40
 Cf. section III C3 below.
 
41
 In our technology assessment, discussions of the issue
were based on several expert reports and commentaries
dealing with agronomic and economic impacts of herbi-
cide-resistant crop plants; see section II C below. For a
more comprehensive account of the discussion in the
technology assessment see: ”Entwicklung der Aufwand-
mengen beim Herbizideinsatz”, in: Materialien zur
 
This debate proceeds from the assumption that
the amount of herbicide used is a good indicator
of whether the burden on human health and
environmental integrity is likely to increase or to
decrease. This assumption was also made in the
technology assessment, but it was agreed that
comparing quantities is only a very crude indi-
cator for comparing the possible negative im-
pacts of herbicides. What would really be
needed would be a comprehensive index inte-
grating the amount of herbicides applied and the
parameters of toxicity and, in addition, taking
into account local conditions at the place of
application (e.g. type of soil, susceptibility to
erosion etc.). It has not been possible to develop
such an index.42 Thus, comparing amounts of
herbicides is a substitute which will only provide
relevant information if the nonselective herbi-
cides used in conjunction with transgenic plants
and the selective herbicides used with conven-
tional plants are widely similar in terms of their
toxicity and ecotoxicity. This can be taken as
being the case for glyphosate (Round-up) and
glufosinate (Basta), the main herbicides consid-
ered in this technology assessment.
 
Arguments about the development of herbicide
use often imply that transgenic herbicide-
resistant crops could become standard for most
areas of agricultural cultivation. As a matter of
fact, nonselective herbicides would probably not
be applied in all crops. The most likely candi-
dates are row crops. Cereals, in contrast, are
often competitive enough and may not need
herbicide treatment at all; and, if necessary,
conventional weed control methods are available
(including selective herbicides) which are both
effective and cheap. As a result, one quarter of
the total cultivated land might well be the maxi-
mum range of application for nonselective
herbicides.43
 
Discussions of whether greater or lesser
amounts of herbicides would be used must
differentiate between the various crop cultures
and answer two questions: Will the amount of
herbicides used per hectare increase or decrease?
Will the total agricultural area treated with
                                                                          
Technikfolgenabschätzung, Heft 6: 126-152
 (see appen-
dix).
 
42
 According to a Danish expert the problem is: ”how to
compare LD50 values with e.g. the persistence. You have
to put some value judgement into each of those parame-
ters. That’s why it is very difficult to reach any agreement
on it” (IHE 1994: 49).
 
43
 While this may be the case in Central Europe Gressel
(1996: 240) sees a definite need to engineer new herbi-
cide resistances into wheat in order to control grass
weeds in India, for instance.
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herbicides increase or decrease? In our technol-
ogy assessment, comparisons were generally
made with the weed control strategies farmers
normally apply at present. For most crops this
means application of selective herbicides, but for
some crops, also mechanical methods. A great
deal of discussion was devoted to the question of
whether herbicide-resistant crops would ”invite”
farmers to use herbicides excessively, since they
must no longer fear that they might damage their
crops. If this were the case, then reductions
which might be possible in theory would not be
realised in practice. Three main topics turned
out to be relevant in the discussions of the
technology assessment:
• the technical options herbicide-resistant plants
may involve for reducing the amounts of herbi-
cide applied in various crops,
• the level of herbicide management that would
be required if these options were to be realised in
actual practice
• the displacement of mechanical methods of
weed control by nonselective herbicides when
herbicide-resistant crop varieties become avail-
able.
 
The following conclusions from the discussions
must be viewed as preliminary. Herbicide-
resistant crops have not been widely tested under
practical conditions. Therefore, neither the
effectiveness of nonselective herbicides nor the
details of their regime of application are yet
completely clear.44
 Question 1: Will the use of herbicide-resistant
crop plants lead to reductions in the amounts
of herbicide applied?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
1. Herbicide-resistant plants favour the switch to
postemergence treatment in weed control, where
the farmer can wait until the weed grows and
then decide whether or not treatment is neces-
sary. Nonselective herbicides such as glyphosate
(Round-up) or glufosinate (Basta) are better in
this respect than the (selective) postemergence
herbicides which are available at present. They
imply less damage to the crop plants and have a
more complete spectrum of weed control.
Whether the switch to postemergence treatment
will in fact reduce the amount of herbicides used
depends on the exact scheme of herbicide appli-
cation.
 
2. In theory, nonselective herbicides could be
applied at a very late stage in plant growth.
                                                  
 
44
 Data have only recently become available; see Reschke
(1996), and Rasche, Donn and Waitz (1996); we quote
from these data in subsequent footnotes.
However, such application is not likely to be-
come a standard method of weed treatment.
Since weeds would also be larger at this stage,
they would compete more vigorously with crops;
they are also a source of viruses which damage
crops. In either case, yield losses must be ex-
pected if weed control is postponed for too long.
For agronomic reasons it will, therefore, proba-
bly only be possible to delay herbicide applica-
tions by up to about 14 days beyond the usual
date.
 
3. With glyphosate (Round-up) and glufosinate
(Basta) current experience suggests that the best
scheme of application might be to split the
treatment: A crop would then be treated the first
time at about the four-leaf stage, when the first
wave of weeds has appeared in the field. A
second treatment is envisaged at about the ten-
leaf stage, when weeds have emerged again.
Second (and further) treatments may eventually
be spared if the pressure from weeds is low and
the crop sufficiently competitive.
 
4. Calculations have been made for the various
crops, which suggest that with nonselective
herbicides (in particular glyphosate and glufo-
sinate) some reductions in herbicide quantities
might be achieved for various crops. Expected
reductions are considerable for sugar beet—up
to 30%. No reductions can be expected for
cereals, if herbicide-resistant varieties are not
developed because they are not economically
attractive. In cases where the fields are infested
with weeds which are particularly hard to con-
trol using conventional (selective) herbicides,
significant reductions can be expected for all
crops.
 
5. These calculations are contingent upon two
assumptions: (a) that the doses necessary for
effective weed treatment are less with nonselec-
tive than with selective herbicides; this would be
true particularly in the case of strong weeds
which must be treated with high doses and
combinations (tank mixtures) of selective herbi-
cides; (b) that the number of applications per
year can be reduced in some crops; further
applications in a splitting scheme could, for
example, be spared if the re-emerging weeds are
too weak to compete with the crop plants.
 
6. Whether herbicide reductions which are
possible in theory can actually be achieved in
practice will have to be tested in further field
trials.45
                                                  
 
45
 Recent trials with glufosinate resistant sugar beets
suggest that 4-6 litres of the product per hectare (in two
applications) provide sufficient weed control; this com-
pares with 8-9 litres of selective herbicides used at
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7. Should the use of broad spectrum herbicides
lead to the selection of resistant weeds, farmers
might try to maintain effective treatment by
increasing the doses of herbicides applied. Any
reductions vis-à-vis the status quo that might
have been achieved with nonselective herbicides,
would in this case be negated. Theoretically, the
amount of herbicide used could even be in-
creased for a while, until it is clear that the
herbicide is no longer effective.46
 
8. It is sometimes argued that herbicide-resistant
crops will result in increased overall amounts of
chemicals used in agriculture, assuming that
transgenic varieties will be less competitive or
particularly susceptible to fungal attack (there-
fore requiring more fertilisers or fungicides).
These assumptions seem to be unwarranted: If
transgenic crops had lower yields or required
more fungicides, they would fail to establish
themselves on the market.47
 Question 2: Will herbicide-resistant plants
increase the amount of herbicides applied in
agriculture because they are more likely to be
misused?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
9. Proper herbicide management requires more
than just adhering to the maximum doses per-
mitted for the product applied. For reasons of
product liability, the permitted doses are set at
high levels which, even under unfavourable
                                                                          
present (Reschke, 1996). For the agronomic details, see
below, section II C2 below. With oilseed rape, one
application of up to 600 g active ingredient is enough
(Rasche et al., 1996). This does not necessarily constitute
appreciable reductions compared to current practices; see
also IHE (1995: 4). With glyphosate-resistant sugar beet
two applications of two to three litres per hectare provide
sufficient control. Reductions might be considerable in
crops not dealt with in our technology assessment, for
example, cotton. ”In fields with light infestations of
weeds, producers should be able to use total postemer-
gence management systems. The herbicide load in theses
fields could be reduced by at least 50% as compared to
current management systems” (Wilcut et al. 1996: 221).
 
46
 The risk that resistant weeds are selected depends on
the mode of action of the herbicide resistance. The risk
appears low in the cases of glyphosate (Round-up) and
glufosinate (Basta), and it is assumed that it can be kept
within limits for all nonselective herbicides by proper
herbicide management (e.g. herbicide rotation), see
section II C2 below.
 
47
 Ahmad et al. (1995) did find that glufosinate impairs
the antagonistic control of the phytopathogen Fusarium
oxysporum
 by Trichoderma species. However, this does
not, according to information from AgrEvo, result in
increased need of fungicides. See, however Gressel
(1996: 243) ”Even low rates of glyphosate suppress the
production of induced phytoalaxins that defend against
fungal attack”.
circumstances, guarantee effective weed control.
In practice, lower doses are often possible and
indeed advisable. If integrated crop protection
and good field practice are the criteria, then
normal herbicide management in Germany
displays many shortcomings, including unneces-
sary routine applications of herbicides, excessive
dosage locally, and lack of herbicide rotation.
Many cases of groundwater pollution and the
selection of resistant weeds can be ascribed to
inadequate herbicide management.
 
10. Because of pressure from rising costs,
farmers have a clear economic incentive to
manage herbicides properly and reduce the
amounts of herbicides they invest. This is, of
course, only true if herbicides represent a rele-
vant cost factor. In this respect, atrazine is an
exceptional (low cost) case. In general, the
prices of herbicides are such that farmers will
try to profit by using less of them. This is borne
out by the fact that the turnover for herbicides
has fallen dramatically in recent years.
 
11. Deficits in herbicide management are a
general problem; nonselective herbicides will be
no exception in this respect. However, there is
little reason to suspect that nonselective herbi-
cides would be handled particularly recklessly
because crops are resistant, or that the farmers
would engage in more unnecessary treatments or
use excessively high doses. This could only be
expected if economic controls played no role
with nonselective herbicides, which is clearly not
the case.
 
12. Nonselective herbicides like glyphosate
(Round-up) and glufosinate (Basta) could, on
the contrary, resolve a number of management
problems which up to now have led to increased
uses of herbicides. The incomplete spectrum of
traditional herbicides causes problems in major
crops: Weeds are selected which are particularly
difficult to control and require additional
herbicide use. The selection of such weeds could
be avoided with broad spectrum, nonselective
herbicides. Some of the herbicides to be used
with transgenic herbicide-resistant crops may
come close to meeting the standard of completed
weed control.48
 Question 3: Will nonselective herbicides
displace mechanical methods of weed control?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
13. Mechanical weed control has already largely
been displaced by herbicide application over the
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 Although glyphosate and glufosinate, too, have gaps in
their weed control spectra. Cf. section II C2 below.
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recent decades. It is now restricted mainly to
organic farming and to areas in which available
herbicides are inapplicable because of
incomplete control spectra or adverse
environmental impacts. Mechanical methods of
weed control are also given some weight within
integrated crop protection schemes. One must
expect that when nonselective herbicides with
sufficient control spectra or favourable
environmental properties become an available
alternative, they are likely to encourage further
displacement of mechanical weed control
methods in conventional farming because they
are labour-saving and more cost-effective.
 
14. The potential of mechanical weed control
methods has not yet been fully exploited. Me-
chanical methods can, for example, be quite
cost-effective in cereal crops with a low inci-
dence of weeds. In such crops mechanical meth-
ods may even be indirectly supported by the
introduction of herbicide-resistant plants. If
broad spectrum, nonselective herbicides are
applied in a postemergence treatment of row
crops, they will also reduce weed pressure on
cereals which are grown the following year;
mechanical treatment might then become techni-
cally and economically viable. This effect could
be very wide-ranging, since cereals account for
some 75% of the cultivated land in Germany,
and since about half of them are cultivated after
row crops which are the main targets of trans-
genic herbicide resistance.
 
15. To the extent that nonselective herbicides
displace mechanical weed control, the introduc-
tion of transgenic herbicide-resistant plants will
increase the use of herbicides in agriculture. The
effect will be rather limited, however, because
mechanical methods are already very margi-
nalised in conventional farming. The various
crops have to be considered case by case.
 
16. For potatoes, which are grown on about 4%
of Germany’s farmland, mechanical weed
control will continue to be practised where it can
be integrated with other agronomic measures,
like hoeing or hilling up, both of which are
necessary for cultivation of the crop. Mechanical
methods might be displaced, however, in areas
where (preemergence) treatment with traditional
herbicides was inappropriate because these
herbicides did not meet water protection
standards or because they did not have a
sufficient spectrum of control. In those cases,
the availability of applicable nonselective
herbicides could result in increased amounts of
herbicides used in potatoes.
 
17. On the other hand, this negative effect might
be compensated, if the number of herbicide
applications could be reduced by shifting to
postemergence treatment in conjunction with
herbicide-resistant potatoes. Preemergence
treatment, which is a routine in many areas,
could then be abolished and the farmer could
instead decide on the spot whether the actual
weed pressure warrants any further herbicide
application, or whether the mechanical measures
they use anyway are sufficient to cope with the
problem. It is not possible to predict whether the
net effect of these contradictory developments
would be a rise or fall in the amount of herbi-
cides used for cultivating potatoes. The effect is,
at any rate, not likely to be appreciable.
 
18. Even if nonselective herbicides replace
mechanical methods of weed control for some
crops, this does not imply that they result in
increased overall use of herbicides in agriculture
at large. The areas in conventional farming
where mechanical methods of weed control are
used are minimal in comparison to those areas
where herbicides are applied. And, in the latter
case, the applicability of nonselective herbicides
will probably lead to a reduction rather than
increase in the amounts of herbicides used.49
 2  Impacts on health: residuesfrom nonselective herbicides in
food crops
 
Only transgenic herbicide-resistant plants can be
exposed to nonselective herbicides without being
killed. Obviously, therefore, products from such
plants may have residues that are different from
those which could occur in products from non-
transgenic plants exposed to selective herbicides.
The decisive point here is not that the herbicide
resistance has been genetically engineered, but
that a new herbicide is applied. A new situation
with respect to residues would also arise if
resistance to nonselective herbicides was created
with other methods (e.g. through conventional
breeding) or if crops were exposed to newly
developed selective herbicides which make use
of a natural tolerance mechanism, the operation
of which implies that the herbicide will have
some impact on the plant metabolism.
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 The displacement of mechanical methods of weed
control may nevertheless be an undesirable political
signal. Even participants in the technology assessment,
who did not oppose herbicides in principle argued that
technical monostructures in weed control and over-
reliance on chemical methods should be avoided (see
section III F3 below). Mechanical methods of weed
control should therefore continue to be applied and
innovated. However, this goal cannot be pursued success-
fully by restricting herbicide-resistant crops; financial
support for the mechanical methods is what is required.
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Existing law requires that a toxicological dossier
of residues which could occur in transgenic
herbicide-resistant crops be produced before
nonselective herbicides can be approved for
application to such crops. It can be assumed,
therefore, that these herbicides would not be
released onto the market were they to lead to
toxicologically incompatible residues in food
products. A technology assessment can neither
substitute nor anticipate the extensive testing
that precedes the approval of new herbicides. It
can only raise points which should be considered
in the testing. On the other hand, it can go
beyond the criteria which are already legally
binding. Some participants in our technology
assessment argued that the criteria for herbicide
approval should become stricter; they also
debated whether the existing rules are applicable
and appropriate for nonselective herbicides.
 
There was agreement that it would be undesir-
able and a clear disadvantage of transgenic
herbicide-resistant plants if nonselective herbi-
cides involved higher residues in crops. This
opinion was held irrespective of whether or not
the residues remained within the limits of what is
tolerated under the usual toxicological criteria.
More residues in food crops were regarded in
principle as undesirable. However, no agreement
was reached about whether the residues would
actually increase or decrease. It was clear that
this would depend on the mode of action of
herbicide resistance, on the timing of herbicide
application (early or late postemergence treat-
ment and harvest delay), and on an increase or
decrease in the amount of herbicides applied per
hectare.
 
Apart from this question, it was also discussed
whether our current state of knowledge was a
sufficient basis for testing the residues of non-
selective herbicides and controlling possible
risks for the consumers. A number of partici-
pants denied this and concluded, therefore, that
these herbicides could not be approved at all.50
                                                  
 
50
 Expert report commissioned from Prof. H. Sandermann
(Forschungszentrum für Umwelt und Gesundheit, Neu-
herberg) and Prof. K.-F. Ohnesorge (Institut für Toxiko-
logie, Universität Düsseldorf): ”Nutzpflanzen mit kün-
stlicher Herbizidresistenz: Verbessert sich die Rück-
standssituation? Biochemische und toxikologische
Aspekte”; commentaries from environmental groups by
V. Haas and L. Peters (Umwelt-Institut München);
W. Bödecker, (Pestizid Aktions Netzwerk, Hamburg),
commentary from industry by J. Honegger (Monsanto), in:
Materialien zur Technikfolgenabschätzung, Heft 6
 (see
appendix).
 Question 1: Will the application of nonselec-
tive herbicides lead to increased residues in
the harvested crop plants?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
1. For herbicide-resistant plants the amount of
herbicides applied per hectare and year will
probably be somewhat reduced in comparison to
those currently in use; with certain crops, for
example, sugar beet, these reductions may be
considerable. This suggests further that the
situation concerning herbicide residues should
improve rather than worsen with the introduction
of herbicide-resistant plants. In general, when
less herbicides are applied, less residues must be
expected in crops.
 
2. Herbicide residues are likely to increase in
those crops where nonselective herbicides dis-
place mechanical weed control. Ironically, this
could also be the case exactly because these
herbicides are better in environmental terms. For
example, should they be classified as not harm-
ful to water, they could be used in protected
areas where conventional herbicides were inap-
plicable. Displacement can only affect a small
percentage of farmland, however, since me-
chanical weed control is already highly margi-
nalised in the present system of crop husbandry.
 
3. On the other hand, residues are likely to
decrease where nonselective herbicides allow a
reduction in the total number of herbicide treat-
ments in a yearly crop sequence. If herbicides
lower weed pressure by reducing the seed bank,
then successive treatments in the following crop
may become unnecessary. This could, for in-
stance, be the case with cereal crops which can
compete well with weeds; at present these crops
are still widely treated with preemergence herbi-
cides.
 
4. The shift of herbicide application to post-
emergence treatment does not necessarily imply
increased residues. Presumably, nonselective
herbicides would not be applied at a very late
stage of plant growth, but rather in a scheme of
split applications relatively soon after the weeds
first appear in the field. This ensures sufficient
delay of harvest and, therefore, time for herbi-
cide residues to be diluted in the crop.
 
5. Increased residues could result if farmers
resort to herbicide application at later stages of
plant maturity shortly before harvest, in the case
of unexpected and unusually high weed pres-
sure. Such applications are more likely to occur
with nonselective than with conventional poste-
mergence herbicides, since the former are less
likely to affect the crop and cause yield losses.
Therefore, very late additional treatment could
 Part II: Empirical Findings—Impacts And Consequences 41
prove profitable. It may be necessary to restrict
such applications of nonselective herbicides by
regulation, in order to ensure that residue con-
centrations would be reduced sufficiently by
plant growth and plant metabolism, so that
tolerances of residues are not exceeded in the
harvested crop.
 
6. Herbicides can nevertheless be abused and
thus give rise to additional residues. For
instance, a farmer, if confronted with unforeseen
weed problems, may disregard the rules of
herbicide approval and good field practice, and
use nonselective herbicides anew, shortly before
harvest. Such abuse is, however, a general risk
with postemergence herbicides; with all of them,
late applications which have neither been tested
nor authorised remain technically possible.
 Question 2: Do we have sufficient knowledge
to assess possible residues from nonselective
herbicides and to control toxicological risks
for the consumers?
 Conclusions for the discussion
 
7. Many of the arguments that the necessary
knowledge is not available refer to points which
have to be considered in the tests legally re-
quired before approval is granted for use of
nonselective herbicides in conjunction with
transgenic herbicide-resistant crops. It can be
taken for granted, therefore, that the accumula-
tion of active ingredients in a crop or the degra-
dation pathways of nonselective herbicides in
plants will be investigated, and that residues will
be subjected to standard toxicological testing
and evaluation. This also includes metabolites of
the herbicides, formed only in plants, if it is
possible to extract them.
 
8. The tests developed for the approval of herbi-
cides have systematic limits for methodological
and technical reasons. What cannot be known
cannot be tested. There is, for example, no way
to test whether herbicide residues at concentra-
tions below the level of detection exist and, if so,
whether they might be toxicologically relevant.
There is also no definite answer as to how
reliable extrapolations from animal testing to
humans really are. Furthermore, metabolites of
herbicides which are only formed in plants
cannot, as a rule, be tested if they remain unde-
tected, or if they cannot be isolated from the
plant itself. Feeding the crop to animals would
be one theoretically possible test strategy; but in
practice this is often impossible because the
amount of plant material needed to produce
base-line effects for toxicological assessment
cannot be incorporated in the test animals with-
out killing them.
 
9. The testing of herbicides is also limited for
pragmatic reasons. In general, a toxicological
dossier related to health risks is confined to the
active ingredients in herbicides. The formula-
tion, i.e. additional substances required for
application in the field, is tested only if evidence
suggests that it might involve risks. Moreover,
the number of model systems (animal species)
tested is limited in order to keep the costs of
testing within acceptable bounds. Tests for
synergistic effects are not carried out systemati-
cally, but only when there is specific evidence of
toxicologically relevant interaction.
 
10. Despite these limitations there is no empiri-
cal evidence that existing herbicide regulation
fails to protect consumers against health damage
from herbicide residues. Levels of residues are
routinely controlled in samples of food products.
Violations of maximum permissible levels rarely
occur; usually the quantities of residues are well
below this. Nor are there any epidemiological
data suggesting that herbicide residues in har-
vested crops constitute health risks (in contrast,
for example, to chemicals used in wood protec-
tion or medical drugs). Cases of poisoning have
been recorded for individuals handling herbi-
cides during application, or manufacturing, but
not for consumers ingesting food products from
crops treated with herbicides (although herbi-
cides—paraquat, for example—have, been
deliberately ingested to commit suicide).
 
11. Regulations for the approval of herbicides
involve political compromise, since they try to
strike a balance between maximising the pre-
vention of risk and allowing for innovation of
weed control techniques. Any such compromise
is likely to remain controversial in the public
realm, and it also remained controversial in our
technology assessment. This is perhaps not
surprising in view of fundamental disagreement
about whether chemical crop protection is
acceptable at all in agriculture. When any use of
herbicides is rejected as a severe mistake, one
cannot, of course, be satisfied to learn that
nonselective herbicides pose no special problems
in comparison with conventional (selective)
ones.51
 3  Impacts on the environment:Are nonselective herbicides
more environmentally friendly?
 
Our technology assessment examined the possi-
ble effects of nonselective herbicides on soil
(including problems of soil erosion), on aquatic
ecosystems and on the phytocoenosis in agri-
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 For this debate see section III C3 below.
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cultural habitats. The findings tended to empha-
sise that the proper use of nonselective herbi-
cides would at least not aggravate the environ-
mental impacts of current herbicide applications
in agriculture, but that the improvements to be
expected would probably also be only slight.
Improvements were projected from favourable
soil and ecotoxicological properties of some
nonselective herbicides, and from the assump-
tion that theoretically possible reductions in
application rates and numbers of treatments
would be actually achieved in practice.
 
For the critics of herbicide-resistant crops these
findings, while not contested in principle, nev-
ertheless did not warrant the conclusion that
nonselective herbicides pose no particular envi-
ronmental problems. They argued that the
current state of knowledge does not allow us to
predict all the possible effects and that tests
conducted for herbicide approval cannot defi-
nitely exclude the possibility that additional risks
might nevertheless exist. The other participants
acknowledged these points but countered that
they merely describe general problems which
apply to any scheme of risk testing and risk
regulation. The question of whether limits of
knowledge and preventive control are sufficient
to deem a new technology unacceptable re-
mained one of the controversial issues of legal
and political debate in the technology assess-
ment.52
 
As in the discussion of health impacts, the critics
did not accept the comparison of selective and
nonselective herbicides when assessing environ-
mental impacts. They insisted that organic
farming was the only appropriate system of
reference and alternative to be considered. This
argument also reflected the basic differences in
value judgements among participants in our
technology assessment.
 Question 1: Have nonselective herbicides less
effects on the soil than herbicides which have
been used up to now?
 Conclusions from the discussion53
 
1. The nonselective herbicides to be applied with
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 See section III B7 below. The issues are the same for
conceivable risks from transgenic plants and nonselective
herbicides.
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 Expert report commissioned from Prof. B.-M. Wilke
(Institut für Landschaftsbau, Technische Universität,
Berlin): ”Verhalten der Komplementärherbizide im Bo-
den”; commentary by Dr. Ch. Siewert (Institut für Ökolo-
gie [Bodenkunde], Technische Universität, Berlin), in:
Materialien zur Technikfolgenabschätzung, Heft 7
 (see
appendix).
transgenic herbicide-resistant crops differ little
in terms of their effects on the soil from the
herbicides already used. In certain respects, for
instance, rapid degradation (persistence) and low
soil mobility (bonding and leaching), they are
slightly better.54
 
2. If it turns out that lesser amounts of herbi-
cides will be used with transgenic herbicide-
resistant crops then, in principle, the burden on
the soil will decline. Whether this effect is
actually significant remains to be established in
field trials.
 
3. Predictive testing of soil behaviour faces
methodological problems. Tests are not carried
out in the field, but in the laboratory on stan-
dardised model soils which do not adequately
reflect the complexities of the processes in real
soils. The results must be extrapolated from the
model systems to the agricultural fields. Such
extrapolations are only valid to a limited extent.
 
4. Synergistic effects which might arise from
interaction between nonselective herbicides and
soil substances and metabolic products formed
by soil microorganisms under pressure from
herbicides are not explicitly tested. They are,
however, dealt with implicitly through tests for
possible negative impacts on soil functions like
respiration.
 
5. The methodology and theory of soil testing
performed with nonselective herbicides reflect
the state of the art in soil science. Current
knowledge may be unsatisfactory and, therefore,
predictions of effects on real soil processes
fraught with significant uncertainty. Such un-
certainty will then, however, not be confined to
the assessment of nonselective herbicides: it will
apply likewise to possible soil impacts from new
selective herbicides and other agronomic
changes like new tillage schemes, variations in
fertilisation, or variations in crop rotation. In
general, the limits of predictive testing are a
problem for all precautionary regulation of new
technology. If such limits are not sufficient to
ban a technology outright, then they must be
compensated by monitoring the technology after
it has been introduced.55
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 See also Moorman and Keller (1996).
 
55
 This solution was favoured by the majority of partici-
pants in our technology assessment, see section III E2
below.
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 Question 2: Will the application of nonselec-
tive herbicides have an effect on soil erosion?56
 Conclusions from the discussions
 
6. The use of herbicides is not a major factor of
soil erosion in agriculture. Soil erosion is mainly
due to mismanagement with respect to tillage
and site-specific choice of crops to be grown.
 
7. Theoretical calculations predict a certain
reduction of the disposition to soil erosion when
nonselective herbicides are applied in postemer-
gence treatment of weeds. The underlying as-
sumption is that the soil will be better and, for a
longer period, covered by weeds (or their re-
mains after treatment). Reductions will vary
depending on location, choice of crop and mo-
dalities of herbicide application. The calcula-
tions suggest, for example, that the disposition
to erosion may be reduced by 11% for sugar
beet and 7% for potatoes and oilseed rape if
nonselective herbicides are applied to one crop
in the rotation sequence. If they are applied to
monocultures of corn the factor may be as high
as 17%.
 
8. Positive effects on soil erosion calculated for
the case of late postemergence applications will
not be achieved if nonselective herbicides are
applied in repeated treatments of low dosage
(splitting). Whether in this case a clean weeding
effect results, which would actually increase the
disposition for soil erosion, remains to be seen.
Theoretically, a certain negative effect is
plausible. This effect does not occur, if
combinations of selective herbicides (tank
mixtures) have been used up to now, which also
lead to broad spectrum weed control; in any case
the impact would be quantitatively small.
 
9. The predicted changes in the disposition to
soil erosion are derived from model calculations
which disregard the high fluctuations of natural
events. It is, therefore, questionable whether they
could be demonstrated in real practice. They are
in any case significantly smaller than changes
due to normal practices in agriculture, like
variations in crop rotation or tillage techniques.
Any positive effect the application of nonselec-
tive herbicides might have for soil protection is
negligible compared to the improvements that
would be achieved through proper, site-specific
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 Expert report commissioned from Prof. K. Auerswald
(Institut für Bodenkunde, Technische Universität Mün-
chen): ”Auswirkungen des Anbaus von Kulturpflanzen
mit gentechnisch erzeugter Herbizidresistenz auf das
Ausmaß der Bodenerosion und der Pestizidabschwem-
mung”; commentary by Dr. L. Ebner (Ciba-Geigy, Basel).
Materialien zur Technikfolgenabschätzung, Heft 8
 (see
appendix).
agronomic management.
 
10. In theory, transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops offer new opportunities to shift to tech-
niques of conservation tillage and mulch
cropping, which imply significant improvement
in soil protection against erosion. In practice,
however, a major shift is not likely to occur
within our present system of agriculture,
because it depends on economic profit rather
than on technical opportunity.57
 Question 3: Will water pollution levels be
reduced when nonselective herbicides are
applied in conjunction with transgenic herbi-
cide-resistant crops?58
 Conclusions from the discussion:
 
11. The pollution of groundwater with residues
from herbicides is due partly to the properties of
the herbicides themselves and partly to poor
management or reckless handling in herbicide
application and disposal. Nonselective herbi-
cides with favourable properties (low mobility
and rapid degradation in the soil) may reduce the
risk of groundwater pollution. Whether they
would actually improve the situation measur-
ably, as long as the practice of herbicide
handling is not effectively controlled, remains an
open question.
 
12. One must expect that herbicides used in
agriculture will leach into surface waters, since
some soil loss and run-off from farmland is
inevitable. Leaching may be slightly lower with
nonselective herbicides, such as glufosinate or
glyphosate, than with the selective herbicides
conventionally used. This projection is based on
the assumption that the amounts of herbicides
will be reduced as calculated. A countervailing
factor might be that herbicide washout from
crop leaf surfaces could increase if postemer-
gence, contact herbicides are applied. It is not to
be expected, however, that this factor would
completely outweigh the advantages from a
reduction in the amounts of herbicides used.
 
13. A possible ecological risk is that herbicides
leaching into surface waters could induce the
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 In Germany mulchseed is practised on no more than 1-
2% of the total area of row crops. However, in sites
which are particularly prone to erosion mulchseed may
amount to 30-50% (personal communication Dr. Reschke,
Pflanzenschutzamt Hannover).
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 Expert report commissioned form Prof. G. Klein
(Institut für Wasser-, Boden- und Lufthygiene, Bundesge-
sundheitsamt): ”Auswirkungen der HR-Technik auf
aquatische Ökosysteme”; commentary by Dr. E. Dorn
(Hoechst AG, Frankfurt), in: Materialien zur Technikfol-
genabschätzung, Heft 9
 (see appendix).
44 Herbicide-Resistant Crops
selection of herbicide-resistant mutants of
aquatic organisms. If these organisms spread
they could disturb the biocoenosis of an aquatic
ecosystem, for example, by disrupting existing
food chains. This could only happen, however, if
the herbicides exert selection pressure on the
nonresistant variants of the aquatic organism,
that is, if they reduce the fitness of these variants
or are toxic for them. Such effects should, in
principle, be excluded by the required testing for
herbicide approval. These tests may not elimi-
nate all uncertainty with respect to the effects of
herbicides on aquatic ecosystems, since testing
relies on model systems and indicators. Never-
theless, herbicide leaching into surface waters is,
in general, brief and concentrations are very low
(in micrograms per litre). It is therefore not
likely to give rise to a spread of herbicide-
resistant water organisms.
 
14. Drift response of water organisms to herbi-
cides is possible and can lead to (presumably
temporary) changes in aquatic ecosystems. Such
a response has also been observed with nonse-
lective herbicides like glyphosate. Drift response
can occur even when herbicide concentrations
are several orders of magnitude below the level
controlled by ecotoxicological testing. The use
of nonselective herbicides could, however, also
have a positive effect insofar as the number of
treatments per year and, hence, the number of
leaching events could be reduced.
 
15. It can be concluded that problems of water
pollution will at least not be aggravated, and
possibly even slightly improved, if there is a
shift from selective to nonselective herbicides in
weed control. With respect to ecotoxicology the
nonselective herbicides generally come off as
well or better than herbicides used up to now.
Whether a reduction in the amount herbicides
leached to surface waters of 10-30% represents
a real improvement in ecological terms is a
matter of debate.59
 Question 4: Will the application of nonselec-
tive herbicides change phytocoenotic struc-
tures in agricultural ecosystems?
 Conclusions from the discussion60
 
16. The application of nonselective herbicides in
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 Expert report commissioned from Prof. E. Mahn (Insti-
tut für Geobotanik und Botanischer Garten, Martin-
Luther-Universität Halle): ”Zu den Auswirkungen der
Einführung herbizidresistenter Kulturpflanzen auf
Ökosysteme”; commentary by Dr. M. Reschke (Pflanzen-
schutzamt, Hannover), in: Materialien zur Technikfol-
genabschätzung, Heft 10
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weed control can affect the phytocoenotic
structure in agricultural ecosystems, that is, it
can induce changes in dominance (numbers of
individuals) and diversity (number of species),
which extend beyond the vegetation period. The
mechanisms for such changes could be reduction
of seed banks in the soil and spread of weed
species that remain unaffected by nonselective
herbicides (incomplete spectrum).
 
17. Nonselective herbicides will change the
spectrum of weed species in the field. They
suppress weeds which may previously have been
tolerated because they are poor competitors for
the crop plants, and they favour weed species
that reproduce later in the vegetation period. If
nonselective herbicides are used in monocultures
or in all crops of a rotational sequence, they are
likely to cause irreversible reductions in the
weed seed bank and eventually eliminate indi-
vidual species from the normal weed community
and, hence, the agricultural habitat. On the other
hand, if a nonselective herbicide is only used
once in the crop rotation sequence, then the
species spectrum of the weed community ought
to be sustained (perhaps at a lower population
level) or it should be able to restore itself.
 
18. From the point of view of agricultural
production a reduced weed seed bank in the soil
would seem to be a positive rather than a nega-
tive factor. It would lower the weed pressure in
the field and, when fewer weeds appear, then
less herbicide treatment is needed—also an
advantage in ecological terms. On the other
hand, increased selection and spread of weed
species which are not controlled by those herbi-
cides may confront the farmer with additional
agronomic problems.
 
19. The spectrum of weed control is not extra-
ordinary with nonselective herbicides compared
to tank mixtures or successive treatments of
selective herbicides. Such treatments, routinely
applied in sugar beet, for instance, also keep
fields virtually free of weeds. In these cases, no
additional impacts on the phytocoenosis of an
agricultural ecosystem should be expected from
nonselective herbicides. The same may even be
true if one compares use of these herbicides with
very thorough manual weeding (which was
applied previously when labour costs were still
extremely low).
 
20. Changes in the agricultural phytocoenosis,
including shifts of dominance and weed spec-
trum biodiversity are implied in many agricul-
tural practices, such as different tillage schemes
or variations in the crops grown. Such effects
are, therefore, in no way specific to the intro-
duction of nonselective herbicides.
 Part II: Empirical Findings—Impacts And Consequences 45
 C  IMPACTS ON AGRICULTURE
 
This part deals with the indirect consequences of
transgenic herbicide-resistant crops. It reaches
beyond the issues of biosafety and considers
possible impacts on the structure and perform-
ance of modern agriculture. In Germany such
impacts are, as a rule, not accounted for in
regulatory frameworks for state approval of a
new technology. They are nevertheless crucial
for the political judgement and public accep-
tance of a technology and, therefore, an essential
topic in a technology assessment. We considered
the impact of transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops on biodiversity in breeding and cultivation,
on the practice and the economy of weed control,
and on food supply.
 1  Issues of biodiversity: Willtransgenic herbicide-resistant
crops accelerate genetic
erosion in plant breeding and
agricultural habitats?
 
The term ”genetic erosion” is used to designate
various forms of loss of biological or genetic
diversity. Its definition remains vague since
reference is made to heterogeneous issues: the
loss of wild species in nature, the loss of culti-
vars in plant breeding, the genetic uniformity of
crops actually grown in the fields, lack of crop
rotation and monocultures. Broadly, three
problem areas should be distinguished:
• the protection of species,
• the development of plant breeding,
• good field practice in agriculture.
 
While these problem areas do overlap to some
extent, within each of them, loss of diversity has
a different meaning and implies different con-
cepts of damage. The following table tries to
summarise these differences.
 
In our technology assessment, all of these issues
were invoked in the discussions of whether the
introduction of transgenic herbicide-resistant
plants might cause a loss of biodiversity; how-
ever, the arguments were varied. All the partici-
pants did agree that we are experiencing a
dramatic, world-wide loss of biodiversity and
genetic resources. The on-going destruction of
tropical rain forests, for instance, probably
eradicates thousands of species per week. While
the expansion of modern agriculture has indeed
added considerable negative impacts as well, it
is not likely that herbicide-resistant plants will
play a significant role in this respect.
 
Arguments were raised that genetic engineering
might reduce the level of variability within
cultivars, thereby destroying genetic resources
for plant breeding. Other arguments addressed
possible losses of diversity in the system of crop
husbandry at large. Key questions were whether,
with the introduction of herbicide-resistant
plants, the spectrum of crop species actually
grown in the fields would become narrower and
the number of cultivars for each crop smaller. It
 DEFINITIONS OF GENETIC EROSION  CONCEPTS OF DAMAGE
 Reference: Diversity of Species
 extinction of wild plant species  nature conservation; loss of genetic resources for plant
breeding
 elimination of weed species from agricultural habitats  nature conservation; loss of useful organisms depending
on such weeds
 reduction in the number of crops grown in agriculture  food supply becomes increasingly dependent on fewer
crop species
 reduction in the number of crops in the crop rotation
sequence
 increased susceptibility to pests and phytopathogens,
increased use of pesticides, environmental damage
 Reference: Diversity of Plant Varieties
 extinction of local cultivars (land races) at centres of
genetic diversity
 loss of genetic resources for plant breeding
 fewer crop varieties cultivated in fields  increased susceptibility to pests and phytopathogens;
monopolising the seed market
 reduction in the number of registered (marketed) crop
varieties
 same as above plus loss of options for farmers
 elimination of cultivars from breeding programmes  loss of genetic resources for plant breeding
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was further assumed that herbicide-resistant
crop varieties monopolise the seed market, either
because of economic advantages or privileges
resulting from patent law. The main objection to
such scenarios was that lack of diversity within
the spectrum of crops and varieties cultivated
was the result of the political, legal and, above
all, economic conditions of modern agriculture,
and not the result of any particular breeding
technique. A good test would be to ask whether
the problems would, in fact, be avoided if the
technique were changed, i.e. if conventional
breeding techniques were used instead of genetic
engineering.61
 Question 1: Will transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops cause further losses of biodiversity and
genetic resources?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
1. The main reason for global loss of plant
biodiversity is continued extinction of wild
species in natural ecosystems. This implies a
dramatic loss of genetic resources for plant
breeding. The introduction of transgenic herbi-
cide-resistant crops will not have a significant
impact on this process. Some key factors are the
political and economic pressures to harness ever
more land for agricultural and industrial use,
high population growth, rapid climate change,
ill-conceived nature conservation policies, and
the displacement of local, traditional cultivars
(land races) still used in the Third World by
newly developed, high-yield varieties.
 
2. Extensive use of nonselective herbicides in
conjunction with transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops could lead to the elimination of rare weed
species from the local seed banks and, hence,
from the local agricultural habitats. Although
the effect would be local, it would nevertheless
constitute a loss of biodiversity in terms of
nature conservation which requires that the
existing spectrum of species in all habitats be
preserved. In terms of genetic resources, how-
ever, even the elimination, for instance, of a rare
weed species from an entire region would not
imply any permanent loss. For breeding pur-
poses, it is sufficient if a species continues to
exist in any other site or nature reserve. Genetic
resources are lost, however, when ecotypes of a
species, i.e. regionally adapted variants, become
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 Expert report from Dr. H. Umbach, Dr. J. Zeddies and
Dr. R. von Broock (Kleinwanzlebener Saatzucht AG
(KWS) Einbeck): ”Auswirkungen der Herbizidresistenz-
Technik auf die Züchtungspraxis und die genetischen
Ressourcen”; commentary by C. Freudling (Saatgut-
Aktions-Netzwerk, Fürth), in: Materialien zur Technik-
folgenabschätzung, Heft 11 (see appendix).
extinct.
 
3. Genetic resources for plant breeding are lost
on a massive scale because, in the Third World,
local, traditional cultivars (land races) of im-
portant crops grown in the centres of genetic
diversity are now increasingly displaced by
modern, high-yield varieties. Although the
”globalisation” of agriculture, prevalent in the
industrialised countries, is a driving force behind
this process, herbicide-resistant plants are not a
significant factor in this respect.
 
4. Maintaining the level of biodiversity in plant
breeding does not seem to be a problem in
Central Europe at present. In contrast to nature
conservation, the protection of genetic resources
can be adequately ensured by gene banking and
cultivation at breeding stations. Moreover, the
continuity of genes from older cultivars is
guaranteed through their inclusion in the gene
pools of new varieties from which old traits can
be retrieved through suitable crossing. It is true
that, in this case, older cultivars will no longer
be grown and developed in the fields;
nevertheless, this is an unavoidable price to pay,
since breeding is by definition designed to
replace old varieties with new ones in the field.
 
5. The fact that transgenic varieties are derived
from a few transformed cells identically repli-
cated (cloned) in cell cultures does not imply a
loss of biodiversity. The development of trans-
genic varieties has no influence on the amount of
genetic variability within the cultivar. The
cloned cells still contain all the genetic variabil-
ity which is, in turn, expressed when these cells
are crossed with others in the process of devel-
oping a new variety. The genetic variability
between varieties is, in contrast, quite limited
(see below). However, this indicates, a lack of
diversity in agriculture and not a loss of genetic
resources.
 Question 2: Will transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops reduce the diversity of crops and varie-
ties grown in agriculture?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
6. Diversity in crop varieties has increased
rather than decreased over the last decade, both
in terms of number of varieties registered by
plant breeders and number of varieties actually
grown in the fields. There is, nevertheless,
reason to infer genetic erosion since, for each
crop species, few varieties dominate in cultiva-
tion and all varieties are closely related. Culti-
vars that are closely related genetically (i.e.
homogeneous) imply higher risk of yield loss
through pressure from pests and phytopatho-
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gens. This certainly applies if the plants are
protected only by the mechanisms of vertical
pest resistance which can be easily overcome by
mutation in the pest organisms.
 
7. The low number of varieties actually culti-
vated in the fields results from economic and
agronomic considerations which bear no relation
to herbicide-resistant plants or genetic engineer-
ing in general. The best available varieties are
usually also the most successful on the market.
And, farmers prefer homogeneous stocks of
plants because these are easier to cultivate and
harvested crops easier to process.
 
8. The current law of plant variety protection
(Saatgutverkehrsgesetz in Germany) reinforces
the trend towards homogeneity, because it
requires a test of ”uniformity” before a variety
can be registered and marketed. The aim of this
test is to ensure the quality of the seed a farmer
purchases, and to guarantee that all plants of a
variety are suitable for a designed purpose, for
instance, wheat for baking bread or potatoes for
making chips. In addition, registration proce-
dures require that new plant varieties meet the
legal test of ”value for cultivation”. This makes
the market for seed products highly transparent,
so that farmers can easily and shift en masse to
the varieties they find most suitable for their
area. Finally, the legal privilege of free use of
available plant varieties for breeding, initially
designed to preclude commercial monopolies and
promote diversity on the seed market, paradoxi-
cally encourages technical uniformity of seed
products: Since all breeders use the best avail-
able varieties for further development, they all
end up with very similar products.
 
16. Economic calculation and political regula-
tion (quotas) determine which crop species
farmers choose to cultivate on their land. The
particular crop rotation sequence is decided
within the constraints of agronomic needs—
usually long before a specific variety of crop is
chosen and irrespective of whether special traits
such as herbicide resistance are available in the
cultivars. Herbicide-resistant varieties could
attract farmers, however, if they offer clear
technical and economic advantages. This is
probably the case for sugar beet, at present. But
any further expansion of the area of sugar beet
cultivation would be prevented by quota restric-
tions in Europe. In general, the availability of
herbicide-resistant varieties is not likely to
determine farmers’ decisions about crop species
to be grown; it will therefore have no significant
impact on the level of diversity in crop hus-
bandry.
 2  Agronomic effects oftransgenic herbicide-resistant
crops: technical gains,
resistant weeds, and integrated
crop protection
 
The application of nonselective herbicides with
transgenic crops is still at the beginning stage in
Germany. Although the number of field trials
carried out under practical conditions is growing
fast, few herbicide-resistant crops have been
placed on the market.62 Therefore, judgements
about the agronomic advantages nonselective
herbicides may have for the farmer are provi-
sional and subject to further demonstration in
practice.
 
In our technology assessment various advan-
tages were claimed63:
• Weed control would become easier and more
flexible. The underlying assumption was that,
with nonselective, broad spectrum herbicides.
the application of tank mixtures herbicides could
be spared, that problem weeds would be effec-
tively controlled and that the opportunities for
postemergence treatment would increase.
• The farmer can use a wider range of herbi-
cides and avoid one-sided (nonrotational) appli-
cations. This is the minimum advantage claimed
for nonselective herbicides, since it would be
valid even if these herbicides were otherwise not
superior to the selective ones used up to now.
• With postemergence, nonselective herbicides,
economic threshold criteria can be applied, i.e.
herbicide treatment can be spared if the
anticipated costs of yield loss from weeds are
less than the costs of the herbicide needed to
control those weeds.
• The farmer has more options to shift to new
systems of crop husbandry, such as direct
drilling, conservation tillage mulch cropping and
mixed cropping, because these systems will be
easier to manage when postemergence, nonse-
lective herbicides can be applied.
• Farmers gain flexibility with respect to which
crop species he can grow in the rotational se-
quence, since the nonselective herbicides have
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 According to reports from AgrEvo, over 1700 field
trials have been carried out with oilseed rape, maize,
soybean and sugar beet resistant to glufosinate (autumn
1996). Resistant oilseed rape was approved in Canada in
1995. Approval of glufosinate resistant maize is expected
to be granted in the U.S. in 1997, soybean and sugar beet
in 1998; see Rasche et al. (1996). Monsanto achieved
U.S. approval of its glyphosate resistant soybeans in
1994. These soybeans have been cultivated on 1-2% of
the soybean area in the U.S. in 1996 (Monsanto, press
release Information Sojabohne).
 
63
 See also Wilcut et al. (1995); Burnside (1996: 400).
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low persistence and no carry-over effects to the
next vegetation period.64
 
Most of these claims were controversial. It was
argued that the advantages, although possible in
theory, could not be achieved in actual practice,
and that they were outweighed by disadvantages.
 
In particular, doubts were raised whether the
nonselective herbicides currently under discus-
sion would not also have incomplete spectra and,
therefore, not be clearly superior to the selective
herbicides already in use. On the other hand it
was argued that selective herbicides could be
driven off the market, leaving the farmers with
fewer rather than more choices of herbicides for
weed control. In general, it was conceded that
nonselective herbicides increase the technical
options to shift to new systems of crop hus-
bandry. However, the practical relevance of
such options was denied, since under existing
economic conditions there would be little scope
for implementing these systems.
 
Arguments over possible agronomic disadvan-
tages focused mainly on the emergence of herbi-
cide-resistant weeds. Are nonselective herbicides
particularly likely to produce resistant weed
populations when they are extensively applied?
Were this the case, then these herbicides would
become useless for agriculture. Resistant weeds
can evolve through gene flux from the crop plant
(hybridisation); however, the most relevant
mechanism would be spontaneous mutations in
individual weeds and selection of the mutants
through herbicide application.
 
A long debate in the technology assessment
addressed the question of whether or not the use
of nonselective herbicides would be compatible
with the standards of integrated crop protection.
These standards require that the farmers mini-
mise pesticide use and try instead to suppress
weeds indirectly through preventive cultivation
measures and good agronomic management, for
instance, growing competitive crop varieties,
increasing the number of crops in the rotational
sequence, or using ground cover or mulch crops
to suppress weed growth. Direct measures,
including treatment with herbicides, should be
adopted only when weed problems are so severe
that the cost they might incur (in terms of yield
loss) would surmount the economic threshold of
the cost for additional weed control; residual
weed populations below this level are viewed not
merely as tolerable, but also as desirable.
 
There was agreement that the current use of
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herbicides does not meet the standards of inte-
grated crop protection. The idea that priority
must be placed on preventive measures, imply-
ing a revision of current crop rotation sequences
and cultivation systems, breaks down in the face
of economic constraints. Nonselective herbicides
are should not change this situation profoundly.
The question is, rather, whether they would
improve it slightly or make it even worse. Two
issues were discussed in this respect: Are eco-
nomic thresholds more likely to be observed if
nonselective herbicides are applied? Can the
agronomic functions of residual weeds in culti-
vated fields be maintained?65
 Question 1: Do nonselective herbicides pro-
vide more flexibility and new options in weed
control and crop management?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
1. Nonselective herbicides applied in conjunction
with transgenic herbicide-resistant crops provide
additional options for postemergent weed con-
trol. They extend the range of choice for herbi-
cide rotation.
 
2. Actually, nonselective herbicides could reduce
the total number of herbicides applied in agri-
culture. If they have significant advantages over
the herbicides currently used, they could replace
these in many areas. This could occur even if
nonselective herbicides were applied only once
in the crop rotation sequence, for instance, when
resistance to one and the same nonselective
herbicide were engineered into the common
cultivars of all row crops.
 
3. While new and better products can always
drive older ones off a market, there is no reason
to suppose that this will be the case for nonse-
lective herbicides. Selective herbicides are
widely used with many crops at present and they
will keep a share of the market; it is unlikely that
they would completely disappear as options for
herbicide treatment.
 
4. Postemergence, nonselective herbicides can
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 Export report on organic impacts commissioned from
Prof. K. Hurle (Institut für Phytomedizin, Universität
Hohenheim): ”Mögliche Veränderungen in der land-
wirtschaftlichen Praxis durch die HR-Praxis”; commen-
tary by Dr. P. Niemann (Biologische Bundesanstalt für
Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Braunschweig), in: Materi-
alien
 
zur Technikfolgenabschätzung, Heft 12
 (see appen-
dix). Expert report on integrated crop production com-
missioned from Prof. R. Heitefuß, Dr. B. Gerowitt and
Dr. H. Steinmann (Institut für Pflanzenpathologie und
Pflanzenschutz, Universität Göttingen): ”HR-Technik und
integrierter Pflanzenschutz”; commentary by A. Gnekow-
Metz, in: Materialien zur Technikfolgenabschätzung,
Heft 13
 (see appendix).
 Part II: Empirical Findings—Impacts And Consequences 49
improve weed control. They allow more thor-
ough elimination of problem weeds and reduce
the risks of yield loss through herbicide applica-
tion, since the crop plants are insensitive. Sig-
nificant advantages might be expected particu-
larly for those row crops with wide row distance
such as sugar beet or potatoes, but also for
oilseed rape and maize. All of these crops are
subject to high weed pressure.66
 
5. These advantages may not materialise, how-
ever, if nonselective herbicides also have incom-
plete spectra and must therefore be applied in
combination (tank mixtures) with other herbi-
cides or in a series of repeated treatments.
Although glyphosate and glufosinate have a
broader spectrum than most other herbicides,
their spectrum is by no means complete.67
 
6. With transgenic herbicide-resistant crops, the
farmer gains flexibility with respect to the time
span available for postemergence treatment. If
necessary, i.e. when unexpected weed problems
arise, a treatment that was spared previously can
be recovered later without harming the crops.
                                                  
 
66
 Reschke (1996) summarises findings from field trials
with transgenic herbicide-resistant sugar beets:
 
”Two applications of three litres of BASTA per hec-
tare (one at the four-leaf stage, the other at the eight-
leaf stage of the sugar beet) provide good control of
nearly all weeds. If weather conditions are favourable
and plant growth enhanced, two applications of 1.5
litres per hectare (plus an additive of oil) provide suf-
ficient coverage, even for fool’s parsley (Aethusa
cynapium) which is otherwise difficult to control. An-
nual nettles (Urtica urens) which occur in rare in-
stances are somewhat less sensitive if weather condi-
tions are not favourable; the same applies (although to
a lesser degree) to cleavers (Galium aparine) and field
pansy (Viola arvensis). These require higher dosage,
as a rule, or a supplement of one litre of GOLTIX per
hectare. This supplement also prolongs the herbicidal
effect and, in combination with 1.5 to 2 litres of
BASTA is optimal in terms of effectivness and cost of
weed control.”
 Crop tolerance to glufosinate has been ranked very high
(9.45 of 10 points) by farmers who cultivated transgenic
herbicide-resistant oilseed rape in Canada, according to a
survey by AgrEvo (Rasche et al., 1996: 10). Reschke
(1996) reports comparable results with the application of
glufosinate in transgenic herbicide-resistant sugar beet.
With glyphosate-resistant sugar beet sufficient control can
be achieved with two applications of three litres of the
herbicide (Reschke, personal communication).
 
67
 In herbicide-resistant sugar beet appreciable reductions
in the rate of herbicide application can be achieved even
if glufosinate is used in a tank mixture with Goltex: a
total of five to six litres per hectare (in two applications)
versus eight to nine litres per hectare (in three to four
applications); see Reschke 1996. Reductions with
glyphosate in sugar beet will be comparable. In soybean
glyphosate can replace a combination of five different
herbicides and reduce the amount of herbicides by 30%—
from 1.13 to 0.74 kilogram per hectare (Monsanto, press
release Information Sojabohne, December 1996).
This assumes that nonselective herbicides indeed
need not be applied in herbicide combinations
and that they do less damage to crops than the
selective, postemergence herbicides currently
available.
 
7. Theoretically, transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops extend the range of technical options for
systems of crop husbandry, such as direct
drilling, mulchseed or intercropping, which
imply more effective soil conservation. Practi-
cally, however, transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops will do little to enhance a shift to such
systems. Ground cover to prevent weed growth
in row crops, for instance, was possible before
herbicide-resistant crops were available; but, for
economic reasons, it has been little used. Tech-
niques of minimal tillage (direct drilling) are
more often cost-effective and could be boosted
somewhat by the introduction of herbicide-
resistant crops, but large-scale intercropping
will hardly be economically viable within the
framework of conventional agriculture.
 
8. With transgenic herbicide-resistant maize, a
monoculture could possibly be better managed.
But monocultures are never advisable anyway,
according to the principles of good field prac-
tice.
 
9. The use of glyphosate and glufosinate can
allow greater flexibility in crop rotation in
certain cases, because they have low persistence
and are unlikely to have carry-over effects to the
next vegetation period. However, the choice of
crops to be grown is above all contingent upon
economic factors, and the applicability of non-
selective herbicides will hardly be a decisive
factor for this choice.
 Question 2: Are nonselective herbicides par-
ticularly prone to produce herbicide-resistant
weed populations?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
10. There is a certain risk with any herbicide of
becoming ineffective with time because of the
spread of resistant weeds. The problem is not
specific to herbicides which are applied in
conjunction with transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops. Resistant weeds presuppose that resistant
mutants evolve which are fit enough to survive
and reproduce. The rate of spread will then
depend on the selection pressure exerted on the
weed population. Selection pressure, in turn, will
depend on the characteristics and management
of the herbicide, e.g. its spectrum, phytotoxicity,
the rate and frequency of its application, or
herbicide mixtures.
 
11. Since nonselective herbicides with a broad
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spectrum and high phytotoxicity exert a greater
pressure on weed populations than conventional
herbicides, they will, in principle, increase the
risk that resistant weeds would be selected,
provided that suitable mutants exist.
 
12. The probability of resistant mutants evolving
with sufficient fitness depends on the target
enzyme of the herbicide. In the case of sulfonyl-
urea, resistance can evolve easily because single
mutations in the target enzymes of weeds suffice
to render the herbicide ineffective. On the other
hand, this risk seems to be relatively small in the
cases of glyphosate and glufosinate. These
herbicides have a long history of extended use
(not involving transgenic plants), yet no resistant
weed mutants have been observed. Nevertheless
such mutants may still be possible.68 The risk of
spontaneous mutations conferring resistance to
weeds may be further reduced if the mechanism
of herbicide resistance in crop plants is derived
from bacterial genes.
 
13. No reasons were given in the technology
assessment to support the hypothesis that non-
selective herbicides would be routinely misused
and that they are therefore more likely to lead to
the selection of resistant weeds. Rising costs
provide an incentive to reduce the rate of herbi-
cide application and avoid excessive treatment.
Crop sequences may not always correspond to
the rules of good field practice, but this is be-
cause of economic considerations and not the
options for weed control.
 
14. The use of nonselective herbicides with
monocultures or without herbicide rotation
through all stages of a crop sequence is not
advisable, since it clearly increases the risk of
herbicide-resistant weeds. Furthermore, volun-
teer plants from the previous vegetation period
will be difficult to control if all crops in a rota-
tion sequence are resistant to the same herbicide.
These disadvantages could probably be avoided
if nonselective herbicides were used only once in
a rotational sequence.69
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 Rasche et al. (1996: 9) emphasise that any mutation in
the target enzyme of glufosinate (the glutamin synthetase)
would be lethal for the plant, and hence the spontaneous
development of herbicide resistance in weeds is unlikely.
Consequently resistant weeds have never been observed,
despite wide ranging application of glufosinate over a
period of more than 10 years. On the other hand, glypho-
sate resistance has apparently been detected recently in
Lolium rigidum. This weed has accumulated several
resistance mechanisms; an Australian biotype shows
multiple resistance to at least nine dissimilar herbicide
chemistries, according to Preston et al. (1996).
 
69
 See also the summary of Thill (1996: 336):
 Question 3: Is the application of nonselective
herbicides in transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops compatible with the standards of inte-
grated crop protection?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
15. Nonselective herbicides improve and extend
the options for herbicide treatment. As a result,
they will probably stabilise herbicide treatment
as a strategy of weed control. The current use of
herbicides does not comply with the standards of
integrated crop protection. Existing options for
indirect control through preventive management
(in particular, through appropriate cultivation
measures) are neglected because herbicides
provide a more attractive alternative. Preventive
weed management not only implies increased
labour input and investment costs for new
machinery, but also technical difficulties, such
as increased dependency on the weather, unpre-
dictable effectiveness, or management problems
with ground cover etc. To the extent that these
constraints would also apply for nonselective
herbicides, their possible contribution to inte-
grated crop protection will be modest at best.70
 
16. In theory, postemergence, nonselective her-
bicides are more in line with the ideas of inte-
grated crop management because they improve
the prospects for cultivation with direct drilling
and mulch cropping, as well as the feasibility of
economic thresholds to be observed in herbicide
use. In practice, however, nonselective herbi-
cides will probably have little effect in this
respect. Economic thresholds are not widely
recognised by farmers in weed control, and the
availability of nonselective herbicides will
probably not make a great difference.71
                                                                          
 
”The risk of selecting herbicide-resistant weeds in a
[herbicide-resistant crop] is no greater than using a
selective herbicide in a naturally tolerant crop. In ei-
ther case repeated use of the same herbicide or herbi-
cides with the same mode of action will eventually se-
lect for herbicide-resistant weed biotypes. This can be
prevented or greatly delayed by using effective inte-
grated weed management strategies in all parts of the
crop producvtion system. Most importantly, avoid
using the same herbicide or herbicides with the same
site of action routinely in any cropping system.”
 
70
 As one participant in the technology remarked, the
introduction of conservation tillage (minimal tillage) has
been thwarted by the fact that, without the use of the
plough, new seed-drilling techniques are required to cope
with the mulch and surface weeds. ”This means the
farmer has to buy a second drilling machine.”
 
71
 This tentative conclusion was criticised by one partici-
pant, who claimed that herbicide-resistant crops are a real
step towards integrated crop protection,
 
”because for the first time a herbicide will be available
which is effective against all weeds, including the
large ones. The biggest barrier to observing economic
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17. Even if economic thresholds are not
observed, farmers have better opportunities with
postemergence, nonselective herbicides to reduce
the rate of herbicide application, depending on
actual weed infestation in the field. This could
lead to appreciable reduction in the amount of
herbicides applied.72
 
18. Herbicide treatments which leave fields
completely void of any residual weeds (”clean
weeding”), contradict the standards of integrated
crop protection. It is doubtful, however, whether
nonselective herbicides would have such an
effect. Glyphosate and glufosinate, for example,
although they have a broad spectrum and are
more effective than previously available selec-
tive herbicides, are far from leaving fields
permanently free of weeds. As systemic (glypho-
sate) or contact (glufosinate) herbicides, they act
on plants which appear in the field, i.e. they only
control those weeds which have already
emerged. Weeds can grow up again immediately
after herbicide application, from the seeds in the
soil. In crops which had previously been treated
with combinations of herbicides, nonselective
herbicides will not mean increased suppression
of weeds.73
 
19. Weed stocks which re-emerge after applica-
tion of nonselective herbicides may not be
sufficient to fulfil the agronomic functions
ascribed to residual weeds as a factor in inte-
grated crop protection, namely, diverting pests
from crops or harbouring beneficial organisms.
What would certainly not be compatible with the
principles of integrated crop protection would be
if, due to the loss of residual weeds, more insec-
ticides had to be applied to fields already treated
with nonselective herbicides. As yet, there are no
signs that this is in fact the case. Moreover, the
so-called positive agronomic functions of resid-
ual weeds are largely a matter of theory; whether
                                                                          
thresholds in weed control has been the fear of not
being able to deal with large weeds with certainty.”
 
72
 The standards of integrated crop protection are not
clearly defined. It would be inappropriate to reject current
practices solely because they do not comply with the
concept of economic thresholds. As a participant writes,
 
”Instead of adopting the economic thresholds pro-
posed by the scientists, farmers have frequently re-
duced the amounts of herbicide they apply by up to a
half if weed cover is low, with the same result, namely
that a residual weed population remains which does
no economic damage.”
 
73
 As one participant notes: ”In view of the lower persis-
tence of nonselective herbicides, residual weeds are more
likely to be in the fields than previously.”
 This argument fails, however, if glufosinate is applied in
a tank mixture with a herbicide which is explicitly added
in order to prolong herbicidal effects.
they occur in practice, has yet to be demon-
strated. Residual weeds, on the other hand, can
also serve as habitats for plant pests and they
increase the risk of transmission of plant dis-
ease.
 3  Economic effects of transgenicherbicide-resistant crop plants:profits, costs, and
concentrations
 
Discussions about the economy of transgenic
herbicide-resistant plants used the current sys-
tem of intensive agriculture as the frame of
reference, and considered possible impacts of
those plants on the economic situations of indi-
vidual farmers and the structure of seed produc-
tion and markets.74
 
Measuring costs and benefits in terms of prices
of agricultural inputs and products is a standard
approach in economics. But it disregards
”external” costs, in the case of herbicides,
possible damage to the environment, or the costs
of developing and testing herbicides. This may
be methodologically justifiable, if conventional
agriculture is chosen as the frame of reference.
Since the evidence presented in our technology
assessment suggests that the ecological and
social consequences of nonselective herbicides
will not differ significantly from the conse-
quences associated with current herbicide use,
external costs should be comparable and may,
therefore, be disregarded.
 
Comparison to the status quo in conventional
agriculture and current practices of herbicide
use was not accepted by all participants as a
valid approach, however. The dispute over this
point notwithstanding, there was agreement that
it would indeed be reasonable and legitimate to
include the external costs of herbicide applica-
tions in conventional agriculture as part of a
comprehensive economic assessment of herbi-
cide-resistant crops. To that extent it was at
least implicitly conceded that market prices for
farmers and consumers are not the sole criteria
for economic costs and benefits.
 
Nevertheless, calculations of external costs raise
unresolved methodological problems. There is
no way to monetarise ecological, social and
political consequences without making arbitrary
                                                  
 
74
 Expert report commissioned from Prof. V. Beusmann
(FSP Biotechnik, Gesellschaft und Umwelt, Universität
Hamburg): ”Betriebs- und volkswirtschaftliche Auswir-
kungen des Einsatzes herbizidresistenter Nutzpflanzen
(HR-Technik)”; commentary by Prof. R. Müller (Institut
für Agrarökonomie, Universität Kiel), in: Materialien zur
Technikfolgenabschätzung, Heft 14
 (see appendix).
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assumptions. The technology assessment did
not, therefore, try to provide such calculations,
and the results remain a matter of speculation. It
was clear, however, that there was no agreement
among the participants about whether or not a
comprehensive balance of all costs and benefits
would show, in the final analysis, that the use of
herbicides in modern agriculture was not eco-
nomical.
 
Calculating the economic gains individual
farmers might harvest from using nonselective
herbicides involves a high degree of uncertainty,
at present. Since transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops have hardly arrived on the market, seed
prices have not yet been established. Nor are the
prices for nonselective herbicides constant. The
report delivered in the technology assessment
based its calculations on 1992 market prices. In
addition, it made assumptions about reductions
in the rate of herbicide application and further
advantages from nonselective herbicides that
are, in part, controversial.
 
With respect to possible impacts from transgenic
herbicide-resistant crops on the seed business,
the main point made was whether concentrations
among breeding companies, and between breed-
ers and herbicide manufacturers become more
likely, and whether herbicide-resistant crop
varieties could be pushed to gain a monopoly on
the seed market. In this context, the discussions
also considered the argument frequently ad-
vanced in public debates that farmers would
become economically more dependent because
they would be forced to buy herbicide-resistant
seeds together with the matching nonselective
herbicide in a ”package”.
 Question 1: Are transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops and nonselective herbicides more cost-
effective for the farmer?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
1. The use of nonselective herbicides in con-
junction with resistant crop cultures benefits
farmers economically insofar as it reduces the
total amount of herbicides used at present and,
through postemergence treatment, minimises
yield loss from crop damage. Calculations
suggest that there is a clear cost advantage for
sugar beet, perhaps a saving of up to 50%.
Smaller advantages can be expected for maize
and soybean, followed by winter rape and po-
tato. If fields are heavily infested with problem
weeds, some benefits may be derived for all
crops.
 
2. The calculated savings will become less or
disappear altogether if nonselective herbicides,
too, have incomplete spectra and, therefore, have
to be applied in combination (tank mixtures)
with other herbicides or in repeated treatments in
order to be fully effective. For glyphosate and
glufosinate, however, gaps in the spectrum will
not totally rule out all the calculated benefits.75
 
3. Given the competition on agricultural mar-
kets, it is to be expected that financial benefits
for the farmers would have to be passed on to
the consumers in the form of lower product
prices sooner or later.
 
4. In many cases nonselective herbicides will
probably not offer tangible price advantages
compared with those herbicides used at present.
Nonselective herbicides will only add to the
number of postemergence herbicides from which
farmers can choose, and they must face compe-
tition from products already established on the
market. Under such conditions, nonselective
herbicides may have a competitive edge, if it
turns out that they do indeed mean easier man-
agement and greater flexibility of weed control
for the same price.
 Question 2: Will transgenic herbicide-resistant
cultivars gain a monopoly on the seed market
and make farmers more dependent on herbi-
cide manufacturers?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
5. No single crop variety will come to dominate
the seed market just because it has been com-
plemented with transgenic herbicide resistance.
If herbicide resistance constitutes a real eco-
nomic advantage, then it is rather to be expected
                                                  
 
75
 According to calculations by Reschke (1996), maxi-
mum costs for weed control in sugar beet would be
DM 250 per hectare (two applications each of three litres
of Basta (glufosinate) plus one kilogram of Goltix); this
implies a savings of DM 100 (30%) compared to the cost
for current applications of selective herbicides (DM 350).
Savings increase up to 45% if fields are infested with
fool’s parsley or if mulchseed has been applied
(DM 450).
 The figures may be even more favourable with glypho-
sate-resistant sugar beet: about DM 100 for two applica-
tions with two to three litres each (Reschke, personal
communication). According to IHE (1994: 42/44) data
from the notifier suggest that savings could amount to 50-
70% (75 ECU per hectare instead of 150-250 ECU); if
problems with nettles are taken into account the savings
might still be 30%. On the other hand, Meisser and
Guenat (1996: 27) estimate a gain of no more than 2-7%
on gross margin for sugar beet in Swiss agriculture. With
respect to glyphosate-resistant soybeans herbicide costs
are reduced from $54.42 per hectare (1993/94) to $23.30
U.S. (1996). Although the seeds are 25% more expensive
famers still gain from the reduction in the amounts of
herbicides used (Monsanto, press release Information
Sojabohne, December 1996).
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that it would be engineered into all the major
cultivars which have a significant market share
at present. This will also apply to the cultivars
of sugar beet currently grown.
 
6. Economic concentration is likely to continue
in the seed business, as indicated by trends in the
US and many European countries. The chronic
economic crisis in agriculture is the main driving
factor behind this trend. To a certain extent,
modern biotechnology could accelerate this
process, if it renders competitive breeding more
capital intensive. Whether the number of varie-
ties marketed would decline as concentration
increased is an open question. Economic theory
does not warrant a prediction of that kind.
 
7. The assumption that chemical companies
which become involved in the seed business
would try to force farmers to buy ”packages” of
herbicide-resistant cultivars and matching
nonselective herbicides is not realistic. In eco-
nomic terms, it would be definitely more profit-
able to sell the seed and the herbicide separately.
A crop variety which can only be purchased
together with a herbicide is by definition at a
disadvantage compared to a variety which is
available without an additional product insepa-
rably linked to it. The same applies in reverse
for the herbicide, if it could only be sold together
with some specific crop variety. For the herbi-
cide manufacturer, the ”package” would, in any
case, only be conceivable if the herbicide had no
application other than that associated with the
company’s own herbicide-resistant crop varie-
ties, and this is obviously an absurd assumption
for all herbicides.
 
8. Seed companies, on the other hand, could
indeed expect extra profit if they were able to
monopolise herbicide resistance genes for their
own crop varieties. This is true, however, irre-
spective of whether a company offers a
”package” including the nonselective herbicide
or whether the herbicide is freely available on
the market.
 
9. For herbicide manufacturers, in contrast, it
would be sheer economic nonsense to restrict
sales of nonselective herbicides to exclusive
packages with a limited number of transgenic
varieties. They are bound to exploit to the full
the limited period of patent protection for their
herbicides. Therefore, if herbicide manufacturers
own resistance genes, they must have an interest
in having them transferred to as many varieties
as possible, whether they own these varieties or
not. From their perspective, it might even be
economical to provide the herbicide resistance
genes freely, i.e. without license fees for breed-
ers. There are some indications that this is, in
fact, what is being done.76
 4  Food supply: Is a contributionto be expected from transgenic
herbicide-resistant crops?
 
It is not particularly sensible to ask whether
transgenic herbicide resistance is an innovation
which can contribute significantly to solving the
problems of world food supply. This is obvi-
ously not the case. In our technology assess-
ment, the question was therefore broadened to
include the possible contribution of herbicides in
general as a strategy for weed control. Discus-
sions focused on agriculture in Third World
countries.77
 
Participants had no doubts that world food
supply is clearly both a social and political
question of distributive justice, and a technical
question of increased production in agriculture.
They thus by-passed much of the ill-conceived
polemics in the public debate, which tended to
play the need for political reform off against the
need for technological innovation and vice versa.
 
Whereas all the participants agreed that food
production in the countries of the Third World
must be increased, the strategy to be chosen
remained a matter of controversy. Some placed
their hopes on the development of smallholder
farming and the improvement of indigenous,
”appropriate” agricultural technology. Propo-
nents of this scheme excluded any use of
herbicides. Others, in contrast, argued that a
subsistence economy of smallholder farmers
would not feed urban masses and that therefore
industrialised, high-input agriculture is indis-
pensable in the Third World as well. From their
perspective, herbicides and also herbicide-
resistant crops were a possible technical option.
There was further disagreement about whether
herbicides could be considered a useful option at
all for weed control under the natural, social and
economic conditions of agriculture in Third
World countries (tropical climates, large sectors
of subsistence economy, and cheap labour).
                                                  
 
76
 It seems difficult to anticipate commercial strategies of
herbicide manufacturers. These must, of course, try to get
a return on investment from licencing the herbicide
resistance gene, if the herbicide is off patent, which is
already the case for glyphosate and will be the case for
glufosinate in a few years.
 
77
 Expert report commissioned from S. Neubert and
J. Knirsch (Pestizid-Aktions-Netzwerk, Hamburg): ”Der
Beitrag des Anbaus herbizidresistenter Kulturpflanzen für
die Ernährungssicherung in der Dritten Welt”; commen-
tary by Prof. K. Leisinger (Ciba Geigy AG, Basel), in:
Materialien zur Technikfolgenabschätzung, Heft 16
 (see
appendix).
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It was not possible to deal with these issues
adequately in our technology assessment . The
following conclusions are preliminary remarks
to an ongoing discussion. The controversy over
policies for agricultural development in the
Third World reflects the general battle over
whether industrialised farming with chemical
inputs or organic farming with appropriate
technology should constitute the model for the
future of agriculture. It became clear in the
technology assessment, however, that both sides
face a battery of unresolved problems. For
instance, it has yet to be demonstrated how
extended industrialised, high-input agriculture
can be ecologically stabilised in tropical climates
and whether it would constitute a sustainable
basis for increasing food production. On the
other hand, it is not clear how the productivity of
farming systems which rely on ”appropriate”
technology and reject any chemical inputs can be
increased to such a degree that food supply
would be guaranteed in the future.
 Question 1: What type of agriculture is re-
quired in Third World countries to guarantee
food supply for a growing number of people?
Should smallholder farming and industrial-
ised agriculture be played off against one
another?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
1. Hunger is endemic in many countries of the
Third World, not because there is a lack of food,
but because there is a lack of income. Domestic
production of food has increased considerably in
recent years because of the ”green revolution”
among other factors. Food supply is nevertheless
not guaranteed since poor people, especially
those in underdeveloped rural areas, cannot
afford to buy food.
 
2. At present, hunger is more a problem of
inadequate distribution than of inadequate
production. To solve this problem, political
reform and economic development are needed,
and not just new technology; and transgenic
herbicide resistance engineered into crop plants
is certainly not part of the solution. On the other
hand, given continued growth of the world
population, food supply will again become a
problem of absolute, available quantities of food
products. Therefore, technological innovations
which increase agricultural productivity will
continue to be crucial for future food supply.
 
3. Problems of hunger are most severe for
people living in rural areas. To feed these peo-
ple, smallholder farming is an important basis
and should be further developed. On the other
hand, it cannot be expected that smallholder
farming would produce sufficient food surpluses
to feed the masses of people in the expanding
urban agglomerates of the Third World.
 
4. A dramatic increase in Third World agricul-
tural productivity is indispensable. One possible
solution might be a ”dual system” of agriculture
which relies, on the one hand, on a sector of
smallholder farming producing mainly for self-
subsistence in rural areas and, on the other hand,
on a high-input, industrialised farming sector
producing for urban populations. However, a
”dual system” of this nature would only be able
to avoid breakdowns in food production and
supply in the long run, if industrialised agricul-
ture can be made ecologically sustainable,
particularly in tropical climates.
 
5. Furthermore, a ”dual system” policy would
seem to tolerate Third World agriculture’s
disintegration into separate sectors, a traditional
one and a modern one. The effect might well be
that the rural areas become even more margi-
nalised. In fact, it might be preferable to mod-
ernise agriculture and develop the infrastructure
throughout all rural sectors and areas. Under
this option smallholder, labour-intensive farming
would be guaranteed a significant place in
agricultural production and it would have to be
promoted. In general, the development of rural
areas will be the key factor for comprehensive
economic progress in many countries of the
Third World.
 
6. It must be emphasised that increased agricul-
tural production is a necessary but not sufficient
condition to guarantee food supply. Problems of
just distribution must be solved by political
means. This includes no discrimination and a
”fair share” for Third World countries within
the international trade system.
 Question 2: Can herbicides and hence nonse-
lective herbicides in combination with trans-
genic herbicide-resistant crops be applied
usefully in Third World agriculture?
 Conclusions from the discussion
 
7. Whether or not herbicides are a useful option
for weed control in Third World countries will
depend on regional and sectoral factors, farm
size, cultivation systems and crops. Herbicides
will not, as a rule, be used by smallholder farm-
ers because they lack cash income to buy com-
mercial inputs, such as chemicals or transgenic
seeds. And, since unemployment is high in rural
areas of the Third World, manual weed control
would appear to be a suitable alternative. There-
fore, if subsidies for chemical inputs are avail-
able, they should be invested in pest control
 Part II: Empirical Findings—Impacts And Consequences 55
(insecticides or fungicides) rather than in weed
control (herbicides). Manual weed control is
rational in economic terms, despite the fact that
it may be otherwise undesirable to use much of
the labour force in rural areas, especially women
and children, to do the hard work of hoeing.
 
8. On the other hand, herbicide use can be an
option for middle to large-sized, intensive farms
whose production is based on chemical inputs
and machinery. Whether or not herbicide use
would be profitable, and would in fact increase
yields and income, must assessed case by case.
This assessment will rest with the individual
farmer in the final analysis.
 
9. Technical specifications for herbicide appli-
cation (dosage, effectiveness) are different for
tropical climates than for more moderate climate
zones. Some of the most urgent weed problems
in tropical zones, such as parasitic weeds, can
hardly be controlled by herbicides, since damage
to crop roots will have already occurred before
the weeds appear in the fields. For many crops
which are highly infested by parasitic weeds,
like sorghum or millet, herbicide use is also out
of question for another reason: since these crops
are typically grown by smallholder farmers who
cannot afford chemical inputs. On the other
hand, a number of important crops to which
herbicides are applicable, in principle, are also
less susceptible to parasitic weeds. Therefore, a
general argument that herbicides, including
nonselective herbicides, cannot be used effec-
tively for weed control in tropical climates is not
warranted.78
 
10. Yield increases which result from high
chemical and modern machinery inputs can only
be sustained in the long run, however, if the
severe ecological problems in tropical agricul-
ture can be resolved—problems of soil fertility
and soil erosion above all. It is mainly in terms
of large-scale monocultures that herbicide
application will be technically and economically
viable. But exactly these cultures are the ones
which cause the most severe problems of soil
erosion. Our technology assessment considered
the question whether or not transgenic herbicide-
resistant crops and nonselective herbicides could
be used to improve this situation, for instance,
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 Gressel (1996) provides a much more optimistic
assessment of the possible role of herbicide-resistant
crops in Third World countries. He reports efficient
control of parasitic weeds, such as broomrape (oro-
banche) and witchweed (Striga), as well as Cyperus
through glyphosate, because the herbicide is translocated.
”At present the only cost-effective control for Cyperus
and Striga is the too-commonly practiced abandonment of
farms.” (243)
by making mixed cropping in large, monocul-
tural fields a feasible technical option. Opinions
were divided over this point. In any case, there
are no indications that such a strategy would be
adopted in practice. Nonselective herbicides do,
however, improve the prospects for shifting to
soil protecting methods of conservation tillage
(minimal tillage).
  PART III: NORMATIVE EVALUATIONS —
ETHICS, LAW AND POLITICS
 Our technology assessment was a pluralistic
procedure. The participants represented a broad
spectrum of political interests and frequently
held contradictory views. Nevertheless, our
numerous discussions concentrated on scientific
controversies rather than political or ethical
differences. Participants argued more about the
relevant empirical facts than the criteria of
normative evaluation. The focus on scientific
evidence was criticised. However, it can hardly
be blamed on the procedure of the technology
assessment; rather, it is a consequence of the
way in which the conflict over herbicide resis-
tant crops had been framed by opponents and
proponents in the assessment procedure and in
the public arena.
 Within this framing opponents claimed that
herbicide resistant crops imply considerable
risks for human health or the environment, and
yield no appreciable benefits. The proponents, in
contrast, denied that there are any specific risks
and envisaged clear benefits from the technology
because weed control in agriculture will become
environmentally more friendly, more flexible and
more profitable. Both sides in this conflict
appeal to political and ethical values (especially
health, ecological stability, food supply) which
are enshrined in social consensus and therefore
cannot really be disputed. Dispute arises over
the empirical statements on which both sides
base their claims: Can unexpected toxic sub-
stances be metabolised in transgenic plants?
Could the same also occur with conventionally
bred plants? If herbicide resistance genes escape
to wild populations, will this have impacts on
the natural ecosystem? Will the total amount of
herbicides used decrease when nonselective
herbicides are available? And so on . . .
 It was agreed among all participants in the
technology assessment that answers to such
questions (including the question whether an
answer is at all possible) would not depend on
political or moral evaluation but on scientific
argument. In accordance, expert reports and
discussions centred on these arguments; there-
fore, preoccupation with scientific issues was
inevitable in the technology assessment. It could
only have been otherwise had the parties de-
clared right at the beginning, that, contrary to
what they say in public, risks and benefits are no
important points in the conflict over herbicide
resistant crops. Apparently no side was prepared
to make such a declaration.
 Scientific discussions leave the problems of
normative evaluation unresolved. Is the genetic
manipulation of plants morally acceptable?
Should the spread of herbicide resistance to wild
plants count as damage? Who bears the burden
of proof for risks which may be hidden or un-
known? Is it legitimate to compare the risks
from transgenic and nontransgenic plants? What
is a relevant benefit? How can risks and benefits
be weighed against each other? Should socio-
economic need be a prerequisite for the approval
of transgenic plants? These are the questions to
which discussions will shift once empirical
controversies are either resolved or reach an
impasse.
 Normative discussions do not start at zero. All
the issues mentioned have already been covered
by existing regulations in one form or another.
But, existing law is only the starting point; it is
not the ultimate criterion of normative evalua-
tion in a technology assessment. The very fact
that a technology assessment operates at some
distance from the true process of decision mak-
ing means that it can and should be used as a
forum where one can raise issues of legal and
constitutional change, or propagate the reforma-
tion of moral standards if that is deemed neces-
sary for coping with the problems posed by a
new technology. Our technology assessment was
occasionally transformed into such a forum,
although consensus was rarely achieved.
 The basic normative problem underlying all the
discussions is how to deal with new technolo-
gies. What is the appropriate response to the
challenges of technical innovation? This is by no
means a new problem. Since the advent of
modern societies, people have been continually
burdened with having to adapt to new technolo-
gies. In every epoch, resistance was endemic;
people have always complained that the speed of
technological change and the pressure it imposes
on their way of living has truly become unbear-
able. However, the fact that a problem is old
does not mean that it has been resolved in any
way. There is no reason to belittle the worries,
uncertainties, and objections which new tech-
nologies generate today. Solutions which may
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have been appropriate in the past can fail today
if innovation is piled upon innovation. The
question whether modern societies have already
developed appropriate methods and regulations
for dealing with the technological dynamics they
have unleashed can never be put at rest. The
current controversies surrounding genetic engi-
neering may be taken as evidence of this.
 
If the discussions in our technology assessment
are taken to reflect the level of awareness of
people in general, they reveal that the range of
views on how society should react to the chal-
lenges of a new technology is really not very
broad. This range includes outright moral rejec-
tion, regulation of tangible risks, questioning the
social need for a new technology and the demand
that decisions on major innovations be trans-
ferred to democratically controlled political
bodies. These positions correspond broadly to
what will be considered in detail below.79
 
A correct account of the normative discussions
in our technology assessment must document the
differences in judgement among participants.
This will not exclude a critical analysis of the
implications and problems associated with
various stances: What are the criteria for the
judgements? Are they consistent with other
accepted values? What are the implications for
comparable cases? What else would need to be
regulated if the proposals were adopted? In
contrast to the scientific claims raised by the
participants, no attempt has been made to inte-
grate the various normative claims and derive
overall ”conclusions”. Participants agreed that
the final judgement of transgenic herbicide
resistant crop plants should be left to observers
of the technology assessment and to political
decision makers. And one can foresee that
normative disagreements which were irreconcil-
able in our technology assessment will be mir-
rored in the on-going public controversy in our
society. The technology assessment displayed
considerable ”judicial restraint”. But there
would seem to be no alternative. Unlike empiri-
cal issues, disputes over value judgements
cannot be said to have one correct solution
which must, in principle, be reached by everyone
when arguments are exchanged in a true dis-
course. There remains scope for dissent. The
real issue in dealing with questions of evalua-
tion, therefore, is not how to produce normative
agreement within society, but rather how to
produce legitimate decisions despite disagree-
ment.
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in section III E below.
 A  IS THE GENETIC MODIFICA-TION OF PLANTS ETHICALLY
PERMISSIBLE?
 
There is consensus in our society that we have a
moral obligation towards nature. Technological
intervention should not call into question the
”sustainable” use of nature, or threaten the
survival of human beings. Nature conservation,
protection of species diversity and commitment
to the long-term stability of ecosystems are not
just arbitrary political preferences. They are
necessary conditions for the survival of human-
kind and, therefore, have the status of moral
imperatives. Moral obligation is based on human
interests and rights for the present and for future
generations. This is an anthropocentric view: We
must respect nature ”for our own sake”.
 
Anthropocentric ethics represents the
uncontested minimum of moral standards in our
society. It rules that we are responsible for the
consequences of our actions; ”Do not harm!” is
the prime duty. On this view, genetic manipula-
tion of plants is not morally permissible if it
entails unacceptable risk for humans and the
natural resources on which we depend. On the
other hand, in the absence of such risk, genetic
manipulation becomes morally neutral. On the
basis of anthropocentric ethics, then, there can
be no a priori moral objection to transgenic crop
plants.
 
Public debate on genetic engineering has, how-
ever, thrown up more radical moral issues. Is it
permissible to engineer living beings like ma-
chines? Should humans have the right to break
the barriers natural evolution has erected for the
reproduction of organisms? Do we owe respect
to nature ”for its own sake”? If substantive
moral objections to genetic engineering can be
raised at this level, then the need to examine
risks becomes superfluous. Such objections
concern the very act of intervention into nature,
rather than its further consequences. Proponents
of this view sometimes postulate new moral
goods which demand our unconditional respect,
such as the ”integrity of evolution”. Ethical
reservations of this kind also had a role in our
technology assessment. In the discussion of the
expert report on ethical aspects of the genetic
modification of plants80, participants considered
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 Expert report commissioned from Prof. G. Altner
(Institut für Evangelische Theologie, Universität Ko-
blenz): ”Ethische Aspekte der gentechnischen
Veränderung von Pflanzen”; commentary by A. Stanger
(Zentrum für Ethik in den Wissenschaften, Universität
Tübingen), in: Materialien zur Technikfolgenab-
schätzung, Heft 17 (see appendix).
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whether the production and release of transgenic
crops would be morally impermissible from the
point of view of a ”biocentric” ethical view, i.e.
one which demands respect for nature for its
own sake.
 1  Is genetic engineering ofplants incompatible with the
moral respect we owe nature
”for its own sake”?
 
Even if one accepts the moral perspective of
biocentric ethics, it is still by no means obvious
why the transfer of herbicide resistance genes to
crop plants should be absolutely unacceptable.
Günter Altner argues that humans are obliged to
keep an
 ”acceptable balance between respecting
the self-purposiveness of nature and sub-
jecting nature to human interests”.
 
He sees four reasons why transgenic herbicide
resistant crops could be ethically unacceptable
and calls for a moral halt to the technology ”for
the sake of plants” if gene transfer
• has adverse effects on the physiological
stability of the plants,
• disturbs the normal interaction of genes in the
host species,
• causes irreversible changes in communities of
organisms and ecosystems, or
• seriously shifts evolutionary parameters.
 
Points 3 and 4 concern the consequences of the
introduction of transgenic crop plants; these
points must be taken into account on a nonbio-
centric (anthropocentric) moral view as well,
under the heading of risk prevention. In any
case, one must bear in mind that herbicide
resistance genes offer no selective advantage in
natural habitats and hence are not likely to have
noticeable effects on the evolution of species and
ecosystems. The first criterion is truly biocentric
since it appeals to the integrity of the plant as a
moral value. We need not discuss whether such
a value should be acknowledged, since it is
questionable whether it could at all be violated
in the case of genetically engineered herbicide
resistant crop plants. Apparently, the transfer of
resistance genes has no adverse effects on the
physiological stability of a plant. Field trials
show that the transgenic plants clearly ”thrive”
under the conditions necessary for cultivating
crop plants. Of course, it could be argued that
the plants do indeed lack physiological stability
because they cannot survive under natural
conditions, i.e. without being tended by cultiva-
tion. But were this ethically relevant, one would
have to reject crop plants in general as morally
unacceptable.
 
One can perhaps apply the moral obligation to
”respect the integrity of plants” to the species
level; but even this still fails to reveal a credible
moral objection to genetic engineering in plants.
The existing spectrum of natural species is
clearly not affected by the transfer of genes to
individual crop plants and the propagation of
these plants for cultivation. Gene transfer sup-
plements the crop varieties available in agricul-
ture. But crop varieties have always been
adapted to suit human needs and, to this extent,
they are ”unnatural”. Even if one would go so
far as to assign crop plants a ”right to their own
evolution”, such a right would not be violated by
the introduction of additional crop varieties in
agriculture, in this case, resulting from genetic
modification. A ”right to one’s own evolution”
cannot possibly imply the right that no other new
species (crop varieties) be introduced alongside.
New crop varieties may displace old ones in
agricultural fields and, in the longer term, per-
haps at breeding stations. But if this contravenes
our moral obligations to nature, then, logically
we must proscribe conventional breeding of new
varieties just as much as genetic engineering.
 
From a biocentric point of view, a valid moral
argument against transgenic herbicide resistant
crop plants can be derived if one adopts Altner’s
second criterion: the transfer of genes across
species barriers would not be permissible be-
cause it interferes with the natural balance of
genes in the host species. This view rests on the
premise that this balance is itself a moral good
and that therefore respect for nature would
prohibit us from using human technology re-
combine what natural evolution has separated.
Whether such a premise can in any way be
grounded on ethical principles remained an open
question in the technology assessment. It seemed
that those who adopted this view could only try
to convince others by appealing to some com-
mon moral intuition.
 
Many of the participants in the technology
assessment could not respond to this appeal.
They simply failed to see why a bacterial gene in
a crop plant should call the intrinsic value of the
plant into question and, in a way, offend its
dignity. Undoubtedly, genetic engineering per-
mits more genetic variability in plant breeding
than would otherwise be available for the natural
evolution of the plant. But the same applies for a
number of other breeding techniques (e.g. muta-
genesis) which have been used without raising
moral objections. Why should we adopt a rule
stating that the natural barriers for the evolution
of plants also constitute moral barriers for the
breeding of plants? Whether crop varieties are
natural, in the sense that they could also have
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evolved without human intervention, or whether
they could compete successfully under the
conditions of natural evolution was never a
moral issue. The fact that a technique is
”unnatural” is not normally a sufficient reason
to reject it on moral grounds.
 2  ”Genetic pollution”,evolutionary impact, and
moral harm
 
Strictly speaking, the question whether interfer-
ence with natural evolution is morally admissible
does not refer to the evaluation of transgenic
crop plants as such, but rather to the conse-
quences the cultivation of such crops could have
on other organisms. It is obvious that the conse-
quences must be assessed in terms of implied
risks, for example, to ecological stability or the
maintenance of species diversity. Sometimes,
however, the fact that such consequences exist at
all is held to be a sufficient ground for moral
rejection of transgenic crop plants—whether or
not any risks are implied. This view is based on
the premise that any impact on natural evolution
is in itself morally harmful. This position was
occasionally adopted in the technology assess-
ment: for example, a number of participants
believed that relevant damage had already
occurred if transgenes had escaped from crop
plants to other organisms in which they would
not normally be found and to which they could
not be transferred naturally. This was denounced
as ”genetic pollution”. Furthermore, they con-
sidered it an unacceptable ”evolutionary risk”
should transgenic crop plants in any way change
the conditions of future processes of species
formation (e.g. by outcrossing transgenes).
 
These views were contradicted by other partici-
pants, for whom it remained unclear why it
would be morally harmful if genes found their
way into organisms in which they would not
naturally occur. These participants criticised the
”genetic pollution” rhetoric because it lacked
empirical meaning, and they refused to accept
the idea that impacts on natural evolution con-
stitute damage. Since any human intervention
into the living world—in particular, shifts in
selective pressure, which result from environ-
mental change—constitutes an influence on the
course of evolution, the concept of ”evolutionary
risk” makes no sense.
 
It is indeed true that the moral evaluation of
human intervention in evolution faces the prob-
lem of how to distinguish between permissible
and impermissible acts. There seem to be no
clear criteria, if we adopt a biocentric perspec-
tive and disregard established (anthropocentric)
concepts of risk or positive legal standards for
nature conservation. In ecological terms, human
populations live and reproduce in nature as the
dominant consumer species, and they will influ-
ence the future evolution of other species and
ecosystems, whenever they interfere with the
living conditions of other organisms, be it
through agriculture, industry or the public health
service. Such influence is not only unavoidable.
Strictly speaking, it is also irreversible. Even if
some particular interferences can be reversed,
evolution does not return to its former state. No
ethics can demand therefore that we abstain
from interventions in evolution altogether or that
we denounce these as inherently immoral.
 
In addition, moral evaluations become embroiled
in contradiction, if impacts on the natural evolu-
tion of species are only deemed unacceptable
when they result from transgenic crop plants,
but are held to pose no moral problem when they
result from conventional crop plants. There is no
reason to suppose that the spread of transgenes
will, in general, have more profound effects on
evolution than the spread of endogenous plant
genes or mutant genes from conventionally bred
crop plants. In any case, it is impossible to
predict, even remotely, what phenotype of some
new natural species might result in the distant
future from the propagation of crop plant genes;
and it is impossible to predict how this pheno-
type could interact in a future ecosystem with
some future existing species unknown at present.
One could anticipate that genetic traits which
offer a clear selective advantage would have
greater consequences than others. This argument
refers solely to the phenotype, however, and it is
valid irrespective of whether a phenotype has
been produced by genetic engineering or con-
ventional breeding techniques.
 
There was probably agreement in our technology
assessment that it does not make sense simply to
equate interventions in evolution with damage to
nature or violation of the natural order. Existing
species and communities of species in nature
remain subjected to evolutionary change. They
are not in static equilibrium, nor do they repre-
sent an optimum which would be jeopardised
should evolution continue. Evolution is a ran-
dom process (caused by genetic variation and
environmental change), and neither the status
quo nor the direction of future development are
in any way determined or ”ennobled” by an
underlying ”purpose” or goal. It is therefore
difficult to predicate damage from the mere fact
that the status quo might be changed or the
direction of future evolution shifted. One par-
ticipant in the technology assessment commented
that evolution itself must be considered a risk, if
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we adopt the notion that transgenic plants’
leading in the long term (hundreds or thousands
of years) to the formation of new species and
new patterns of coevolution constitutes
”evolutionary risk”.
 
The difficulties in specifying operational criteria
to distinguish between morally permissible and
morally impermissible human intervention in
evolution are obvious and unresolved. But this
does not mean that the underlying questions are
pointless. We usually avoid the problem by
adopting an anthropocentric perspective in
which we refer to the interests and needs of
human beings. Thus intervention in evolution is
clearly not permitted, if it would endanger the
stability of the global climate, for instance, or
reduce the level of biodiversity which we need to
survive (or which we want). Such evaluation
avoids the more radical moral issue of whether
any intervention in evolution is permissible as
long as it does not harm human interests and
rights. This question remained open in our
technology assessment, but its legitimacy was
not disputed. No one argued that any and every
intervention in evolution should be tolerated
merely because the moral limits were so difficult
to define. It may be that fundamental issues
about our attitude towards nature come into play
in this debate, over which opinions and feelings
are deeply divided. What does seem clear,
however, is that ”respect for nature” is not yet
an operational criterion, because there is no
inherent goal of evolution in ”nature” to which
we could refer for guidance. In the final analysis
it will always remain necessary to resort to
cultural and political criteria, i.e. to criteria of
human choice. The limits to human intervention
in nature cannot be derived from nature itself,
but only from human interests in nature and
from the standards we set for dealing with
nature properly. Conflicts over these interests
and standards will then reflect the underlying
diversity of fundamental moral attitudes towards
nature in our society.
 3  The impositions of ethicalpluralism
 
As soon as ethical criteria above and beyond the
prevention of harm to human interests and rights
are applied, there will be as little consensus in
society at large, as there was among the partici-
pants in our technology assessment. We must
expect that moral judgements on the admissibil-
ity of genetic engineering in general—and trans-
genic herbicide resistant crops in particular—
will remain divided. Some people will find that
science should not put together what natural
evolution has put asunder. Others will see no
ethical problem when genes are transferred
across species boundaries to crop plants (nota
bene: as long as the possible risks involved in
the transfer are not at issue). There appears to
be no way to mediate between these conflicting
evaluations. We may well have reached the point
where differences in the perception and judge-
ment of moral issues are irreconcilable. What
does this imply for the evaluation of transgenic
herbicide resistant crop plants?
 
The first requirement is that differences in moral
views be taken serious and dealt with properly in
society. Perhaps the technology assessment we
organised could itself be a kind of model in this
respect. It proceeded from the assumption that
the conflicting judgements had to be discussed
and mutually acknowledged as valid moral
views. Indeed, a synthesis of respect and toler-
ance must surely be necessary for a plurality of
irreconcilable ethical convictions to be accepted
and to coexist peacefully in society. Beyond the
well-founded, minimal ethical standards based
on the postulate, ”Do no harm”, which are
generally enforced in our society by the rules of
law, individuals should be entitled to live their
own lives according to their own values. What
they cannot expect, however, is that their own
moral views be adopted by everybody else. The
impositions of pluralism are that people must
accept or at least tolerate the fact that, in a
modern society, values which they consider
ethically well-founded and absolutely binding
are regarded by others as mere preferences to
take or leave according to interest and taste.
 
The verdict on transgenic plants, which can be
formulated from a restrictive biocentric ethical
perspective, is not entirely without public sup-
port; but it is still a particularistic or group
ethic. The moral consensus in our society is less
restrictive. When dealing with (nonhuman)
nature, the only things which are clearly morally
proscribed are interventions with unacceptable
harmful effects for humans (with some extension
to higher organisms in the special case of animal
protection). General moral judgement of a
technology is thus based on the direct or indirect
consequences for humans, and not on the type or
the intensity of the interference with nature, i.e.
the degree of unnaturalness of the technology.
As long as this remains the dominant view, it is
difficult to imagine that a moral position which
views the transfer of genes from other species as
ethically ”harmful” and hence strictly illicit
could become the basis for collectively binding
legal regulation. At the level of regulation,
restrictive ethical codes which go beyond the
moral, ”common sense”, cannot be taken into
account by appealing to moral grounds. Rather
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they become downgraded, so to speak, to the
status of legitimate group interests which must
compete with other interests, and may or may
not find a majority in the political process.81
 
Redefining and shifting conflicts from the con-
frontational arena of ethical conviction to the
competitive arena of group interest is an impor-
tant mechanism for peace-making in differenti-
ated, pluralistic societies. However, this mecha-
nism will only work if no values are at stake
which are considered fundamental and sacro-
sanct. In the case of transgenic herbicide resis-
tant crop plants, the danger of moral polarisa-
tion is not particularly great. While a strict
stance against any transfer of genes across
species barriers may be morally valid, the engi-
neering of plants is not exactly predestined as a
topic of fundamentalist conflicts of belief. In our
technology assessment, no one went so far as to
accuse those who did not share their particular
moral views of being ethically blind and irre-
sponsible. Even in a biocentric ethical view it is
still possible to suspend ”respect for nature”, if
there are good reasons for doing so. In each
case, it will be necessary to weigh agricultural
considerations or economic considerations and
also advances in science, to determine whether
there is indeed sufficient justification to ignore
”respect for nature”. And, such deliberations
always tend to work against the rise of funda-
mentalism in moral belief.
 B  ARE THE RISKS OF GENETICENGINEERING ACCEPTABLE?
 
The novelty of genetic engineering raises fears,
and criticism of risk is the most common politi-
cal manifestation of these fears. Discussions in
our technology assessment over the possible risk
of genetically engineered crop plants went
through various stages with which we are al-
ready familiar in the public debate over genetic
engineering in general. The discussions pro-
ceeded as follows:
• from recognisable risk with predictable conse-
quences to the hypothetical and to unknown risk
with unforeseeable consequences: Should we
regulate imaginable risk or risk that we cannot,
in any case, exclude with certainty?
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 If the law ignores the moral beliefs of some segments
of society, it will only be acceptable if it is based entirely
on the principle of legitimation by majority decision and
if it refrains from any judgement about the validity of
overruled moral beliefs. Political battles nevertheless
tend to provoke appeals to moral fundamentalism;
consider, for instance, the rhetoric used in the referendum
campaigns against transgenic organisms in Austria and
Switzerland.
• from the isolated assessment of risk involved
in genetically modified plants to a comparison of
risk between transgenic and nontransgenic
plants: Are there specific risks associated with
genetically modified plants, which do not arise
with conventionally bred plants?
• from the need to substantiate suspected risk to
the reversal of the burden of proof: Should
freedom from any and all risk be demonstrated
before a new technology can be introduced?
• from arguments over risks to arguments over
social benefits and needs: Are uncertainties with
respect to risks only acceptable if there is a real
and significant social need for the technology?
 
Going through these stages of debate is both
typical and necessary. It reflects the logical
order which the criticism of risk will follow
when put to the test of argumentation. Through-
out the course of the discussions, both propo-
nents and critics of genetic engineering were
confronted with empirical findings they could
not avoid. Empirical findings do not, by them-
selves, force a revision of political assessment;
but they may force people to reconsider and
eventually modify or replace the reasons for
their assessments. As a result, new normative
issues will be brought into play, which raise the
conflict onto a different plain. The following
sections summarise the transformation of risk
discussion in our technology assessment, start-
ing from imminent, recognisable risks and
culminating in restrictions based on diffuse,
unsubstantiated fears that may be induced by the
sheer novelty of genetic engineering.
 1  Recognisable risks of trans-genic plants: unexpected
metabolic changes, feral
populations, horizontal gene
transfer
 New toxic or allergenic substances in plants.
No participant of our technology assessment
contested the notion that unexpected toxic or
allergenic metabolic products represent a rele-
vant risk which must be regulated at least for
food and fodder crops. For transgenic herbicide-
resistant plants three possible risk mechanisms
are clearly identifiable. (1) Detoxification of the
nonselective herbicide in the resistant crop plant
can result in toxic metabolites of the herbicide
being formed. (2) The gene product introduced
via gene transfer can itself be toxic. (3) Gene
transfer (and the introduction of the gene prod-
uct) can activate or increase the level of toxi-
cants typical for a given crop species (for in-
stance, alkaloids in potatoes). It is also conceiv-
able that some known allergenic potential would
increase, i.e. that the host plant could become a
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more potent allergen as a result of plant meta-
bolic interaction with the transgenic gene prod-
uct. And it is conceivable that a known aller-
genic potential in the donor organism be trans-
mitted to the host plant through the transgene.82
 
While there was consensus that these risks must
be regulated, it was also pointed out that they
are not specific to transgenic plants: they can
also occur in crop plants which have been
modified using conventional breeding techniques
(see above, section II, A1). The real issue was,
therefore, how far such the tests should go and
whether there are nevertheless good reasons to
regulate transgenic plants more strictly than
conventionally bred crops varieties (see below,
section III E1).
 Feral populations. Much the same arguments
were applied with respect to the risk that feral
populations of herbicide-resistant plants might
be formed. There is a recognisable risk that a
domesticated transgenic crop could run wild, i.e.
that it ”escape” from cultivated areas or that it
could propagate the transgene to related wild
plants through hybridisation—if suitable repro-
ductive partners were available. But these
mechanisms apply equally to transgenic and
nontransgenic cultivars. Furthermore, the possi-
ble harm that could result from feral herbicide-
resistant plants does seem to be limited. Such
plants could become weeds in agricultural
systems, which would then imply financial loss
for the farmer and, more significantly, for the
herbicide manufacturer who, in turn, would lose
a market for the nonselective herbicide. Feral
populations could also result in a temporary
increase in herbicide load on the field—for
instance, if farmers attempt to kill resistant
weeds by increasing herbicide dosage or number
of herbicide applications. It seems unlikely,
however, that feral populations would pose any
ecological threat to natural habitats. Wild plants
which develop herbicide resistance through
hybridisation with resistant crops will not be
more competitive, since herbicide resistance
offers no selective advantage outside the area
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 This apparently happens when the gene coding for 2S
albumin in the Brazil nut is transferred to the soybean
(Nordlee et al., 1996). It should be noted that this
finding, although new, has by no means come as a
complete surprise. The Brazil nut is a known allergenic
food. That 2S albumin could transfer allergenicity to
soybeans is a clearly identifiable risk. It goes without
saying that such risk must be tested for and excluded (see
FDA, 1992). In the present case, the tests were carried
out by university researchers in cooperation with a seed
company, Pioneer Hi-Bred, in the early phase of devel-
oping the transgenic soybean, i.e. well ahead of the
testing required for the approval of transgenic products.
where the matching herbicide is applied.
 Horizontal gene transfer. Herbicide resistance
genes can be proliferated from transgenic plant
cells to soil bacteria through horizontal gene
transfer. Although such transfer can also occur
with endogenous plant genes from nontransgenic
plant cells, the transfer rates would be higher
theoretically for certain transgenes—depending
on the gene construct. In any case, horizontal
gene transfer will probably occur only rarely. If
it does, and if the resistance genes find expres-
sion in the soil bacteria, a foreseeable conse-
quence would be selective growth of these
bacteria, so long as a matching herbicide is
applied; the growth would be confined to those
parts of the soil where the herbicide is effective
(usually close to the soil surface). In addition,
the transformed bacteria could influence soil
chemistry by releasing metabolic products which
did not previously exist in the soil in this
form.83
 
Since it was agreed that horizontal transfer of
genes from herbicide-resistant crops cannot be
excluded, the question whether the effects we
could expect should be considered environmental
damage became a crucial point of discussion.
Many participants denied that any damage
would result. In particular, it was pointed out
that many farming activities, such as crop
rotation or fallowing, induce significant changes
in soil chemistry, and that mechanical weed
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 This summary of the discussion in the technology
assessment was criticised by one of the participants:
 
”The text unfortunately fails to point out that in par-
ticular the nonselective herbicides glufosinate (Basta)
and glyphosate (Round-up) and their derivatives are
effective against bacteria and fungi, so that horizontal
gene transfer under this selective pressure would be
considerably enhanced.”
 Whether glufosinate and glyphosate actually do exercise
greater selective pressure on bacteria and fungi than other
certified herbicides requires closer examination. The
expert report by Wilke on the effects nonselective
herbicides have on the soil concludes tentatively that this
is not the case, in: Materialien zur Technikfolgenab-
schätzung, Heft 7 (see appendix); see also the statement
by Dr. J. L. Honneger (Monsanto): ”Factors for Consid-
eration Regarding Glyphosate Tolerant Crops”, in:
Materialien zur Technikfolgenabschätzung, Heft 6,
pp. 90-93; and section II A2 above. On the basis of this
finding, it seems reasonable to assume (as in the discus-
sions of the technology assessment) that whether hori-
zontal gene transfer from transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops is more likely than from nontransgenic plants
depends primarily on the gene construct. Incidentally,
selective pressure resulting from the anti-microbial
effectiveness of nonselective herbicides was one of the
presuppositions in our technology assessment; otherwise
we could not have considered the accumulation of
resistant bacteria and changes to soil chemistry as
possible impacts of gene transfer.
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control, in particular ploughing, also leads to
massive fluctuation among populations of soil
microorganisms. None of these effects have ever
counted as environmental damage. Selective
growth and temporary increase of herbicide-
resistant populations of bacteria in soil can also
be expected when selective herbicides are
applied to nontransgenic crops, because
naturally occurring resistant mutants are
selectively favoured. That soil functions could
be impaired is not a very realistic expectation.
The impact of herbicides on soil is tested before
approval of a herbicide is granted. Herbicides
which permanently eliminate nonresistant soil
bacteria will not pass these tests; this also
applies in the case of nonselective herbicides.
 
The risks from transgenic herbicide-resistant
crop plants described so far would not seem
dramatic, were they compared to the risks from
conventionally bred crops using well-established
techniques and practices. Basically no risk from
transgenic plants was identified in the technol-
ogy assessment that was not already known
from nontransgenic plants. Recognised risks
seem to ”normalise” through comparison. At
this point the debate in the technology assess-
ment moved one stage further, from recognised
risk to hypothetical (i.e. suspected or unknown)
risk.
 2  Focusing on the lack ofknowledge:
the risks of ignorance,
uncertain prognoses and the
limits of testing
 
The main argument against normalising risks
through comparison was that an assessment
must not be confined to recognisable risk which
can be described and tested. The real risk from
transgenic plants lies in the fact that we do not
yet know exactly what all the risks are. We can
neither foresee all the possible consequences of
transgenic herbicide-resistant plants, nor control
them through preventive testing. And we cannot,
therefore, rule out physiological and ecological
impacts of transgenic crops, which are different
from those we know from nontransgenic crops.
 
The basic premise of this argument was
uncontested: Our knowledge is limited. There is
no way to predict all the possible effects of
transgenes on plant metabolism nor to rule out
the presence of toxic or allergenic substances
that we have not or cannot observe in the host
species. Nor can we eliminate these risks com-
pletely by extending the certification tests. We
do not know all the substances in plants, nor can
we test for them all. Similar uncertainties exist
with respect to environmental consequences. It is
not enough to assess the ecological impacts of a
single, transmitted trait (herbicide resistance);
the transfer of herbicide resistance genes could
have unexpected side-effects on the plant me-
tabolism, which affect the plant phenotype and
possibly expand its ecological range, i.e. in-
crease its fitness. Such impacts will not neces-
sarily be revealed through the testing required
for the approval of new cultivars, so long as
they do not impair breeding goals. It is also
impossible to predict what impacts herbicide
resistance genes transmitted to wild species
through hybridisation could have on the evolu-
tion of natural species and habitats in the long
run and under changing ecological conditions.
Finally, it is difficult to refute the theoretical
possibility that bacteria transformed through
horizontal gene transfer from herbicide-resistant
plant cells would release substances into the soil,
significantly different from and more harmful
than new substances which might result from
changes in crop husbandry or from the use of
new herbicides.
 
While it was generally admitted in the technol-
ogy assessment that uncertainties exist which
cannot be resolved, participants disagreed about
how the uncertainties should be dealt with. Do
they constitute a sufficient reason to ban trans-
genic herbicide-resistant crop plants? Critics of
the technology deemed this conclusion compel-
ling, invoking the principle of precaution which
requires that risk be minimised. For them,
uncertainty of prognosis was not only an un-
avoidable risk, but an unacceptable one. The
proponents of transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops, on the other hand, rejected this conclu-
sion. They argued that unforeseeable conse-
quences must always be expected, and that
uncertainty of prognosis also applies to conven-
tionally bred plants, without ever being consid-
ered sufficient reason to ban such plants.
 
Breeders have, in fact, never been able to predict
what the physiological impact of new genes
might be or to control them, given the genetic
background of the host plant. ”Surprises”, i.e.
unexpected or undesirable side-effects (pleio-
tropy) are abundant in conventional plant
breeding; they must always be dealt with ex post
facto through testing to select those examples
which are suitable for being further developed
into new crop varieties. The testing process is
necessarily limited. One can never screen all
plant substances to detect changes which might
be toxicologically relevant. Phenotypic changes
in new plants will be identified through selection
procedures only if these changes are undesirable
in terms of breeding goals. On the other hand,
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other changes which may still be ecologically
relevant (like increased stress resistance) could
go unnoticed. With respect to long-term impacts
on the evolution of species and ecosystems, one
can only say that they are as indeterminate and
unpredictable for conventionally bred plants as
for transgenic plants.
 
As a result, comparison to conventionally bred
plants not only tends to ”normalise” the recog-
nisable risks from transgenic plants, it also tends
to normalise the uncertainties involved in such
plants and the hypothetical risks that may be
derived from the fact that we have limited fore-
sight of the possible consequences of such
plants. This defeats the main public argument
against transgenic plants, namely, that such
plants will present us with new, specific risks.
Not surprisingly therefore, the question of
whether the comparison between conventionally
bred and transgenic plants is legitimate became
a central focus in our discussions.
 3  Are risk comparisonslegitimate? The ”specialquality” of genetic engineering
 
Risk comparisons were commonly used in the
debate over transgenic crops.84 They suggest
themselves as a general method of evaluation for
normative issues. Since levels of acceptable risk
cannot be objectively determined, an obvious
approach would be to refer to what has actually
been accepted in comparable cases in the past,
and to consider if there are any reasons to devi-
ate from this model. The underlying assumption
is that comparable risks should be treated com-
parably, but this need not be the case. It is also
possible to decide that the risks from a new
technology should be regulated more strictly
than comparable risks from a well-established
technology with which we are already familiar.
In this case, ”novelty” would be the main crite-
rion for such regulation.
 
Comparing risks will in general be regarded as
legitimate as long as the risks are indeed compa-
rable. However, the criteria of comparability are
controversial. Arguments, for instance, which
compare voluntary and involuntary risks are not
considered conclusive. The same holds for the
comparison of dread risks, which could inflict
sudden catastrophe, and diffuse risks, where
damage slowly accumulates slowly, resulting
from a series of scattered events.85 Obviously, no
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 Even if the absolute amount of damage (in terms of
lives lost) is the same in both cases; see Slovic et al.
(1985); Slovic (1987).
such pitfalls exist when the risks from transgenic
and nontransgenic crop plants are compared.
Moreover, in our technology assessment, the
legitimacy of this comparison is confirmed
prima facie by the fact that it was the critics of
genetic engineering who put it on the agenda.
The report commissioned from the Öko-Institut
refers explicitly and repeatedly to the problems,
risks, side-effects and uncertainties known from
conventional breeding, in order to demonstrate
what could happen with genetically engineered
plants. This approach invites the claim to the
contrary that, if the criticism is valid, then it
shows, at the same time, that the risks and
uncertainties from transgenic plants are the same
as those from nontransgenic plants. To escape
this conclusion, critics must dispute the compa-
rability of transgenic and nontransgenic plants,
and show that genetic engineering makes a
difference. Two arguments were used in the
technology assessment to prove the ”special
quality” of genetic engineering:
 
(1) Genetic engineering allows the transfer of
genes across species barriers. Hence metabolic
pathways can be introduced into a host plant,
that have never belonged to that species and
could not have been acquired through natural
evolution or conventional breeding. Such new
pathways constitute a specific factor of uncer-
tainty; therefore the risk of uncontrollable
physiological or ecological side-effects (pleio-
tropic effects) is higher with transgenic plants
than with new conventional plants.
 
(2) The transfer of genes through genetic engi-
neering disturbs the genomic context of the host
plant. Transgenes are inserted at random in the
genome. Therefore, positional effects (inser-
tional mutagenesis) must be expected, that can
induce changes in the traits of the transformed
plant, which are unrelated to the information
coded in the transgene and hence cannot be
foreseen.
 
In our technology assessment and in the German
public debate these were the key arguments used
to support the claim that transgenic plants pose
higher risks than new plants produced by con-
ventional breeding techniques. These arguments
refer to the suspected or hypothetical risk that
there might be more severe unexpected side-
effects from transgenic than from nontransgenic
plants. There is no empirical evidence as yet that
more side-effects do in fact occur; nor can
theoretical models be invoked to elaborate this
hypothesis in any detail. However, as one critic
put it, one can infer from the ”special quality”
of genetic engineering that a ”special type of
uncertainty” is implied by transgenic plants and,
hence, an additional factor of risk. This argu-
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ment is designed to refute the comparative
”normalisation” of risk by claiming that trans-
genic and nontransgenic plants are, in fact, not
comparable. At the same time, however, it
implicitly confirms the validity of the compara-
tive approach in principle: if the ”special qual-
ity” of genetic engineering cannot be demon-
strated, then the comparison to conventional
crop plants remains legitimate; the assumption
that transgenic plants constitute a specific risk
becomes unfounded.
 
In our technology assessment it was not possible
to defend the notion that disturbances in the
genomic context (and positional effects) consti-
tute a ”special quality” of genetically engineered
plants. Such disturbances also result from
conventional breeding techniques or when natu-
rally occurring transposable elements (transpo-
sons) move around in the plant genome. Trans-
posons, too, are inserted at random. No reasons
were given why context disturbances in trans-
genic plants should be different. At the end of
the discussions, context disturbances, too, were
”normalised” through comparison, and the
argument that these disturbances demonstrate
the ”special quality” and special risks of genetic
engineering was invalidated.
 
On the other hand, the argument that the intro-
duction of new metabolic pathways unknown in
the host plant constitute a special risk factor,
was declared as valid in principle. Once again,
however, the argument was relativised by com-
parisons. While it is true that the probability of
side-effects is theoretically higher for transgenic
plants, whenever new metabolic pathways are
transferred, it is also true that the probability of
side-effects is theoretically higher for nontrans-
genic plants because, when these plants are
crossbred, an uncontrolled number of undeter-
mined genes is exchanged, all of which can
interact with the existing plant metabolism (in
contrast to genetically engineered plants, where
only one, exactly identifiable gene product is
transferred). No method exists to balance these
two countervailing factors. Since the argument
is about hypothetical but undetermined and
unpredictable side-effects, quantitative prob-
abilities are unknown. In the final analysis, then,
the claim that there will be more physiological
side-effects with transgenic plants is not better
or worse than the claim to the contrary that there
will be fewer such side-effects. Neither hypothe-
sis can be confirmed or refuted.
 
It would seem, therefore, that opting for one or
the other of these hypotheses as a basis of our
risk assessment is merely a matter of political
preference. It should be noted, however, that
theoretically fewer side-effects are to be ex-
pected from transgenic than nontransgenic
plants, if the gene transfer introduces metabolic
pathways which are already established in the
host plant species.
 4  Reductionist versussynergistic risk philosophy?
 
In Germany, the public debate over genetic
engineering has frequently been framed as a
battle of competing risk philosophies. The
dominant regulatory approach concentrates on
the gene (gene product) to be transferred and
considers the function of this gene in the donor
organism in order to assess the risks of the gene
transfer: ”It is the gene that matters”. Critics
have rejected this approach as an unacceptably
reductionist view of the problem. They empha-
sise that the effects of transgenes depend on the
genetic background which they find in the host
organism. Therefore the effects cannot be de-
rived from knowledge of the gene sequence and
of the gene function in the donor organism: ”It is
the context that matters”.86
 
This controversy did not have a prominent role
in our technology assessment, since consensus
was reached on the following points:
• The coding information of a transgene de-
pends on the gene sequence and not on the
context of the gene, which means, that the site in
the host genome to which the gene is transferred
has no influence on the type of gene product that
can be formed.
• Transgenes coding the information for a gene
product which induces toxic substances in the
donor organism or enhances its fitness pose
greater risks than transgenes for which no such
effects have been identified.
• Transgenic gene products can have effects in
the host organism, which result from interaction
with the existing plant metabolism and therefore
cannot be derived from the information encoded
in the transgene or from the gene function in the
donor organism.
• The locus of integration of the transgene can
influence the expression of the transgene or of
neighbouring endogenous plant genes. This may
also have impacts on the host organism, which
cannot be derived from knowledge of the genetic
information of the transgene or its function in
the donor organism.
 
These points shed doubt upon the formula, ”It is
the gene that matters”. While they still support
the notion that one must consider whether the
specific gene construct to be transferred poses
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any known risks in the donor organism, they
also show that such consideration is not enough
to anticipate the effects the gene might have in
the host organism. Therefore, it is not only the
gene that matters, the context matters as
well.This conclusion was not controversial in the
technology assessment. Participants implicitly
agreed that there are some reasons which sup-
port a synergistic risk philosophy. They dis-
agreed, however, about whether these reasons
warrant specific regulation for genetically
engineered plants. If it is true that all breeding
techniques can induce unforeseeable metabolic
changes (pleiotropic effects) and disturbances of
the genomic context (insertional mutations) in
crop plants, then reference to synergistic risks in
transgenic plants is clearly legitimate but not at
all sufficient to mark a real difference from
nontransgenic plants which have been modified
by conventional techniques. It was the question
of whether and how a difference can be estab-
lished, that dominated discussions in the tech-
nology assessment, not competing risk philoso-
phies. And in dealing with this question the
critics had to resort to ever more remote hy-
potheses about the specific risks of genetically
engineered plants.
 5  From hypothetical tospeculative risks
 
All participants agreed that the assumption of
specific risks which may be involved in trans-
genic but not in conventionally bred crop plants
must be substantiated if it is to be taken seri-
ously into account. The expert report from the
Öko-Institut attempts to do just that. In general,
reference to the novelty of genetic engineering is
not considered sufficient to substantiate sus-
pected risk. The critics suggested various risk
hypotheses which differed in their degrees of
elaboration.
 
The hypothesis that transgenic plants pose
specific risk in terms of physiological side-
effects seems relatively well-founded. A plausi-
ble mechanism is described for this postulated
risk: It is possible that the transgenic gene
product metabolises other substrates and hence
has a different impact in the host plant than in
the donor organism. The probability of this will
be higher in transgenic than in nontransgenic
plants if genes are transferred which code for a
product that was never in the plant metabolism
before.
 
On the other hand, the hypothesis that genetic
engineering might involve specific risks per se,
which exist irrespective of what the gene product
is, seems rather weak. No mechanism was
proposed for such a risk. The standard argument
advanced in the German debate was the ”special
quality” ascribed to genetic engineering because
of context disturbances and positional effects
resulting from the insertion of transgenes. If one
accepts that the comparison with transposons,
chromosome translocations or chromosome
breaks occurring in nontransgenic plants refutes
this argument effectively, it remains a mystery
why gene transfer should be able to cause more
or different unexpected side-effects in crop
plants than changes induced by conventional
breeding techniques. The claim that transgenic
plants might involve specific risks is reduced to
suspicion without foundation.
 
In our technology assessment discussions, it was
proposed that different risk scenarios be distin-
guished: The term ”hypothetical risk” should
apply only if a scenario bases suspected risk on
known mechanisms which demonstrate that
harmful effects are possible in principle and
show how these could arise. The term
”speculative risk” should be used when no
mechanism is specified or when a scenario
assumes that mechanisms might exist or events
might occur which are not yet known. On the
basis of this distinction, the claim that transgenic
crop plants could involve specific risks solely
because they have been genetically engineered
must be classified as speculation, not as hy-
pothesis.87
 
This result tends to justify current trends to-
wards product-based rather than process-based
regulation of genetic engineering, i.e. where
genes and gene products are assessed, not the
methods through which the genes have been
transmitted. A good case could have been made
against this regulatory approach, if the assump-
tion that genetic engineering per se involves
specific risks were a well-founded hypothesis;
the case is much weaker, of course, if it is
merely unfounded speculation. It is therefore
understandable that the critics of transgenic
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 In contrast, the assumption that the introduction of gene
products alien to the metabolism of the host plant species
might imply additional risk was accepted as a valid
hypothesis. One participant argued, however, that this
assumption is also just speculation.
 
”That new toxic or allergenic substances will be
formed is mere speculation, as long as it is not clear
why one should reasonably expect that substrates
modified by the gene product could be toxicologically
relevant.”
 In the case of transgenic plants with resistance to glufosi-
nate (introduction of a specific acetyltransferase), the
suspicion would be warranted only, ”if there were some
indication that acetylated substances are likely to be toxic
or allergenic”. But there are no such indications.
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plants in our technology assessment did not
simply give in at this point. They insisted that
the discussions could, at best, have shown that,
on the basis of existing scientific knowledge, the
”special quality” of genetic engineering (and
hence specific risks) cannot be demonstrated.
They argued further, however, that differences
between transgenic and nontransgenic plants,
which cannot be demonstrated, can nevertheless
exist.
 
This argument replaces reference to an empirical
fact, ”genetic engineering has a special qual-
ity”, with reference to a logical possibility, ”it is
conceivable that genetic engineering has a
special quality”. It seems that this move is no
longer an attempt to provide reasons for the
hypothesis of specific risks, but rather an at-
tempt to avoid the need for further reasons.
 
In general, the discourse in our technology
assessment proceeded from the premise that,
whoever makes a claim must substantiate it.
Consequently, those who claimed that the risks
of transgenic and nontransgenic plants are
comparable had to deliver the arguments. What
they did was to show that whatever risk or
uncertainty was identified and described for
transgenic plants, equivalent risk or uncertainty
can be identified for conventionally bred plants.
But they were not supposed to demonstrate the
impossible, namely, that unknown risks from
transgenic plants, which might exist but have not
been identified and cannot be described, are also
equivalent.
 
The fact that our knowledge is limited mitigates
against those who claim that differences which
we do not recognise may nevertheless exist.
Logically, lack of evidence does not prove that
the differences do not exist (we may find one
tomorrow); practically, however, if we find no
difference we treat things as being equal (for the
time being), not as different. There seems to be
no alternative. Where we do not know, we
cannot distinguish. This makes an easy argu-
ment for those who claim that things are compa-
rable. On the other hand, the concept of equality
would lose all meaning if, in the absence of
observable differences, things must be counted
as different and not as equal, until the contrary
were proven.
 
This rule was apparently accepted, at least
implicitly, by all participants in the technology
assessment. Otherwise, critics of the technology
could have foregone sophisticated arguments to
show why genetic engineering has a ”special
quality” which makes a difference between
transgenic and nontransgenic plants. They could
have argue instead that even if we do not ob-
serve any differences, we can assume that they
exist and base our risk assessment on this as-
sumption. Obviously, no one thought this argu-
ment to be sufficient. In sum, therefore, the fact
that transgenes, as far as their impact on the
genomic structure is concerned, cannot be
distinguished from transposons and the recombi-
nations that occur in conventional plant breeding
precludes the hypothesis that specific risks might
be involved just because genetic engineering has
been applied.
 6  Hypothetical and speculativeworst-case scenarios
 
When we consider suspected risks which might
exist but have not been experienced, then, by
definition, the possible damage from such risks
cannot be foreseen. But is the damage also
”unforeseeable”, in the sense that anything could
happen? Should we assume that the hypothetical
risks from transgenic plants could have fatal or
catastrophic consequences?
 
Different worst-case scenarios were discussed in
the technology assessment. In terms of specific
metabolic risks from transgenic plants, associ-
ated with alien gene products, the envisaged
damage was that toxic or allergenic plant sub-
stances could be formed, making the plants
unsuitable as food. If reactions to these sub-
stance were severe, the risk would be easy to
identify and the respective cultivar could be
taken off the market immediately. If the effects
were low-level, however, while they may not
necessarily be harmless for human health,
damage would likely go unnoticed or it would be
difficult to attribute to the transgenic food crop
as the probable cause.88
 
This worst-case scenario uses empirical exam-
ples and theoretical models from plant physiol-
ogy, plant breeding and food toxicology to
circumscribe possible consequences. It relies on
known causal mechanisms and does not assume,
for example, that harmless crop plants would
suddenly begin to produce deadly poisons when
a herbicide resistance gene is added.
 
A cautious approach was also taken to describe
the worst case of environmental damage that
could result from transgenic plants: Should
unexpected metabolic changes lead to increased
ecological fitness then, it was assumed, trans-
genic crop plants could invade agricultural
habitats as weeds and cause agronomic prob-
lems or yield loss for the farmer. Eventually the
plants (or their hybrids with wild relatives) could
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become established in natural ecosystems and
change these. The empirical model for the latter
assumption was the undesired spread of nonin-
digenous or poorly domesticated crop plants
such as the American black cherry in German
forests, topinambur along rivers, or rhododen-
dron in the British countryside.
 
Occasionally, however, much more dramatic
images of worst cases were proposed in our
technology assessment. In a kind of ”thought
experiment”, one participant developed the
following scenario of how horizontal gene
transfer from genetically engineered crop plants
could result in ecological catastrophe: Trans-
formed bacteria could release new metabolic
products into the soil which induce permanent
changes in the composition and function of soil
microflora that differ from and go farther than
the changes normally induced by agricultural
practice. These changes could, if transgenic
plants became used on a massive scale, affect
the evolutionary balance between bacteria and
plants—the basis of the composition and pro-
duction of earth’s atmosphere. As a result, our
atmosphere and climate could be changed sig-
nificantly.
 
This thought experiment is revealing because it
shows that a catastrophic threat can easily be
hypothesised if logical possibilities are compiled
one after the other without identifying any
mechanism to explain how events which are
imagined could become real under suitable
circumstances. The above scenario for ecologi-
cal catastrophe triggered by horizontal gene
transfer must be dismissed as mere specula-
tion—it is not a reasoned hypothesis. This
stands in sharp contrast, for instance, to the
worst-case scenarios discussed in relation to
nuclear power. Here, the causal mechanisms that
would inevitably lead to catastrophe, provided
certain initial conditions are met, are known: for
example, a permanent breakdown of all cooling
systems. No comparable mechanisms are known
for the case of transgenic plants. One would
have to postulate them as a hypothesis, that is,
assume that hidden mechanisms exist, of which
we are unaware, but which operate specifically
and only for transgenic organisms and have the
capacity to translate small, immediate conse-
quences into large, long-term catastrophe.
 7  Regulating suspected risks
 
There were widely differing views in the tech-
nology assessment about appropriate political
and legal responses to suspected risk, and this
aspect remained controversial. Some argued that
while hypotheses of risk might be a proper
reason for demanding more research, they
should on no account be the basis for additional
regulation. Others felt that even speculative risks
warrant drastic precautionary measures to ward
off possible harm from genetically engineered
plants.
 
The first position outlined above is more
restrictive than current policy and law. It is an
accepted principle in many fields that precau-
tionary measures can be taken if there are good
reasons to suspect risk. It is not necessary to
wait until some risk is clearly recognisable and
danger imminent. Effective protection of
important goods such as life, health, or ecolog-
ical stability presupposes some response to
uncertain risk. This applies in particular when
such risks could have catastrophic consequences
should they become real. Therefore, it should be
no question that some kind of regulation is
appropriate in dealing with hypothetical risk.89
The question is, how restrictive can the
regulation be? In general, the assumption of
hidden risk from a new technology will justify
additional safety measures and controls, but not
a complete ban on the technology. In the
German law this rule follows from the principle
of proportionality. This principle also says that
the greater the potential damage from assumed
risk, the more restrictive the precautionary
measures may be.
 
The second position outlined above, that drastic
precautionary measures always be taken, goes
beyond current policy and law in most countries.
It implies that any kind of suspected risk is a
valid reason to ban a technology, even if that
risk can only be described as ”theoretically not
to be excluded” (a formula used throughout the
Öko-Institut’s report). In this case it would be
sufficient that there is a logical possibility that
the technology implies hidden risks which we do
not know and hence cannot describe in any way.
The German Supreme Court had to deal with
this kind of uncertainty about risks in the case of
nuclear power plants and ruled that it constitutes
”residual risk” which must be tolerated as
socially adequate, since the only alternative
would be that the state had to ban the new
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 The German Federal Administrative Court has ruled
that, in designing precautionary measures for nuclear
power,
 
”also possibilities of harm must be taken into account
which cannot be excluded because, given the present
state of knowledge, certain causal relations can neither
be confirmed nor denied and, hence, there is no clear
and present danger, but only suspicion of danger or a
potential of worry” (Bundesverwaltungsgericht, Vol-
ume 72, 1985: 315).
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technology completely.90 However, the court did
decide what the state must regulate in order to
meet its obligation to protect the basic rights of
its citizens. What the state can regulate under
the precautionary principle is a different ques-
tion. There is considerable scope for a more
restrictive policy.
 
The German constitution, for example, certainly
does not rule out precautionary measures against
speculative risk, or regulations that respond to
diffuse public anxiety that some unknown evil
occur if transgenic plants are released. The early
safety guidelines for genetically engineered
organisms issued in most countries during the
late 1970s (after the Asilomar Conference in
1975) may be taken as an example for the
regulation of speculative risk. The guidelines
were quite restrictive although the main justifi-
cation for them was the fact that genetic engi-
neering was a novel technology and that experi-
ence was lacking with respect to its possible
consequences. Nevertheless, these guidelines
would have been permissible as binding law
under the German constitution, because they
leave some freedom. While they restrict the use
of genetically engineered organisms, they do not
exclude them completely; the scope of the
guidelines envisages that these restrictions could
be lifted after a period of testing, if there are still
no further indications that the suspected risks in
fact exist. It was along these lines that most
participants in the technology assessment pro-
posed to regulate transgenic herbicide-resistant
crop plants. They recommended some additional
safety measures to be reviewed after a specified
period.91 Under German constitutional law,
however, it would be difficult to sustain absolute
and complete prohibition of transgenic plants on
the ground that this would be the only way to
eliminate all the conceivable, unknown risks
these plants might imply. Such a ban would be
incompatible with the basic rights of the parties
with an interest in the technology (manufacturers
or users).
 
Therefore, the legal relevance of arguments
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(Bundesimmissionschutzgesetz)
 that ”there
are sufficient reasons to assume that immissions could
possibly lead to harmful effects on the environment”
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht, Volume 69, 1984: 43).
Suspected risk ”on the basis of theoretical considerations
and calculations” may be sufficient reason; it is not
enough, however, if ”small minority opinions in science
propose a theoretical assumption which is falsifiable, in
principle, but untestable with the available means”
(ibid.).
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based on speculative risk is limited. But this
may not be a conclusive objection within the
context of technology assessment. In principle, it
would be legitimate to argue that proper regula-
tion requires a revision of current legal princi-
ples, including a redefinition of the balance of
basic rights between those who want to use new
technology and those who want to minimise its
risks. A more serious objection would be that
speculative risk arguments are inadequate as
criteria of normative assessment because they do
not distinguish between what should be allowed
and what forbidden. If no justification must be
provided for suspected risk, then such risks can
be invoked against anything at any time. The
same applies to speculative worst-case scenar-
ios. If the fact that we do not know exactly what
could happen constitutes legitimate reason to
assume that any imaginable consequence might
be possible, then we would have to expect
catastrophes everywhere all the time, and no
innovation could be approved. There is no way,
really, to know what can happen with a new
technology until it has been tested under real
conditions. And even then, we cannot be sure
that we have complete knowledge of all the
possible consequences. Established technologies,
too, may have hidden risks. Therefore, if we are
to calibrate precautionary policy and approval
of new technologies with a view to the maximum
possible harm that can ensue, then speculative
worst-case scenarios are useless as criteria.
 8  Reversing the burden ofproof—in dubio contraprojectum?
 
Discussions in our technology assessment sug-
gest that unsubstantiated, hypothetical risks and
worst-case scenarios that fail to explicate suit-
able mechanisms for how damage might occur
will have no relevance for the regulation of new
technology. But is this conclusion compelling? It
was, at any rate, rejected by all those partici-
pants who had argued that transgenic herbicide-
resistant crop plants should be banned, because
the existence of unknown risks could not be
excluded. The underlying rationale of this argu-
ment seems to be that the burden of proof should
be placed on claims of safety, not on claims of
risk.
 
As a rule, the relative safety of a new technology
must be demonstrated by passing it through a
filter of preventive testing before it can be
unleashed on society. But the general legal
principle is that the burden of proof lies with
those who claim risks. Those who argue that a
technology, although it may have survived the
testing for approval, is nevertheless still not safe,
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have to prove that there are additional risks. If
they are unable to do so, or if they cannot sub-
stantiate suspected risks in plausible hypotheses,
they loose their case and the technology is
authorised. This principle favours innovation. It
is based upon the value judgement that hidden
risks and unforeseeable consequences that
escape our best efforts of anticipation are a
worthwhile price to pay for new technology and
the freedom to innovate. Furthermore, it implies
confidence in society to be able to cope with
such risks and their consequences, should they
occur in the future. Apparently, neither broad
acceptance of innovation nor confidence in our
ability to repair things if they go wrong can be
taken for granted in society. And these premises
were definitely not shared by the critics of
transgenic plants in our technology assessment.
They demanded a complete reversal of the
burden of proof. Given the fact that herbicide
resistance genes cannot be contained or retrieved
in nature, the possible harm from hidden risks
could be irreversible once transgenic plants are
released into the environment. Therefore, it was
argued, the release of such plants should not be
allowed until it is proven that they involve no
additional risk.
 
Under such a rule any kind of risk assumption
becomes a conclusive argument. Remote or
speculative scenarios do not have to be justified
by the critics of a technology; rather, they must
be refuted by its proponents. In dubio contra
projectum! Consequently, reversal of the burden
of proof suggests itself as an ideal strategy to
maximise the impact of risk arguments. The
question remains, however, whether this strategy
is practicable. In particular, two problems were
raised: (1) Must we not apply the reversal of the
burden of proof to both old and new technology?
(2) Will any new technology ever be approved
under this rule?
 
Why should the reversal of the burden of proof
apply to new technologies and not to old ones?
After all, continued use of an old technology is
just as much an experiment involving uncertain-
ties and unforeseen consequences as the intro-
duction of new technology. A pragmatic answer
to this question might be that we also treat old
and new technologies asymmetrically in other
cases. For example, the German law on toxic
substances or medical drugs still allows old
products which would not be approved accord-
ing to current standards. In principle, however,
such asymmetry discriminates against innova-
tion and favours the technological status quo.
This is based on the value judgement that society
has little to lose if innovation is slowed down or
blocked, and that we are generally better off
living with the risks and uncertainties of old
technology than with the risks and uncertainties
of new technology.
 
Of course, this value judgement was also con-
troversial. We are not necessarily on the safe
side when we opt for the continued use of old
technology against innovation. Established
practices can also be fraught with unknown
hidden risks which we may only recognise later.
These, too, could have consequences as severe
as any of those unknown risks from a new
technology—for instance, climatic changes
brought about by the continued burning of fossil
fuels. In addition, where we could act, we are
not only responsible for what we do, but also for
what we do not. Strictly speaking, the precau-
tionary principle would also require that we
consider the risks (including hidden risks) we
take if we forego innovation and stick to old
technology.
 
A remaining argument in this debate was that
those technologies with which we are familiar
seem less threatening because we have already
had some time to detect their hidden problems
and to adapt to them. We have extensive practi-
cal experience with conventional breeding
techniques, but not with genetic engineering. In
this sense, nontransgenic plants indeed fare
better in terms of safety levels than transgenic
plants (although some so-called conventional
breeding techniques may also be new and hereto-
fore untested). The final question would then be
whether this advantage is a sufficient reason to
prefer an old technology over a new one. Opin-
ions over this question were indeed divided in
our technology assessment. In any case, if the
burden of proof is to be reversed some additional
rule would be needed to justify giving the benefit
of doubt to the older technology. Without such a
rule of preference, any technology, old or new,
would fall victim to the suspicion of hidden
risks.
 
The main weakness of regulatory schemes which
reverse the burden of proof to minimise techno-
logical risk, is that they are unable to distinguish
between acceptable and unacceptable innova-
tions. The unsubstantiated assumption that a
technology could involve unknown risks can
always be made and can hardly be refuted.
Empirical proof of a negative fact, in this case,
that hidden risks do not exist, is a logical impos-
sibility. One cannot, in a finite period of time,
examine an infinite set of possible facts in order
to demonstrate that it does not contain some
specific element. Consequently, a strict reversal
of the burden of proof would exclude all inno-
vation. From the perspective of risk prevention,
then, no new technology would ever be accept-
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able.
 
It seems plausible, therefore, to assume that
those who insist on the strict reversal of the
burden of proof have a moratorium on the
freedom to innovate in mind. They want to
replace control of risk as the test for approval of
new technology with other criteria such as
socioeconomic need or democratic vote. On the
other hand, if it is accepted that new technology
should be regulated within a framework of risk
control, the burden of proof can only be reversed
to a limited extent. One must be satisfied with
indicators for relative safety and leave aside risk
scenarios which can neither be tested nor sub-
stantiated. Then, only doubts justified by good
reason will count as an argument contra pro-
jectum, and reversal of the burden of proof
comes close to what we have in existing regula-
tions under the precautionary principle.
 9  Reversibility as a criterion?
 
Various efforts have been made to find criteria
which take unknown risks into account without
the need to ban new technologies outright. In the
public debate, it was proposed that new technol-
ogy only be permitted if its possible conse-
quences are reversible. In the event of unex-
pected risks, it must be possible to revoke the
approval of a technology without leaving lasting
damage. This criterion was adopted by some
participants in the technology assessment, who
argued that genetically engineered organisms—
in contrast, for example, to chemicals—were
able to reproduce themselves and multiply, and
hence could not be recalled once they have been
released in large quantities. These participants
felt that transgenic herbicide-resistant crops
should be banned, as a precautionary measure to
ensure that no irreversible harmful effects on
nature could occur.
 
Reversibility or retrievability seem plausible
criteria. Responsible decision making ought to
consider whether and at what cost it would be
possible to reverse a decision, should it turn out
to have been a mistake. However, the question
again is whether this is a viable criterion for
precautionary regulation of transgenic plants.
We may disregard the philosophical objection
that, strictly speaking, no decision is reversible
since historical development and natural evolu-
tion continue, and the world can never be the
same as before. From a practical point of view it
is sufficient to distinguish between consequences
which are more or less irreversible, and in this
sense pharmaceutical products can be recalled,
whereas released organisms and their genes are
not. The main objection in the technology as-
sessment was that no difference can be made as
far as reversibility is concerned between trans-
genic and nontransgenic crop plants. As a rule,
the crops developed using conventional breeding
techniques are also able to reproduce; they are
just as difficult (or easy) to retrieve as geneti-
cally engineered crops and they can, under
certain circumstances, induce irreversible
changes in the ecosystem and natural evolution.
 
If reversibility were really taken seriously as a
condition for approval, then conventionally bred
crops would also not be allowed. This would
clearly be absurd. There is general consensus
that such crops be accepted. Lack of reversibil-
ity cannot be a sufficient reason to ban any new
crop. In the final analysis regulation returns to
the issues of risk. The relevant question is
whether a crop will have harmful consequences,
not whether the consequences will be reversible.
Accordingly, possible damage from transgenic
herbicide-resistant plants was the central topic in
our technology assessment, not whether the
release of such plants can be reversed or not.
 10  Regulatory responses toanxiety
 
The assumption that transgenic plants pose new,
unknown risks which, in extreme cases, could
prove fatal or catastrophic may be arbitrary and
scientifically unfounded and therefore unsuitable
as the basis for regulation. However, fear of
unforeseen consequences is psychologically
plausible and probably widespread. People need
not have particularly good reasons to be seri-
ously worried; it may be sufficient that geneti-
cally engineered plants are novel and unfamiliar.
Anxieties are a legitimate political signal, even if
they cannot be justified on scientific grounds. In
a democracy, citizens’ feelings count; everyone
has, so to speak, the right to choose what he or
she fears and what not. On the other hand, this
does not imply a right to have one’s fears put at
the basis of collective regulation. Under the
German constitution it is not possible to ban a
technology merely because some people are
afraid of it. However, there is no reason why the
law should not respond to the anxieties of the
people by imposing additional safety measures
short of a complete ban on the technology.
 
Some recommendations along these lines were
made in the normative discussions in our tech-
nology assessment. It was proposed that addi-
tional tests and monitoring be required for
transgenic herbicide-resistant crops.92 These
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requirements should apply even if there were no
reasons to suppose that these plants are in any
way more dangerous than plants developed
using conventional breeding. This asymmetric
treatment of transgenic plants could be regarded
as a sort of safety penalty for the novelty of the
technology.
 
Regulations which are not based on identifiable
risks but on the novelty of genetic engineering
are increasingly denounced as anti-modernism in
the international discussion. Such regulations
were, however, not really in dispute in our
technology assessment. They represent a kind of
tribute to the lack of acceptance of genetic
engineering among the general public (albeit an
insufficient tribute according to the critics).
Transgenic plants are frequently viewed with
suspicion, whereas new conventional plants are
widely accepted without reservation. This diver-
gence of opinion will probably not be overcome
in the short term by reiterating that the identifi-
able risks for both types of plants are equivalent.
Additional safety measures seem to be an ap-
propriate response. They can be imposed for a
limited period of time. They are open to revision
and they do not represent an unreasonable
restriction as long as they do not in fact amount
to an attempt to obstruct the introduction of
transgenic plants altogether.
 C  NONSELECTIVE HERBICIDES:ARE THE BENEFITS
APPRECIABLE?
 
Public debate is preoccupied with the control of
risks involved in genetic engineering. However,
this is only one of the issues generated by trans-
genic herbicide-resistant crop plants. Another
issue is the use of nonselective herbicides in
agriculture, which becomes a feasible option for
weed control if herbicide resistance genes are
engineered to crop plants. The risks and benefits
of such a strategy have been dealt with in nu-
merous reports and discussions in the technology
assessment. The results are, to put it cautiously,
nonspectacular. As was shown in sections II B
and II C above, neither grave risks nor dramatic
benefits can be expected:
• Nonselective herbicides will not pose any
particular problem of residues in food products.
The situation is basically the same as it is with
the introduction of new selective herbicides.
• The overall amount of herbicides used in
agriculture is likely to decrease; in some crops
considerable savings could be achieved. There
could be some increase, however, in marginal
areas if mechanical methods of weed control are
displaced.
• Nonselective herbicides such as glyphosate or
glufosinate are slightly better in terms of envi-
ronmental impact than the herbicides they would
replace. Rapid degradation in the soil and re-
ductions in the amount of herbicides used will
theoretically reduce the risk of groundwater
contamination. Measurable effects on levels of
erosion are not to be expected. The use of only
one nonselective herbicide with monocultures or
in the all crops of a rotational sequence could
result in the loss of rare weed species from the
seed bank.
• Nonselective herbicides improve agronomic
conditions by providing new options for flexible
postemergence application and better control of
problem weeds. Nonrotational use of such
herbicides could, however, increase the selection
of herbicide-resistant weeds. New opportunities
for systems of integrated crop management (e.g.
direct drilling, ground cover crops) may remain
purely theoretical, since they may not be eco-
nomic under present conditions.
• For some crops, nonselective herbicides will
offer financial benefits for farmers because weed
control becomes cheaper.
 
These findings were considered provisionary,
since they were based on assumptions about the
use and effects of nonselective herbicides, which
may have to be modified when more data are
available from field trials and practical experi-
ence. But they were not really in dispute among
the participants in our technology assessment.
The dispute was over the normative evaluation.
Many participants rejected the conclusion while
that nonselective herbicides promise only slight
advantage, they at any rate have no significant
disadvantage and their use, therefore, constitutes
an acceptable method of agricultural manage-
ment. Participants disagreed over the assessment
of existing regulations, over the proper criteria
of benefit, and over fundamental issues of future
development in modern agriculture and the role
of technological innovation in our society.
 1  Regulations as a factor in risk-benefit analysis
 
It was a common practice throughout the tech-
nology assessment to counter arguments about
possible risks, disadvantages and misuses of
nonselective herbicides by saying: ”the argu-
ment is true, in principle, but irrelevant, in
practice, because existing regulation is coping
with the problem”. This form of counter-
argument considered ”unfair” by some partici-
pants. Indeed, one can easily make the results of
any risk-benefit analysis positive, by assuming
ideal regulations and controls which will elimi-
nate all negative factors. At the other extreme,
74 Herbicide-Resistant Crops
however, it would also be misleading if regula-
tions were not considered at all. No technology
in our society is approved without any restric-
tion. Therefore, a risk-benefit analysis of trans-
genic herbicide-resistant plants can take into
account legitimately the established regulatory
framework (testing requirements, rules of appli-
cation, liability etc.), to determine what the
impacts of such plants would be. Nor would it
be ”unfair” to recommend new regulations and
to argue that these would solve the problem and
make the technology acceptable. To the con-
trary, such recommendation is clear evidence
that risk-benefit analysis will yield different
results with or without the proposed regulation.
For example, if nonselective herbicides were
continuously applied without rotation, they
would cause the total eradication of some weed
species from the seed bank, and this must be
counted as negative according to standards of
”integrated crop protection”. However, if proper
regulations ensure that these herbicides are used
only once with rotational crops, their impacts
will probably be neutral or, in some respects,
even positive.93
 
A risk-benefit analysis may have to disregard
problems which are dealt with by proper regula-
tion. But it is still a legitimate argument that
existing or proposed regulation is in fact not
adequate to solve the problem, or that the rules
would not be observed in practice. Arguments
on this line were raised against all regulation
concerning herbicides by the critics in our
technology assessment. In particular they re-
ferred to the limits of preventive testing, both in
terms of size and validity of tests (use of animals
and model systems). Critics also claimed that
compliance with existing rules would be par-
ticularly low in the case of nonselective herbi-
cides.
 
All participants in the technology assessment
admitted that the tests for herbicide approval
have limitations, but many contested the claim
that, because of these limitations, existing
regulations could not guarantee the safety of
health and environment. They pointed out in-
stead that the regulations had apparently been
sufficient in the past to prevent damage. If
unexpected harmful effects from herbicides
occurred, the regulations could be tightened or
approvals for the herbicides withdrawn, as in the
case of the ban on atrazine and paraquat in
Germany (because of groundwater contamina-
tion or lasting soil impacts). Since our technol-
ogy assessment was not supposed to judge
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herbicides in general, the debate on the scope
and predictive power of preventive testing for
approval of herbicides remained a side issue in
the discussions. There was agreement that the
development of better test methods and models
in toxicology and ecology is desirable. However,
the argument that available tests should be
dismissed as useless because they have inherent
limitations was clearly rejected: that would
eliminate all objective, reproducible criteria from
predictive risk assessment.
 
One thing the debate did achieve was to call to
mind that regulations should not make unrealis-
tic guarantees of safety. No preventive testing
can exclude every risk; it can only control a
finite set of clearly defined risk assumptions.
There can always be risks which will not be
controlled, because they are unknown or
untestable. Thus, if tests find no risk, this is
strictly speaking, only an indication of relative
safety, and not a proof of full safety. The fact
that we accept such indicators and consider a
technology safe (enough) once it has passed the
tests for approval, is a political compromise
between minimising risks and enabling techno-
logical innovation.
 
Since it is impossible to test for all conceivable
negative effects, any regulation of new technol-
ogy must draw a distinction between possible
effects which can be tested and controlled before
the technology is approved, and possible effects
which must be tolerated without being tested.
This applies as well to the approval of nonselec-
tive herbicides and of transgenic herbicide-
resistant cultivars. Uncertainties which may still
be implied by such cultivars but have not been
controlled by preventive tests will, in legal
terms, count as residual risk which may be
imposed legitimately on the society. In political
terms, however, the question of what constitutes
an acceptable residual risk when herbicides are
approved is a highly controversial matter—both
in the public debate, in general, and in our
technology assessment. While it is true that tests
which prove, to the negative, that no risks exist,
are impossible, it is always possible to test more
than has been done up to now. Therefore, there
will always be room for new demands to tighten
the conditions for herbicide approval.
 
This dispute is not likely to be resolved because
of the underlying disagreement over whether
herbicides should be approved at all, in the first
place. Those who reject all use of herbicides will
demand ever more exacting tests, even if this
makes the introduction of new herbicides virtu-
ally impossible or uneconomical. Those who
consider the use of herbicides acceptable and
necessary in agriculture will advocate limited
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testing programmes and warn against ”over-
regulation”. It would be honest, in this dispute,
to do away with the misleading scientific rheto-
ric that preventive testing will prove the safety
of a new technology; instead one should admit
that some compromise between what is tested,
and what is not, is always implied. Political and
moral arguments must then explain why this
compromise should be accepted as fair and
fitting. On the other hand, it is dishonest to drive
demands for stricter regulation to the extreme:
those who press for ever more preventive testing
as a means to exclude all conceivable risk,
should admit instead that they really seek the
total rejection of the technology, regardless of
testing.
 2  Shifting criteria of evaluation
 
Any risk-benefit analysis requires evaluation
criteria. What counts as damage, what as bene-
fit? In many cases the answers are clear. In
general, there is a social consensus on basic
goals and values (human rights, protection of the
environment, productivity in agriculture). Plu-
ralism does not mean that people live in separate
normative worlds. Disagreement arises over
questions of how accepted goals and values
should be realised in concrete situations, and
how priorities should be set if they are in con-
flict. When it comes to these issues, pluralistic
moral attitudes and political preferences will
prevail. This was especially the case in our
technology assessment whenever the develop-
ment of acceptable or desirable forms of agri-
culture was at issue. The debate over whether
protecting the diversity of weed species is a
proper goal when we consider agricultural
farmland, can serve as an example.
 
We can assume that the widespread use of
nonselective herbicides will reduce weed seed
banks and occasionally eliminate rare weed
species from the areas treated. Is this a negative
factor in the risk-benefit analysis? If we apply
the criterion of nature conservation, then the loss
of a rare species in a region constitutes signifi-
cant damage; this criterion demands that the
existing spectrum of species be preserved over
the widest possible range of sites. But is this a
proper criterion for evaluating a method of weed
control? Evidently, where farmland is concerned,
some aspects of biodiversity will give way to
aspects of productivity. Agriculture gives, by
definition, preferential treatment to crops over
other plant species. All forms of agriculture,
including organic farming, attempt to eliminate
most weeds from the fields and reduce the
pressure from weed seed banks. Weed control
entails some loss of biodiversity. In addition,
local or regional biodiversity within agricultural
habitats is in any case contingent upon the
choice of crops to be cultivated. If certain crops
are no longer cultivated (for instance, sugar beet
in Central Europe if alternatives become avail-
able), then the weed complexes associated with
these crops will disappear from the fields. The
same applies if large areas are set aside or
reforested. Therefore, in contrast to natural
ecosystems, it makes no sense to regulate agri-
cultural habitats with a view to preserving
existing biodiversity. If necessary, reserves
would have to be created for rare weeds outside
agricultural areas.
 
Some participants concluded from this that
species conservation should have no significant
role in the assessment of nonselective herbicides.
The general feeling was, however, that while
production must have priority on farmland, this
does not imply a carte blanche for unrestricted
eradication of weed species. This is in line with
the German Plant Protection Act which rules
that herbicides cannot be approved if they
impair the ”household of nature”. However,
there was no agreement concerning to what
extent species conservation on farmland is
compatible with agricultural production. Those
who considered organic farming as a feasible
and desirable alternative to conventional,
intensive agriculture felt that any loss of weed
biodiversity from herbicide use was avoidable
and should therefore count as damage.
Consequently, these persons were not impressed
by the argument that nonselective herbicides
would not reduce weed stocks more than would
the tank mixtures of selective herbicides used at
present; they demanded instead that weed
control be carried out in general at much lower
levels. A common ground for evaluation
accepted by all participants was the notion of
”integrated crop protection”, with the objective
to reduce the chemical load on agricultural
fields, if possible. The majority accordingly
rejected permanent, nonrotational applications of
nonselective herbicides because this is likely to
lead to extreme depletion of weed seed banks.
 3  Are small benefitsappreciable?
 
Most of the participants in the technology as-
sessment felt that transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops did not represent a major technological
breakthrough in chemical weed control. These
crops contribute to innovations that were already
in place before, like shifting to postemergence
treatment using split doses of herbicides. Tech-
nically speaking, nonselective herbicides are
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equivalent to new postemergence, selective
herbicides. They will offer some advantages
with respect to flexibility and cost of weed
control, and with respect to more effective
elimination of problem weeds (especially in row
crops). However, most participants saw little
reason to vest great hopes of agronomic benefits
in them.94
 
This assessment raised some basic questions of
evaluation to be dealt with in any risk-benefit
analysis: Are small benefits appreciable? Is a
technology acceptable if it improves the status
quo moderately, or must the status quo be
evaluated as well? Will any improvement to the
status quo suffice to ”really” solve the prob-
lems? Should alternatives to the technology be
assessed in comparison?
 
There was broad agreement that risk-benefit
analysis implies a limited frame of reference. It
makes little sense to extend the evaluation to
technology in general, if we are to assess trans-
genic herbicide-resistant crops. There will
always be some innovations which are more
worthwhile to pursue. And there will always be
other problems against which the possible
harmful effects from herbicide-resistant crops
appear to be negligible. Therefore, opportunity
costs (i.e. how the resources necessary for the
development, introduction and regulation of
herbicide-resistant crops could be put to better
use) should not be considered. Conversely, the
fact that destruction of tropical rain forests is the
primary cause of loss of genetic diversity cannot
be used as an argument to ignore the negative
impacts herbicide-resistant crops might contrib-
ute to that problem.
 
Even so, the choice of reference level remained a
problem in the technology assessment. For
example, participants agreed that herbicide
leaching into groundwater must be prevented
and that savings in the amounts of herbicides
used in agriculture are desirable. But views as
differed over whether a reduction of 10 to 20%,
expected with nonselective herbicides, consti-
tuted any real improvement. Some took current
levels of groundwater pollution as the point of
reference, others the optimum of zero pollution
required by the precautionary principle. The
latter would only accept reductions in herbicide
use of at least one order of magnitude (i.e. to
one-tenth or one-hundredth) as a real improve-
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ment.95 In the discussions on soil erosion it was
argued that any improvements that might result
from a shift to postemergence, nonselective
herbicides should be ignored because, on the one
hand, they were in no way adequate to compen-
sate for existing losses from erosion and, on the
other hand, they would be superfluous if proper
site-specific crop management were observed.
 
A reduction in the amount of herbicides used
was generally booked as an ecological benefit.
However, participants in the technology assess-
ment, who rejected herbicides in principle, did
not find them more acceptable or ecologically
beneficial just because they would be used in
smaller quantities. With respect to the economic
evaluation, some participants criticised that
reduced cost of agricultural inputs and products
was taken as the criterion of benefit, because
this implicitly accepts the status quo, namely,
the practices of intensive farming, as the starting
point. They argued that if external costs were
included in the economic assessment—especially
negative environmental effects and also social
problems—then conventional, intensive farming
as a whole might prove ”uneconomical”. In this
case, relative improvements in terms of reduced
costs for the farmer could no longer be consid-
ered an economic benefit of herbicide-resistant
crops.
 
This pattern of argument repeated itself
throughout the discussions in our technology
assessment. While some individuals emphasised
that relative ecological or technological im-
provements were to be expected, others argued
that such ”improvements” should not count
because, in absolute terms, they merely amend a
state of affairs which was not acceptable from
the outset. They make things ”less bad”, at the
most, but not ”good”, and they do not, therefore,
represent any real benefit.
 
How the frame of reference for evaluation is
selected, is itself a matter of evaluation. The
choice cannot, in the final analysis, be refuted
but merely laid open. It then becomes apparent
that such choices need not be consistent. People
found it convenient to shift the frame of refer-
ence to suit their interests in the argument. For
example, in our technology assessment, changes
in the amounts of herbicides used were valued
asymmetrically by many participants: a 10%
reduction was not considered an improvement at
all, but a 10% increase would clearly have been
rated as a change for the worse. In the latter
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case, the status quo of herbicide inputs is the
starting point of reference for evaluation; in the
former case, it is not. Similarly, a slight reduc-
tion in water pollution, which might result if
nonselective herbicides are applied in lesser
amounts, was not considered a real benefit; but
an equally small increase which might result if
more herbicides were washed off leaves was
considered to represent real harm.
 
Nevertheless, there is still scope for a balanced
political assessment of herbicide-resistant crops,
irrespective of the frame of reference adopted for
evaluation. Even if one concedes that any im-
provements achieved through such crops were
only variations of a status quo which itself must
be regarded as problematic, one could still argue
that we ought to do what we can to improve this
status quo step by step. The counter-argument is
that this is treating the symptoms but not curing
the disease. Although this may be true, it is still
not a sufficient reason to reject herbicide-
resistant crops altogether. Why should a positive
development be rejected just because it does not
go far enough and cannot solve all the problems
at once? It is possible to justify herbicide-
resistant crops as an option that offers moderate
agronomic and environmental benefit and, at the
same time, emphasise that these crops represent
no significant contribution to the more ambitious
goal of making modern systems of agriculture
sustainable. This argument will, however, not be
acceptable to those who oppose the use of
herbicides as a matter of principle.
 4  Reference to intensiveagriculture or to organic
farming?
 
Normative discussions in the technology as-
sessment frequently ended up with more funda-
mental questions of how agriculture should be
developed in the future. If the prevalent system
of intensive agriculture is considered to be
neither worthy nor capable of being reformed,
then virtually no improvements to this system
would count as real benefits. Accordingly, it was
argued by some that the technology assessment
dealt with the wrong issues. Instead of assessing
only transgenic herbicide-resistant crops, a
comparative assessment of alternative systems
of agriculture (intensive versus organic farming)
would be needed.
 
Our technology assessment indeed only posed
limited questions and can therefore only give
limited answers. In deriving conclusions with
respect to possible ecological, agronomic and
economic benefits of herbicide-resistant crops,
conventional, intensive agriculture was taken as
the frame of reference. The question was
whether or not we can expect relative improve-
ments compared with current weed control
practices. The context of these practices—
cultivation of high-yield crops, small crop
rotations, and high chemical inputs of fertilisers
and pesticides—were taken as given.
 
Our technology assessment was not supposed to
engage in a systematic, comparative evaluation
of alternative farming systems. However, par-
ticipating environmental groups operated on the
premise that were such a comparison to be
made, organic farming would come out ahead,
and that it could (and should) replace conven-
tional farming on a broad scale. This view was
contradicted by others whose main argument
was that organic farming could not ensure food
supply for the world population. Nor was it
accepted unconditionally that organic farming
represents the superior model in terms of envi-
ronmental impacts and sustainability.
 
Whereas no participant would probably have
denied that organic farming has a better envi-
ronmental record than conventional agriculture,
many insisted that conventional agriculture
could prove an equally viable alternative in
environmental terms if it were developed ac-
cording to the principles of ”integrated crop
management”. Opinions were divided over this
question. However, even the advocates of or-
ganic farming did not rule out that, with appro-
priate management, conventional agriculture
could be continued indefinitely and also fulfil the
criterion of sustainability. They did not claim
that present agriculture would inevitably lead to
the ecological collapse of food production and
that, for this reason alone, the transition to
organic farming was indispensable. The question
whether organic farming could completely
replace conventional agriculture as the basis of
world food production was not extensively
discussed. This issue is mainly of ”academic”
interest since even the advocates of organic
farming did not assume that the phasing out of
conventional agriculture was a realistic political
goal for the near future. It is obvious that any
transformation to organic farming would not
imply an abrupt switch from one system to the
other; but at best it would mean a slow, progres-
sive shift in emphasis between two co-existing
strategies.
 
The dispute over which form of agriculture we
should develop was in many ways the real core
of political disagreement over transgenic herbi-
cide-resistant crops. Nevertheless it would not
be appropriate to evaluate these crops solely
within the broader framework of alternative
systems. Even advocates of organic farming
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would have to admit that improvements in
conventional agriculture could be highly rele-
vant, since this form of agriculture is what is
practised on almost the total area of farmland in
the industrialised countries and much of the
Third World, feeding billions of people. Thanks
to increased yields in conventional agriculture
(including the so-called Green Revolution), food
production has been able to keep up with popu-
lation growth in recent decades. At least for the
time being, therefore, hunger is more a problem
of distribution than of production. A realistic,
short-term alternative to replace the present
system is not in sight. Despite all their differ-
ences, participants in our technology assessment
would not have disputed that organic farming
methods could not take over the role of ensuring
food supply on a global scale in the foreseeable
future; nor perhaps would it ever be able do so,
on the basis of its present level of productivity.
One must therefore concede that—dramatic
political and technological revolutions notwith-
standing—a growing world population will
continue to depend on conventional agriculture,
and steady agronomic, ecological and economic
improvements in this type of agriculture are
absolutely indispensable.
 D  USEFULNESS ANDSOCIOECONOMIC NEED AS
CRITERIA FOR APPROVAL:
A ”FOURTH HURDLE” FOR
INNOVATION?
 
What benefits might be obtained from transgenic
herbicide-resistant crops is, without a doubt, a
central topic in a technology assessment. But
how relevant is it for decisions about the tech-
nology? Seed producers and chemical companies
will try to estimate the economic advantages
before they invest in transgenic herbicide-
resistant crops, and public funding should be
withheld if these crops do not promise a benefit
for the community.96 But to what extent should a
legal test for benefits become a criterion for the
approval of new technology? Could/should
transgenic herbicide-resistant crops be banned
because they offer no real benefits or because
we actually do not need them as equally good or
better alternatives are available?
 
These questions were the subject of controversy
in our technology assessment. Discussions
centred in part on the limited risk-benefit analy-
                                                  
 
96
 Probably because of public criticism surrounding the
project, the German Ministry for Research and Technol-
ogy decided not to become involved in the funding of the
development of transgenic herbicide-resistant crops.
sis required by the German law (article 16 of the
Genetic Engineering Act, article 15 of the Crop
Protection Act). In part, they were concerned
with more radical demands to extend the politi-
cal control of innovation in our society.
 1  Risk-benefit analysis underthe German Genetic
Engineering Act
 
According to article 16 of the Genetic Engi-
neering Act, transgenic herbicide-resistant crops
may only be released or placed on the market if
 ”according to the available scientific evi-
dence no effects are to be expected which
are unjustifiably harmful in view of the
purpose of the release”.97
 
The elements to be considered for such a deci-
sion were brought together in our technology
assessment. Most participants assumed that
transgenic herbicide-resistant crops would pass
this test and could be approved.98 However,
several aspects need to be clarified: When is a
risk-benefit analysis necessary (admissible)?
What effects have to be taken into account in
assessing damage?
 
One question is whether a release can at all be
justified by weighing the risks against the pur-
pose, if harmful effects are not only a possibility
but definitely to be expected. Can benefits only
compensate for risks, that is, for harm that
would result from transgenic organisms if some
unfortunate circumstances occur? Or can bene-
fits also compensate for imminent danger, that
is, for damage inherent in the application of such
organisms? The European law seems to rule
that, in the latter case, approval must always be
denied without any consideration of benefits.
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 Harm is defined in terms of impacts on life and health
of humans, on animals and plants, as well as other
aspects of the environment and its fabric of interaction,
and on material goods. See article 1.
 98 In Germany, releases of glufosinate-resistant oilseed
rape and maize were approved (for field trials only) in
1994. On the European level, herbicide-resistant oilseed
rape and chicory were authorised for being placed on the
market as seeds for breeding purposes (but not for food or
feed) in 1996 (Official Journal, 1996 L, Nos. 37/30 and
175/25). Monsanto’s glyphosate-resistant soybean was
authorised for food purposes in April 1996 (Official
Journal
 L 107/10). Transgenic pest-resistant maize with a
herbicide resistance gene as a marker was finally ap-
proved on the European level without restrictions for
marketing in December 1996. France refused, however,
to register the variety, which is a precondition for grow-
ing it (see Nature Biotechnology, 15, 1997: 308). Thus,
the maize is not yet grown in Europe; import has been
approved in all EC countries except Austria and Luxem-
bourg (May 1997).
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Directive 90/220 on the deliberate release re-
quires measures ”to avoid adverse effects” on
human health and the environment (article 4).
This question is controversial,99 but it appears to
have no particular significance for transgenic
herbicide-resistant crops since these pose no
specific risks for human health or the environ-
ment. The risks discussed in our technology
assessment all referred to possible harm that was
more or less remote and the probability of which
could be further reduced by appropriate safety
measures. Harm may nevertheless be possible,
but that possibility can be compensated legiti-
mately by the purpose (the benefits) of the
technology.
 
On the other hand, weighing the risks and the
purpose of a release is only necessary (and
hence only admissible) according to the German
law if adverse effects are to be expected with
some degree of probability. Therefore, conse-
quences which are possible or probable but not
harmful need not be justified by the purpose of
the technology. This would probably apply, for
example, to horizontal gene transfer from crop
plants to soil bacteria. Should herbicide resis-
tance genes be transferred, the effect to be
expected would be a temporary increase in
numbers of transformed herbicide-resistant
bacteria near the soil surface while the herbicide
is active. Whether this in itself represents a
harmful effect is questionable. For similar
reasons the possibility that transgenes for herbi-
cide resistance are outcrossed from crops to
related wild species will be irrelevant. Since
herbicide resistance does not represent any
selective advantage in natural habitats, one
cannot envisage ecological damage from occa-
sional wild plants which might have taken up the
transgene. Nor can the disadvantages resulting
from the selection of herbicide-resistant weeds in
agricultural fields be brought forward as damage
in a risk-benefit-analysis. They constitute real
harm to the economic interests of farmers or the
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 Expert report commissioned from Prof. E. Rehbinder
(Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft, Universität Frankfurt
am Main): ”Rechtsprobleme gentechnisch veränderter
herbizidresistenter Pflanzen”; commentary by Dr. J.
Steinberger (Bundessortenamt Hannover), in: Materialien
zur Technikfolgenabschätzung, Heft 18 (see appendix).
Were the EC Directive to be applied strictly, then the
need for revision would arise as soon as it would be
necessary to consider a really useful application with
unavoidable harmful effects. It would hardly be appropri-
ate if it were not even possible to consider whether, for
example, the use of genetically modified microorganisms
against the malaria mosquito might not warrant certain
levels of water pollution or a shift in the species spectrum
of the food chain. See the official commentary on arti-
cle 16 in Hirsch and Schmidt-Didczuhn (1991, No. 17).
chemical industry, but the protection of these
interests is not covered by the Genetic Engi-
neering Act. The same applies for negative
consequences attributable not to the transgenic
herbicide-resistant crops themselves, but to the
use of the nonselective herbicides introduced
with these crops. An example would be envi-
ronmental damage that might result if nonselec-
tive herbicides were used particularly recklessly.
Such problems concern the use of herbicides and
are a matter for the plant protection law rather
than the law for genetically modified organ-
isms.100
 
It is generally agreed that so-called residual
risks, that is, uncertainties about hidden risks, do
not have to be compensated in a risk-purpose
assessment under the German law. Conse-
quently, harmful effects which cannot be pre-
dicted or described because they are not known
are not taken into account, even if they remain a
theoretical possibility. Many of the assumed
risks which were the subject of controversy in
our technology assessment fall under this cate-
gory, for example, the assumption that herbi-
cide-resistance genes which had been outcrossed
to wild plants or transferred to soil bacteria
could have unforeseen environmental or other
novel effects not previously observed, or that
they could initiate evolutionary developments
which could prove harmful after many years. It
is questionable whether any of the scenarios
discussed in our technology assessment substan-
tiated sufficient risk to warrant an assessment of
purpose as a condition for the approval of
transgenic herbicide-resistant crops under arti-
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 This is also the standard rule in the European law. The
impact of transgenic herbicide-resistant crops on the
practice of herbicide use in agriculture is outside the
scope of Directive 90/220; see, for example the decision
by the Commission on herbicide-resistant chicory (Offi-
cial Journal, 1996 L, No. 175/25). Such arguments may
nevertheless be used to block decisions in the respective
committees (see IHE, 1996: 5). The legal separation of
safety issues from socioethical problems runs counter to
the mood of public debates and policy advisory bodies
which represent a broad range of interests. The excluded
aspects must either be dealt with in other legal arenas or
be taken up in informal deliberations and dialogues
”surrounding” decision making on genetic engineering;
see, for the Netherlands, Schomberg (1996). However, a
number of countries (Denmark, Austria) explicitly refer
to social criteria in their gene technology laws; see
Levidow et al. (1996: 148) and below. On the other hand,
any risk-benefit-analysis under the Genetic Engineering
Act
 would have to include agricultural disadvantages and
problems related to the use of nonselective herbicides as
negative factors in assessing the benefits of herbicide-
resistant crops; these factors reduce the benefits to be
taken into account. But benefits would only be assessed
after it has been decided that harmful effects must be
expected.
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cle 16 of the German Genetic Engineering Act.
Perhaps one could argue that the risk of unex-
pected metabolic side-effects in food crops is an
example. This risk must be tested in every case,
but it still cannot be completely ruled out. If it is
not classified as a residual risk, it would have to
be balanced by the purpose (the benefits) of the
release. Moreover, the definition of what con-
stitutes harm is not a mathematical exercise.
And with no established jurisdiction in this field,
it is difficult to predict whether the judgement
that horizontal transfer or outcrossing of herbi-
cide resistance genes does not constitute harm,
will finally be accepted by the courts. It seems
advisable, therefore, to consider what benefits
could be pointed out to compensate for such
risks.
 
Insofar as only field trials are concerned, the
benefits to be considered are increases in knowl-
edge about the performance and the effects of
transgenic herbicide-resistant crops under field
conditions. When transgenic crops are placed on
the market, the benefits to be considered will
include reductions in the amounts of herbicides
used, better control of problem weeds, greater
flexibility and higher crop yields. Small im-
provements relative to the status quo must be
taken into account (with appropriate weighting).
There seems to be no legal basis for the demand
raised by some participants in our technology
assessment that a reduction in herbicide use
amount to at least one order of magnitude (one
tenth) less before it could really count as a
benefit. Any reduction in the use of chemicals
for crop protection is a legal objective according
to the German Plant Protection Act (article 6).101
 
In balancing the risks and purpose of transgenic
herbicide-resistant crops it seems legitimate to
consider as well that the risks to be compensated
(like uncontrolled metabolic changes or in-
creases in fitness) also exist for conventionally
bred plants. It is true that comparability of risks
does not imply acceptability. The very fact that
special legislation has been enacted for geneti-
cally modified organisms suggests that trans-
genic crops could be subjected to stricter con-
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 On the other hand, it is questionable whether it can be
considered a benefit that, with transgenic herbicide-
resistant crops, farmers have better options for the
management of monocultures (as concluded by Rehbinder
in his report, p. 27). Such options are hardly compatible
with the rules of ”integrated crop protection”. In our
technology assessment, they were considered as a disad-
vantage and as abuse of herbicide-resistant crops, even if
farmers could benefit economically in the short term.
Like other agronomic disadvantages, they do not add to
the risks of transgenic crops; rather, they reduce the
benefits which can be taken into account.
trols than conventionally bred plants. The Ger-
man law requires safety measures corresponding
to the state of scientific knowledge (Stand der
Wissenschaft), which generally means a par-
ticularly high standard of precaution. However,
if, despite the safety measures transgenic crops
still involve risks, and if these risks are compa-
rable to those normally accepted with conven-
tionally bred plants, then a moderate benefit
should suffice to outweigh them in the risk-
purpose assessment. It can be assumed that
transgenic herbicide-resistant crops would meet
this requirement.102
 2  Have alternatives togenetically engineered crops
to be taken into account?
 
Whenever risks and benefits have to be balanced
the question of alternatives comes to the fore.
Can the benefits of transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops justify the risks when other options are
available for weed control, with the same or
lower risks? Can approval be denied if these
crops, although useful when viewed in isolation,
are not better than what we already have? There
is no provision in article 16 of the German
Genetic Engineering Act that alternatives have
to be taken into account. This may nevertheless
be required under the general principles devel-
oped by the German Federal Administrative
Court in the paraquat case.103 However, the law
poses tight restrictions here.
 
It is uncontested that the risk-benefit assessment
under article 16 may not be used to test for
socioeconomic need nor to enforce political
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 This conclusion is based on two assumptions:
(1) Certain harmful effects are possible if we release
transgenic herbicide-resistant crops. (2) The possibility of
such effects will be outweighed legally by the benefits of
these crops. This interpretation would not be valid if the
law really required that ”harmful effects on the environ-
ment must be excluded” (see Rehbinder, p. 25). Strictly
speaking, this formula would bar any approval of trans-
genic herbicide-resistant crops, irrespective of purpose or
benefit. According to the results of our technology
assessment, harmful effects cannot be excluded. This
does not just mean that it is logically impossible to
exclude unknown risks: it is also not possible to reduce
realistic, identifiable risks to zero. It is only possible to
show that the risks are very small or that they can be
made very small by appropriate precautions. If there is an
application for the risk-purpose assessment of article 16,
it should lie here.
 
103
 Judgement by the German Federal Administrative
Court, 10 November 1988, Volume 81, p. 12: Approval of
a herbicide which has considerable effects on the house-
hold of nature may be denied, because substitutes are
available that have fewer effects and that are suitable for
the farmer in agronomic and economic terms. See also
Rehbinder, p. 40.
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choices of the technology on which agriculture
should be based. Competent authorities have to
examine whether transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops are useful, but not whether they are actu-
ally needed. And it is not an admissible legal
argument that herbicides and thus herbicide-
resistant crops can be spared altogether if agri-
culture were shifted to organic farming. Alter-
natives that might have to be taken into account
are technical options for weed control without
transgenic herbicide-resistant plants. Mechanical
methods will not usually be considered because
they have agronomic and economic disadvan-
tages and are not an equivalent option.104 But
selective herbicides with comparable perform-
ance and equal or less risks than nonselective
herbicides would provide a suitable alternative.
Such alternatives might in fact be available, at
least for some crops. Has this any legal implica-
tions for the risk-benefit balance of transgenic
herbicide-resistant crops? Two arguments could
be made in this respect. The first is that, because
alternatives are available, no benefit accrues
from herbicide-resistant crops. The second is
that, because alternatives are available, the risks
posed by herbicide-resistant crops are unaccept-
able. Both arguments are to the same point but
with a slightly different focus.
 
When we compare benefits of different tech-
nologies, we may find that one is more useful
than the other. However, we would not normally
conclude from this that only the best one is
really useful and that the others offer no benefit
at all. The very fact that we do have different
versions of a technology, in our case, that we
have more options for herbicide use, can itself
represent a benefit. In general, the approval of a
new technology is not contingent upon its repre-
senting real progress compared to an older
technology.105 Older herbicides do not lose their
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 Following the ”paraquat” ruling they would neverthe-
less have to be considered if severe impacts on the
household of nature were to be expected from nonselec-
tive herbicides, which exceed those levels usually caused
by herbicides. Having to tolerate such impacts would be
unjustifiable, if mechanical methods were an available
and suitable alternative. However, no evidence was
produced in our technology assessment that severe
impacts must indeed be expected. Therefore, as long as
the availability of mechanical methods of weed control is
not a sufficient reason for denying the approval of
herbicides in general, it will also not be possible to use it
as a legal argument against the approval of transgenic
herbicide-resistant plants.
 
105
 The certification of new plant varieties is an exception
to a certain degree; new varieties only get listed if they
pass the test of ”value for cultivation and use” which,
according to the German law, requires that a ”noticeable
improvement” compared to existing varieties is to be
authorisation when new and better products are
brought onto the market, and new herbicides can
be launched even if existing ones are as good or
better. Consequently, it would not be legitimate
to reduce the benefits of transgenic herbicide-
resistant crops to zero just because nonselective
herbicides may not be better than already exist-
ing selective herbicides.
 
In evaluating risks, alternatives may have
greater significance since, according to the
paraquat ruling, environmental impacts of
herbicides may be unjustifiable if suitable alter-
natives are available. This ruling presupposes
that the impacts exceed the levels normally to be
expected from herbicide use. In line with this
reasoning, one could perhaps argue that risks
involved in transgenic herbicide-resistant crops
are unjustifiable (and cannot be compensated by
benefits) (1) if they pose an imminent danger to
protected legal goods and (2) if selective herbi-
cides are available from which harmful effects
are less probable. Our technology assessment
suggests that the possible risks from transgenic
herbicide-resistant crops do not meet condi-
tion°1. They refer to possibilities of damage,
which are either remote or ”normal” in dealing
with crop plants. Therefore, it should be legiti-
mate to compensate them with possible benefits.
There is no established rule under the precau-
tionary principle that alternatives must be taken
into account in order to minimise risks, and that
when alternatives are available, only the tech-
nology that implies the least risk can be ap-
proved. Such a rule does not even apply for
nuclear energy. If it were adopted then, in the
case of transgenic herbicide-resistant crops, the
alternatives to be taken into account would be
conventionally bred plants (and not selective
herbicides). However, on the basis our technol-
ogy assessment, it is questionable whether less
harmful effects are to be expected from conven-
tionally bred plants than from transgenic ones.106
 
In conclusion, any suggestion that transgenic
herbicide-resistant crops should only be ap-
proved if they offer clear advantages over previ-
ously applied strategies of weed control would
be treading new legal ground. It advocates the
                                                                          
expected (article 34, Saatgutverkehrsgesetz); see also
Rehbinder, p. 8.
 
106
 It would seem that there is also little scope for taking
alternatives into account in herbicide approval. Nonse-
lective herbicides tend to have less and not more impact
on the household of nature than commonly used herbi-
cides. The risk that rare weed species could be eliminated
by excessive reductions in weed seed banks may require
additional regulation; it hardly justifies denial of approval
for nonselective herbicides because alternatives are
available.
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rule that old technology should be given prece-
dence over new, and that ”novelty” is sufficient
reason for rejecting a technology if no additional
benefit can be demonstrated. It was surely not
the intention of the German law to subject
genetically modified organisms to such a rule.
That would have been expressed clearly in the
Genetic Engineering Act. This rule cannot,
therefore, be introduced through the back door
of the risk-purpose assessment required under
article 16 of the act.107 However, participants in
the technology assessment discussed whether
such a rule was desirable, in principle, and
whether it should be included in the law in the
future.
 3  Socioeconomic need as acriterion for technological
innovation
 
In a way, the postulate that new technology
should only be approved if it is shown to be
socially useful and to fulfil a real need, was the
logical endpoint of the risk debate in our tech-
nology assessment. It refers to residual (hidden)
risks and implicitly admits that no conclusive
argument could be formulated against transgenic
herbicide-resistant crops within the common
framework of risk regulation. The central argu-
ment is simple: If no innovation can escape the
risk of harmful effects which we do not know
and therefore cannot test in advance, then we
should take this risk only if the innovation is
really worth it. A technology which, strictly
speaking, is superfluous because it serves no
acceptable need or because appropriate alterna-
tives are available, does not even justify residual
risks being imposed on the society.
 
This is a standard argument of the critics of
modern technology in many areas. It was
brought before the European Parliament by a
member of the Green Party, who advocated a
”fourth hurdle” in the regulation of innovation.
New technologies or products should not only
pass tests of safety, efficacy and quality, but
also the test of socioeconomic need.108 It was
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 Nor can it be read from the European law.
 
108
 Breyer (1992), as rapporteur of a draft report for the
Committee on Energy, Research and Development.
Hiltrud Breyer, member of the German Green Party,
criticises the intention of the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities (CEC 1991) to exclude socioeconomic
and need criteria from the regulation of products of
genetic engineering.
 
”This position runs counter to that repeatedly taken
by the European Parliament in its recommendations
on genetically engineered Bovine Growth Hormone
(BST) and to the views of numerous public interest
organisations. Such a stance will make it difficult . . .
rejected by mainstream policy and, as was to be
expected, met with opposition in our technology
assessment as well.109 The objections were in
part pragmatic and in part a matter of principle.
 
Pragmatic arguments considered problems of
delimitation: What counts as need? Are trans-
genic herbicide-resistant crops only needed when
existing herbicides have gaps in their weed
control spectra which can only be plugged with
nonselective herbicides? Or, is there also a need
for additional herbicides even if they are not
better than the existing ones? Is the farmer’s
interest in cutting costs an acceptable need? And
what about lower food prices, or jobs created in
the breeding sector? Obviously, the assessment
of social need depends on which short and long-
term effects of new technology are taken into
consideration. One could solve this problem by
taking only direct effects of the new technology
or product into account. This is the practice
under current law, in determining benefits which
might balance risks. In this case, the assessment
would have to be confined to the intended appli-
cation of transgenic herbicide-resistant crops
and consider the need for technically reliable,
environmentally friendly and economically
viable weed control. This proposal does not
                                                                          
for example, to make sure that a particular product
will not exacerbate existing agricultural surpluses or
result in further decline in small farming operations”
(1992: 8).
 
109
 The Commission of the European Communities
intends to assess products only under the conventional
criteria of safety, efficacy and quality. ”By their nature,
socio-economic aspects need to be considered in a
different way. It is not the intention to have another
systematic assessment in addition to the three criteria”
(CEC 1991: conclusion); see also Cantley (1995: 639).
The US Office of Science and Technology Policy has
emphasised that regulation should be confined to risks.
”The risk-based approach is scientifically sound, properly
protects public health and the environment against risk,
and avoids hindering safe innovations. . . . Determining
the scope of oversight on grounds other than risk would
also tend to discourage useful innovations” (OSTP 1992).
The German government followed that reasoning when it
proposed to amend the Genetic Engineering Act in 1993.
”Restrictions of the use of genetic engineering are only
warranted to the extent that they are justified to protect
humans and the environment” (Bundestagsdrucksache
12/5145: 10). The Austrian Gene Technology Act of 1994
includes, however, broader criteria. The government has
a mandate (and an obligation) to issue special regulation
in order to prohibit products if they ”could lead to a
burden on society or social groups, which cannot be
compensated and if the burden on the society appears
unacceptable for economic, social or ethical reasons”
(section 63). The Norwegian Gene Technology Act of
1993 requires ”that in deciding whether or not to grant
the application significant emphasis shall be placed on
whether the deliberate release represents a benefit to the
community and a contribution to sustainable develop-
ment” (section 10); see Backer (1995).
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answer the question, however, how alternatives
have to be taken into account in the assessment
of social need. Is need to be denied if suitable
selective herbicides or nonchemical methods of
weed control are available? Is it a valid need
argument that herbicide-resistant crops are
superfluous because crop sequences could be
changed or organic farming methods used?110
 
These questions indicate that more fundamental
problems are involved in the proposal to intro-
duce ”need” as a legal prerequisite for innova-
tion: Who decides whether there is a proper need
for a new technology? Acceptable social demand
is not an operational legal criterion. To deter-
mine such demand (particularly if available
alternatives have to be weighed against one
another) implies wide-ranging political choice
and this is the prerogative of the legislator.
Therefore, normal standards of the rule of law,
which establish a separation of powers in all
democratic societies, seem to exclude that
decision making be relegated to regulatory
agencies. A ”fourth hurdle” which implies a
mandate for regulatory agencies to determine
whether the society really needs some new
technology would be out of the question. In any
case, it could not be upheld under German
constitutional law.111
 
Determination of socioeconomic need by parlia-
ment or referendum would be a different ques-
tion. Even then one would have to consider,
under the German constitution, whether such
determination violates basic individual rights
that guarantee economic freedom and freedom of
research. However, the mandate of the legislator
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 The Norwegian Ministry of the Environment was
confronted with these problems when it had to decide on
the release of Christmas begonia which had been engi-
neered with antisense ACC-synthase to make the flowers
more durable. The applicants referred to savings in
chemical sprays normally used to make the flowers
durable as the ”benefit to the community”; they also
mentioned export opportunities for Norwegian gardeners.
The Department of Agriculture supported the argument of
export opportunities. A dissenting opinion in the Norwe-
gian Biotechnology Advisory Board denied any benefit;
the flowers could be preserved without genetic modifica-
tion or spraying if they were removed from warm rooms
overnight. The competent authority finally granted the
approval; it did not consider the export opportunities, but
saw a ”benefit to the community” in the gain of knowl-
edge to be expected from the project and in the saving of
chemical sprays (from the files of the Ministry of the
Environment). The Austrian ”social compatibility” clause
has not yet been applied, see Martinsen (1997).
 
111
 Similar arguments apply to the broad mandate given
the government in section 63 of the Austrian Gene
Technology Act
 to restrict products if they imply an
unjustified social burden. These are value decisions
which must be left to the legislator (Waldhäusl, 1995).
is very broad. These questions were not dis-
cussed a length in our technology assessment.
The main objection was that a legal test for
socioeconomic need would replace market
mechanisms with political decision making and
ultimately lead to a planned economy.
 
Markets have become the decisive mechanisms
in our society in determining whether a new
technology or product is needed, and economic
demand is normally taken as the irrefutable
indicator of real need. The state may control the
market to protect the moral order and minimise
risk, but it may not try to ”educate” market
actors by deciding which economic demand
constitutes a proper need and which does not.
Whether video recorders, mountain bikes, in-
dustrial robots or holidays on the Mediterranean
are superfluous (because we could live just as
well or better without them) is not a legitimate
state concern. Full political control over the need
for a technology is confined to decisions on
subsidising the technology or to cases where the
state has a virtual monopoly on demand, such as
for military or infrastructure technology. In line
with this reasoning the political majority could
still implement a preference for nonchemical
weed control, but only through subsidies or tax
incentives, not through a ban on the use of
transgenic herbicide-resistant crops.
 
Most of the participants in our technology
assessment defended the established institutional
balance between markets and political decision
making.112 They pointed out that the decline of
the socialist countries had demonstrated that no
model for an efficient economy exists in which
decisions on innovation and investment are the
domain of politics. Moreover, whether the
results were always convincing in those cases
where the need for technology had actually been
decided by the state may be a moot point: some
examples are the Euro-fighter, the Transrapid
monorail project, the use of nuclear energy and
the continued use of subsidised coal burning for
power generation.
 
The critics conceded the problems but insisted
nevertheless that some revision of the institu-
tional balance between market and politics was
necessary, and that the question of whether we
really need a new technology must be put on the
political agenda. The controversy over this point
remained unresolved in our technology assess-
ment, as it has in the rest of the society. Opin-
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 They opted instead for a regulation that genetically
modified products be labelled so that consumers can
choose (see section III E below). Labelling and consumer
choice are, so to speak, the conformist response to the
radical demand for a ”fourth hurdle”.
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ions will depend among other things on how the
gains and losses of modern technology are
balanced. Those who see mainly losses will
plead for the political control of needs in order
to limit the dynamics of technology develop-
ment; those who see mainly gains will reject
such controls and defend the principle of free-
dom of innovation.113
 E  SPECIFIC PROBLEMS,RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
REGULATIONS
 
In the course of our technology assessment
recommendations were made on the regulation
of various points. Most of these were controver-
sial. Critics of transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops had fundamental reservations, because
they felt that the regulations implied acceptance
of the technology, even with limitations. Advo-
cates of the technology were worried that addi-
tional bureaucratic hurdles might be added on
top of existing rules making the introduction and
use of new technology practically impossible.
Nevertheless, the disputing parties did establish
some kind of lowest common denominator for
various points. The critics were probably aware
that a complete ban on transgenic herbicide-
resistant crops was not a realistic political
option. The supporters felt that some kind of
additional regulation was the price to be paid in
order to gain acceptance of such crops among
the wider public.
 
Stricter regulations for genetically engineered
plants were justified as precautionary safety
measures that take the novelty of the technology
into account and should be implemented for a
limited period of time. Such regulations could be
withdrawn subsequently if no problems arose;
otherwise it would be necessary to consider
whether these regulations should be extended to
cover conventionally bred plants as well.114
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 The question is by no means settled. While the
exclusion of need criteria from administrative regulations
may become common practice in almost all countries, it is
not uncontested in the general public. The argument that
decisions on whether ”we really need” biotechnological
innovations should not be relegated to scientists, private
investors and markets may well win the case through
referenda—for instance, in Austria and Switzerland
where the requisite initiatives have been taken; see
Schweizer Bundesrat (1995).
 
114
 Some of the additional safety measures discussed here
would not be merely possible but necessary conditions for
the release of transgenic herbicide-resistant crops.
Article 16 of the German Genetic Engineering Act rules
that ”all safety measures must be adopted which are
necessary according to the current state of science and
technology”.
 1  Testing for unexpectedmetabolic changes and food
safety
 
The approval of nonselective herbicides implies
routine testing to determine whether metabolites
of the herbicide formed in transgenic herbicide-
resistant crops could pose health risks for the
consumer. Similar testing of other metabolic
changes that occur in such crops, apart from
herbicide metabolism, is or should be required in
the law governing the introduction of genetically
engineered plant varieties or food products.
Tests should be designed particularly to control
unintended or unexpected side-effects of the
gene transfer and the transgenic gene product.115
 
Most participants in our technology assessment
wanted to confine the testing to problems which
are known to be characteristic for the species
involved in the gene transfer. For instance, it
should be controlled whether toxicants known to
exist in the host plant species would be activated
or increased (e.g. alkaloids in tomatoes or pota-
toes); this includes control of whether silent or
cryptic metabolic pathways characteristic to the
plant species are activated, that have the poten-
tial to synthesise toxicants. The tests should also
ensure that toxicants or allergenic determinants
characteristic of the donor species have not
inadvertently been transferred to the host
plant.116
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 As a rule, food products from transgenic crops are
subjected to stricter controls than products from conven-
tionally bred crops. The latter do not have to be reviewed
and approved prior to marketing, in most cases; how they
test for the safety of their products, to avoid injunction or
prosecution and damage claims under product liability
law, is left to the producers. A shift to premarket controls
in the case of transgenic food is common policy in all
countries and in 1997 this policy was enacted in the
Novel Food Regulation in Europe (EC 258/97). The US
Food and Drug Administration considers a transgenic
gene product that differs significantly in structure,
function, or composition from substances found currently
in food as a food additive that is not generally recognised
as safe (GRAS) and, therefore, requires premarket review
(1992). The FDA considers substances that occur unex-
pectedly in the food as a result of pleiotropic effects as
”added substances” which require formal premarket
review if they occur at a level which may be injurious to
health.
 
116
 The FDA (1992) includes toxicants, antinutrients and
allergens in the list of potentially harmful constituents
that must be tested if they are known to be present in the
host or donor organism or related species. On the other
hand, transgenic nucleic acids are not as such considered
as potentially harmful; since nucleic acids occur in all
cells they are ”generally recognised as safe”. In line with
this argument the Administrative Court of Berlin ruled in
1995 that the mere presence of a ”foreign” nucleic acid
does not yet constitute a ”harmful effect” on the legal
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Even limited tests such as these go beyond what
was hitherto required for the registration of new
conventionally bred crop varieties. Metabolic
changes were only tested in special cases where
increased risk was indicated—for example, if the
crops had been crossed with poisonous, nonedi-
ble wild relatives. Routine testing for alkaloid
levels in potatoes was stopped in Germany some
decades ago (although it applies in the US and
has recently been reintroduced in Holland). That
testing should be stricter for transgenic plant
varieties met with opposition from some partici-
pants in the technology assessment. They argued
that the risks of metabolic side-effects were
exactly the same for conventionally bred plants
and had been tolerated without testing. This had
never led to identifiable problems. However, the
point in designing additional tests for transgenic
varieties is not so much that these varieties pose
specific risks, but rather that they raise specific
public concern. Whereas new conventional
plants are easily accepted, transgenic plants are
widely met with scepticism. This should be
sufficient justification for special regulation.117
For most of the proposed tests standardised
protocols are available. Moreover, since trans-
genic varieties are still largely experimental in
character, it can be assumed that a wide range of
testing is being carried out in any case by the
laboratories and companies that develop these
varieties.118 Therefore, to formally require addi-
tional testing is not likely to represent an undue
burden.
 
Along these lines, it was recommended in our
technology assessment that the substrate speci-
ficity of the transgenic gene product be tested if
a metabolic function is transferred which is new
in the recipient plant. Little or no substrate
specificity indicates a higher probability that
unexpected metabolic side-effects will occur.
Tests could be carried out in vitro on substrates
that have been selected according to biochemical
theory. In addition, some in vivo testing could be
carried out on selected model plants. Discus-
sions in our technology assessment did not
substantiate what the consequences would be if
                                                                          
goods protected by the German law, Zeitschrift für
Umweltrecht, 3 (1996: 150).
 
117
 To that degree, the regulation should indeed be
process-based, which means that formal review is
triggered by the fact that the plant has been genetically
engineered. This is the regulatory approach underlying
the European directives. It does not imply that risk is
assigned just because the plant has been genetically
engineered.
 
118
 Extensive testing will be needed, in addition, to
comply with the legal obligation to ensure that food
products brought to the market are safe and wholesome.
tests were to show that a transgene-coded prod-
uct could change substrates; further metabolic
testing of the transgenic plant would probably be
appropriate in this case.119
 
Metabolic tests which control for known toxi-
cants and allergens are available. However, tests
which screen the complete plant metabolism for
any unintentional or undesirable change induced
by the gene transfer are technically not possible.
The chances are low that unknown harmful
constituents could be identified, which were
never associated with the species involved in the
transfer. Feeding studies with whole plants are
not a feasible solution in many cases, because
the test animals would die before they could be
administered the (excessive) dose of plant mate-
rial necessary to produce toxicological data. The
postulate that metabolic testing should provide
complete control of possible harmful side-
effects, would indeed block any development of
transgenic crops. If it were extended to conven-
tional crops it would put an end to plant breed-
ing in general.
 
Uncertainty about possible harmful side-effects
that are unknown and untestable, are a normal
problem of food safety. It is not possible to
completely eliminate such uncertainty, either for
conventionally bred or transgenic plants.120
Therefore, it is questionable whether the fact
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 The FDA also gives no clear answer. With respect to
intentional changes in biochemical pathways, it uses the
formula that the metabolic effects on the host plant
”should be considered at the conceptual stage of devel-
opment and monitored, when appropriate and feasible”
(FDA, 1992). Substrate changes that testing has shown to
occur can be viewed as analogous to intentional changes.
 
120
 This applies also to the question whether new proteins
or new plants could themselves be (or contain) allergens.
”The FDA recognises that routine procedures for testing
foods derived from new plant varieties for the presence of
unknown allergens are not currently available. If the
donor has no history of food use, the issue of allergenicity
cannot be addressed at this time” (FDA, 1992). The
problem is the same, if a nontransgenic plant variety with
no history of food use is introduced. Whether in vitro
digestibility assays are a valid method to exclude un-
known allergens (see Astwood et al., 1996) remains to be
seen. Monsanto used (among other indicators) an amino
acid similarity analysis to known allergens for its assess-
ment of the allergenic potential of the transgene product
conferring glyphosate resistance to soybeans. ”The
protein expressed was shown to be derived from a
nonallergenic source, to have no significant amino acid
homology to known allergens, to be rapidly degraded in a
digestion model and to be present in low levels relative to
common allergenic proteins. Most importantly, the
introduced protein is closely related, both structurally and
functionally, to the corresponding soybean protein. Based
on this information, it was concluded, that this introduced
protein posed no significant allergenic concern” (Fuchs
1995: 212).
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that no tests exist to ensure complete control of
such side-effects in the case of transgenic herbi-
cide-resistant crops is sufficient reason to reject
such crops.
 2  Ecological testing andmonitoring of genetically
engineered crops
 
Environmental risk assessment has to consider
case by case whether transgenic crop plants, or
the respective transgenes, could possibly escape
from cultivation and spread to natural habitats
or wild species. Since the risk depends on the
phenotype, the criteria for transgenic plants
must be the same as those for nontransgenic
plants. The following criteria were used in our
technology assessment:
• the degree of domestication of the crop plant,
• the presence of related wild species with
which the crop plant can crossbreed,
• the selective advantage that might be con-
ferred by the transgenic trait, and
• the frequency of the release.121
 
On the basis of these criteria it was concluded
that the herbicide-resistant crop plants consid-
ered in this technology are not likely to invade
natural habitats and that the herbicide-resistance
gene is not likely to proliferate in wild species
(even if it would be captured occasionally as in
the case of oilseed rape). The main reason was
that herbicide resistance does not confer any
selective advantage beyond the agricultural
fields that are treated with the matching nonse-
lective herbicide. It was nevertheless proposed
that routine testing for increased fitness be
included in the regulation of transgenic crop
plants, even if the transgenic trait confers no
selective advantage, since an unexpected in-
crease in fitness could occur as a result of
synergistic impacts or side-effects from the
resistance-coding gene on the plant phenotype.
 
Tests usually performed in plant breeding are
not designed to identify whether fitness in natu-
ral habitats has inadvertently changed. Test
requirements for transgenic plants are more
comprehensive at present. This seems to be
justified. In many cases an investigation of
fitness change will already have been included in
the experiments carried out for developing new
transgenic crop varieties. They should be em-
bodied in the step-by-step procedures current
regulations require for the release of transgenic
organisms. While such testing seems indispen-
sable if the transgenic traits confer a selective
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 These are standard criteria; see, for example, EPA
(1994: 60512), ”Environmental Fate Analysis”.
advantage outside agricultural areas, it may be
reduced sooner or later in those cases where no
selective advantage is to be expected, and per-
haps it could be confined to highly competitive
plants with a low degree of domestication (such
as woody perennials). Highly domesticated
annual or biennial crops are not likely to regain
the ability to survive outside cultivation as a
result of side-effects from gene transfer. Testing
for increased fitness in transgenic crops is a
precautionary measure which could, in principle,
be dropped after a certain period of time, if
experience shows that it is not necessary. But, it
is also conceivable that experience would show
that such testing is appropriate for transgenic
plants in certain cases and that it should be
extended to conventionally bred plants as well.
 
In our technology assessment, it was argued that
the proposed testing could not, in fact, remove
doubts about the ecological safety of transgenic
plants. Testing will be performed on model
plants at selected sites, and the results can only
be extrapolated to other plants and locations to a
very limited extent. It does not seem to be
prudent, however, to set test requirements that
cannot be met on the basis of our scientific
knowledge at present. Predictions about the
wider ecological effects of new crop plants
remain uncertain—this applies to both
transgenic and conventionally bred plants.
 
It was proposed in our technology assessment
that the limits of ecological prediction and
preventive testing be compensated by a more
systematic postmarket monitoring of transgenic
crops. If uncertainties about risks are inherent in
new technology, and if these uncertainties must
be accepted because otherwise all innovation
would be blocked, then it seems good policy to
ensure that harmful effects of the technology can
be identified and regulated ”after the fact”. The
monitoring of transgenic plants would have to be
long-term, i.e. beyond the period required for
field experiments under the law of genetic engi-
neering.
 
Monitoring of transgenic plants would have to
be coordinated with other monitoring activities,
where these exist or are planned. Most partici-
pants in our technology assessment felt that
proper ecological monitoring must be organised
on a permanent basis through government
institutions or agencies, and that it could not be
delegated as research projects to universities.
They referred here to the testing of fertilising
schemes, that has been carried out continuously
for more than 80 years by experimental agri-
cultural stations in Germany. In the case of
herbicide-resistant plants, this monitoring should
cover not only the escape and uncontrolled
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spread of the crop and the transgene, but also
the early recognition of the selection of herbi-
cide-resistant weeds. It was further recom-
mended that the long-term effects of nonselective
herbicides on agrophytocoenosis and weed
diversity should be monitored. However, there
are pragmatic limits to any ecological monitor-
ing. No programme can guarantee with certainty
that all possible consequences will be discovered
in time. This will not, as a rule, be an argument
to forego as well the knowledge that could be
gathered with reasonable effort. It was suggested
that the ecological monitoring of transgenic
plants should correspond in scope and method to
the respective programmes carried out in the
field of nature conservation.
 
Monitoring is not the answer for all ecological
issues at state with transgenic herbicide-resistant
crops. Specific programmes of safety research
will be necessary, for instance, to clarify
whether soil functions would be impaired by
horizontal gene transfer from the transgenic
crops. The importance of funding such research
was emphasised in the technology assessment. It
was further stressed that field trials with trans-
genic organisms should be designed and evalu-
ated more often as ecological experiments, to
ensure that these trials can really demonstrate a
history of safe use of such organisms.122
 3  Increasing the transparency ofherbicide approvals
 
The approval of transgenic herbicide-resistant
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 The question of postmarket monitoring should not be
confused with the question of whether the monitoring that
(according to existing regulations) should be inherent in
the step-by-step approach when releasing transgenic pro-
ducts is properly done. There is evidence that the field
testing of transgenic plants has been inadequately
designed and evaluated from the perspective of safety
issues (see Wrubel et al., 1992; Mellon and Rissler,
1995; Rüdelsheim, 1995). Limited trials in small fields
under conditions of reproductive containment cannot be
conclusive evidence that large-scale commercial releases
are harmless. Regal is more critical: ”Yet this sort of
nondata on nonreleases has been cited in policy circles as
though 500 true releases have now informed scientists
that there are no legitimate scientific concerns”
(1994: 11). But even if field trials are better designed and
linked to safety research (see also Neemann and Braun,
1997) proceeding to commercial releases will
nevertheless, in any case, remain a step beyond existing
knowledge. Such steps must be based on the political
assessment that one feels ”safe enough” to go ahead.
Whether this assessment is correct should be controlled
by postmarket monitoring. The competent authority in the
United Kingdom explicitly requires the applicant ”to
keep himself informed of any damage to the environment
caused by the release or marketing [and] notify if there is
any information which would indicate a change in the
level of risk” (Deliberate Release Regulation).
crops will remain a matter of controversy for the
foreseeable future. Whether approval testing can
provide sufficient safety is not, in the final
analysis, a scientific question; it implies political
decisions on the level of residual risk that can be
imposed legitimately onto society. Under
democratic rule such decisions have to be
tolerated by those who disagree. It is therefore
all the more important that the procedure for
approval be as transparent as possible and that
the reasoning behind decisions be explained to
the public.
 
Criticism was directed against current practice
in Germany for herbicide approval because of its
lack of transparency. In particular, it was felt
that the relevant toxicological and ecological
dossiers should be made available not only to the
competent authorities, but also to the public, so
that they could, if necessary, be controlled and
reproduced by independent scientists (for in-
stance from universities). The point was not that
the investigations should actually be repeated—
this would, in many cases, amount to a waste of
public money and, with respect animal testing,
also violate existing law. However, it would
increase transparency and trust in the procedure
if, in principle, the investigations could be
repeated.
 
It is unclear whether EC Directive 91/414 goes
far enough in this respect. It allows access only
to the summaries produced by the competent
authority of the dossier provided by the appli-
cants (test protocols that have to be applied are
specified in the annex to the directive). Freedom
of information concerning the complete dossiers
is at odds with the commercial interests of the
applicant, since competitors (second applicants)
could then ”save” the costs of repeating the
required investigations. On the other hand, one
can ask if it makes sense to force second appli-
cants to repeat all investigations. The legitimate
interests of the first applicant could be protected
without denying public access to relevant infor-
mation, for example, by having second appli-
cants contribute to the cost of approval, or by
extending patent protection. With respect to
animal testing, cost sharing with second appli-
cants is already provided for in the law (for
instance, article 13 of the German Plant Protec-
tion Act).
 
In order to increase transparency, it was also
demanded in our technology assessment that
reasons for refusing or withdrawing the approval
for herbicides be disclosed. The public has a
legitimate interest in and a right to be informed
about the harmful effects or abuse of herbicides,
which may constitute grounds for rejecting them
or withdrawing the approval for their use.
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 4  Precautionary standards forherbicide certification: Zero
contamination as goal?
 
There is probably general agreement that herbi-
cide residues in food or elsewhere in the envi-
ronment are undesirable. However, existing
regulations permit certain levels of residues
where it can be guaranteed that they will not be
harmful for the consumer or the household of
nature. Only in the cases of drinking water and
groundwater are tolerance limits set to a level of
zero contamination. Existing regulations for
herbicide certification were criticised in the
technology assessment from opposing perspec-
tives. On the one hand, it was argued that con-
sumer protection was inadequate because vul-
nerable groups (small children, the physically
frail or sick) might still suffer harm from herbi-
cide residues in food products. On the other
hand, tolerance levels close to zero were consid-
ered as ”overregulation” and unjustified in
toxicological terms. The discussions relativised
both views.
 
Whether herbicide residues in foodstuffs repre-
sent a health risk depends not only on toxicity,
but also on dosage. Most food plants contain
natural substances which would have to be
classified as toxicants (or mutagens or carcino-
gens) were they tested according to the standards
of toxicology. The tolerance limits set for herbi-
cide residues in food products are well below
those levels which produce toxic effects (usually
a hundredth of the so-called no-effect level).
These limits are rarely exceeded; usually herbi-
cide residues only amount to a fraction of what
would be permissible; often they are below
detection levels. Under these conditions, the call
for zero contamination is hardly justifiable on
the grounds of preventing human health risks.
Zero contamination could perhaps be justified
by consumer’s expectations that food products
should satisfy certain standards of naturalness
(absence of foreign substances). Such expecta-
tions, while undoubtedly legitimate, do not
necessarily warrant additional regulation. Con-
sumers might instead be advised to turn to
markets of food products which meet particu-
larly high standards of ”naturalness”, like
organic farming products.
 
With respect to water protection standards, there
was, first of all, consensus among the partici-
pants in our technology assessment that any
discharge of herbicides into groundwater is
highly problematic. Herbicides are an agricul-
tural technology, and it would be reasonable
policy therefore to try to confine the impacts of
herbicides to the fields on which they are ap-
plied. Against this background, it was obviously
not easy to argue for a relaxation of the zero
contamination standard for groundwater.
 
The tolerance limits set for herbicide residues in
drinking water by EC Directive 80/778 of 0.1
micrograms/litre for individual substances and
0.5 micrograms/litre in total are coming under
pressure because, on the basis of normal toxi-
cological criteria, they are some orders of mag-
nitude below the limits necessary to protect
public health. This is probably correct, but it
may not be an objection. The extremely low
tolerances (at the sensitivity limits of existing
detection methods) have been set to ensure that
water is measurably free of pesticides. Such
regulation can be justified for reasons other than
the protection of human health, namely, as a
measure of food hygiene (since drinking water is
a very special foodstuff), and as an incentive for
better protection of groundwater, the most
important source of drinking water in Germany.
The objective to achieve zero groundwater
contamination was accepted in the technology
assessment; at least, there was no open dissent.
No one advocated that the precautionary stan-
dards enacted in existing regulation be weak-
ened; the need was rather to ensure their proper
implementation.
 5  Compliance with theconditions of herbicide
approval, integrated crop
protection, site-specific
regulations
 
Opinions remained divided among the partici-
pants in our technology assessment whether
stricter requirements should be set for the ap-
proval of herbicides in general, or nonselective
herbicides in particular. This was no doubt due
to the deep split of opinion over the question
whether the agricultural use of pesticides is
acceptable at all.
 
Apart from this controversy there was, however,
some agreement that where the use of herbicides
had caused obvious problems (e.g. groundwater
contamination, selection of resistant weeds) ,´ the
main reason was not inadequate regulation, but
rather inadequate implementation of the regula-
tion. Therefore, instead of adding further condi-
tions for herbicide certification, the proper way
to avoid problems resulting from lack of herbi-
cide rotation, excessive applications or improper
disposal of herbicides would probably be to
improve monitoring of compliance with the
regulations and to raise the standards for how
farmers handle herbicides.
 
While the argument that nonselective herbicides
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are particularly likely to be abused because they
do no damage to crops was rejected in the
technology assessment, it was generally admitted
that the application of herbicides often fails to
meet the standards of ”good field practice” and
the rules of integrated crop protection.123 There-
fore, the demand that compliance with existing
rules be better monitored seemed plausible. On
the other hand, it raises considerable problems at
a pragmatic level. One can hardly imagine that
the actual practice of farmers can be ”policed”
comprehensively and effectively. To a large
extent, one would have to rely on methods of
counselling and education to improve compli-
ance with the rule.
 
Moreover, it was pointed out that the standards
of good field practice and integrated crop pro-
tection are fairly vague and, unless they are
further specified, do not entail particularly clear
guidance as to how herbicides should actually be
applied practically on the farm. Consequently,
the legal status of these standards remains
ambivalent. The German Plant Protection Act
imposes them as a goal, but implies no sanctions
if they are violated.124 However, the idea that the
rules of good field practise be specified and
enforced as legal regulation was also not wel-
comed by all the participants. The regulation of
crop rotation sequences met with particular
opposition, since this might force farmers to
adopt cultivation systems that are not economi-
cal for them. Instead of encouraging the further
bureaucratisation of agriculture, it would be
better, on this view, to rely on proper counsel-
ling and education of farmers, and on the effects
of good examples to demonstrate that integrated
crop protection does in fact pay off in economic
terms. Falling prices for agricultural products in
the European Union provided sufficient incen-
tives to reduce herbicide use and, therefore, no
further regulation or additional incentives, such
as a herbicide tax, would be needed. The princi-
ple of relying on economic constraints and
market controls was rejected by other partici-
pants as completely unsatisfactory. The eco-
nomic interest of farmers is clearly no justifica-
tion for engaging in systems of crop husbandry
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 A number of participants have objected to the impres-
sion created in the discussions that the standards of good
field practice were widely neglected in the use of herbi-
cides. It is indeed true that the discussions focused on
examples of such neglect and that no data were available
to show how representative such examples might be. The
point here is, however, that the situation is at any rate not
different for nonselective than for selective herbicides.
 
124
 Article 6 ”Pesticides may only be used in accordance
with good field practice. Good field practice implies that
the principles of integrated crop protection are observed.”
that are not ecologically sustainable. Whether
legal regulation of integrated crop protection
was a viable alternative remained an open
question in our discussions. It was generally
admitted that, in view of the inevitable regional
differentiation of farming practices, it would be
very difficult to formulate plausible general
rules.125 Therefore, one would have to rely
largely on proper counselling to specify the
implications of integrated crop protection for
local conditions.
 
Along these lines it was also suggested that
herbicide use in particularly vulnerable areas—
for example, where groundwater pollution is to
be expected because of soil conditions—be
regulated more often by negotiating the appro-
priate, site-specific precautionary measures with
the farmer. It would also be much easier to
monitor adherence to additional regulations if
they were confined to restricted areas. This
suggestion marks a break from conventional
regulatory approaches and puts emphasis on
more cooperative, persuasive policy instruments.
Ever stricter conditions for herbicide approval
and more bureaucratic control of all farming
activities may not be the best way to improve the
level of precaution. On the other hand, coopera-
tive, site-specific arrangements will only be
successful, if they are negotiated ”in the shadow
of the law”, that is, if general regulations impose
sufficiently strict tolerance limits to force
something to be done in the area concerned.
 6  Specific regulation fornonselective herbicides
rotation
 
All participants in the technology assessment,
even the advocates of transgenic herbicide-
resistant crops, operated on the assumption that
it is advisable to use nonselective herbicides only
once in a crop rotation sequence and not with
monocultures. The reasons given were that
continuous use of nonselective herbicides would:
• select problem weeds, because all herbicides
have gaps in their weed control spectra,
• increase the risk that herbicide-resistant weed
populations spread,
• make the herbicide inapplicable for the control
of volunteer crops from the previous vegetation
period,
• have more serious environmental impacts,
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 The amended German Nature Conservation Act
(1997) exempts agriculture from the liabilities of nature
conservation if the ”rules of environmentally friendly
agriculture” are observed (article 2a). Accordingly, there
is a need now to develop these rules into an explicit and
standardized code (Bundestagsdrucksache 13/19930).
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because a small number of herbicides would be
applied over larger areas,
• lead to excessive elimination of weeds from
agricultural habitats and to irreversible reduc-
tions in weed seed banks—a practice incompati-
ble with the objectives of integrated crop protec-
tion,
• violate the rules of good field practice (espe-
cially in the case of monocultures).
 
Not all participants found all these arguments
equally compelling, but it was agreed that there
was sufficient reason to reject the use of one and
the same nonselective herbicide without rotation.
That resistant weed populations had to be pre-
vented was probably considered as the most
compelling reason for herbicide rotation.126
Different views were held as to whether rotation
of nonselective herbicides with different modes
of action was advisable. While some partici-
pants pointed out that, in agronomic terms, this
would be equivalent to the current situation in
which all crops in a rotation sequence are treated
with different selective herbicides (often used in
combinations of tank mixtures), others insisted
that weed elimination would still be more radical
with nonselective herbicides. If the threat of
genetic erosion of weed species is taken seri-
ously and the principles of integrated crop
protection strictly observed, one could probably
argue that, even with rotation, nonselective
herbicides should not be applied exclusively
throughout the whole crop rotation sequence.
The question was considered to be ”academic”
for agriculture in Central Europe, since for
cereal crops, an element in every crop rotation
sequence, the use of herbicides is declining and
the development of herbicide-resistant cultivars
is apparently not being pursued.127
 
Should the restrictions to be observed for proper
management of nonselective herbicides be
legally regulated? This would not be necessary if
bad management were purely a private matter
and if farmers alone would have to bear the
costs of the mistakes they made. But, this is not
the case. Unnecessary or pointless herbicide
applications are, by definition, incompatible
with the legal objectives of integrated crop
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 It must be noted, however, that rotation while, a means
to contain the problems that might result from herbicide-
resistant weed populations, may not be a means to get rid
of resistance in weeds again, since resistance will not
necessarily imply a fitness penalty in absence of herbicide
application (see Gliddon, IHE, 1994: 14).
 
127
 The situation may of course be different in other
countries; weed grasses may have to be controlled in
wheat by herbicides, and cross-resistance to wheat-
selective herbicides is quickly developing. See Gressel
(1996: 240).
protection and therefore a matter of public
concern. A regulation which specifies where and
how often nonselective herbicides may be ap-
plied in the crop rotation sequence should be
feasible in principle. There are examples of
detailed regulations of this kind. For instance, in
Germany atrazine (before being banned) could
only be used in conjunction with one crop,
namely, maize, only once in the vegetation
period, with a maximum dose of one kilogram
per hectare in postemergence treatment.
 
Whether such regulation could be established on
a Europe-wide basis is an open question. A
further issue is how compliance with the regu-
lation could be monitored once herbicide-
resistant cultivars and matching nonselective
herbicides become readily available for all the
crops farmers grow. Finally, it was argued that
general regulations make no allowances for
regional differences, but that local conditions
have a crucial influence on whether and how
rapidly nonselective herbicides can lead to
problems. Proper site-specific choice of crop
rotation sequence and herbicide management can
perhaps be better ensured by counselling than by
additional regulation. On the other hand,
counselling may not be enough to exclude
practices which, although disadvantageous in the
long run, appear economically attractive for the
farmer in the shorter run, as illustrated in the
case of maize monoculture and the nonrotational
use of atrazine.
 7  Labelling of geneticallyengineered food
 
After lengthy discussions in the technology
assessment all participants, including those from
industry, agreed that genetically engineered food
ought to be labelled as such. The rationale for
labelling is consumer sovereignty, not protection
of human health.128 Health issues should be dealt
with by testing for food safety before products
from transgenic crop plants are placed on the
market. Consumer sovereignty brings completely
other aspects into play. While regulatory deci-
sions about whether transgenic food products
can be placed on the market must be based on
accepted criteria and sound reasoning, decisions
to buy such products or not can be based legiti-
mately on individual (even idiosyncratic) mo-
tives, interests and preferences. Freedom of
choice means that consumers can follow subjec-
tive fears, fundamental ethical reservations or
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 See also Rehbinder 1994: 99; health protection would
be implied in the labelling, if transgenic food crops were
ever approved that have been transformed with genes
from a donor plant which is a known allergen.
 Part III: Normative Evaluations—Ethics, Law And Politics 91
political goals without asking whether their fears
are well-founded, whether their ethical judge-
ments are based on common sense or whether
their political goals are supported by the major-
ity. In order to guarantee freedom or choice,
transgenic food products must be clearly la-
belled.
 
This principle was only reluctantly accepted in
our technology assessment. It was argued that
labelling would
• deceive customers by creating a false impres-
sion that the labelled products were dangerous,
• discriminate against genetic engineering, since
other products of modern food technologies
would not be labelled accordingly,
• be abused, or instance, to organise boycotts of
transgenic food products for purely political
reasons,
• be impractical if food products were proc-
essed further or mixed with other nontransgenic
products.
 
The first three objections were found untenable;
with respect to the fourth objection a pragmatic
compromise was proposed. The very fact that
food products from transgenic plants must be
labelled might be misunderstood by a sceptical
public or deliberately misinterpreted in political
rhetoric as a signal of danger (”. . . otherwise
they wouldn’t have put a label on it!”). This
does not remove the rationale for labelling.
Consumers have a right to be informed irrespec-
tive of whether they have a true understanding of
genetic engineering or whether they realise that
transgenic and nontransgenic foods are compa-
rable in most respects. Prejudice and misinfor-
mation are surely factors of legitimate concern,
but they can only be a reason for improving the
level of information, but never a reason for
withholding information.
 
A specific requirement that transgenic food
products be labelled can hardly be considered
discriminatory and unfair. The fact that genetic
engineering has become an issue of public
debate and source of anxiety should suffice to
justify extra regulation. The same reasoning was
also applied in the case of labelling food addi-
tives.
 
If transgenic food products have to be labelled,
they can indeed more easily become the target of
politically motivated consumer boycotts. Such
boycotts are not in any way illegitimate or
illegal, unless the declared goals are unconstitu-
tional. In the past, consumers have used their
freedom of choice to express opposition to
apartheid in South Africa, to support Third
World cooperatives, or to criticise the environ-
mental behaviour of multinational companies.
Why should they not be allowed to express their
rejection of genetic engineering in their choice of
foods! Thus, there is no reason to dispense with
labelling requirement because it makes political
boycotts possible.
 
On the other hand, it is doubtful whether label-
ling is required in order to make political boy-
cotts possible. This view was propagated by
some participants in our technology assessment.
However, the sovereignty of the consumer is an
economic right, not a political one. It is a fact
that individuals may rely as much on political
preference as on economic incentive when they
”calculate” the usefulness of a product. They
may, therefore, be really interested to learn
whether the product comes from an automated
factory or from labour-intensive production,
what the company’s policy is with respect to
labour organisation or nondiscrimination of
women, whether the firm is involved in the arms
business or invests in low-wage countries, etc.
Up to now, however, such information has not
been required for product labelling. If consumers
want this kind of information they must seek it
from other sources. Obviously, it cannot be the
purpose of product labelling to provide whatever
information ”politicised” consumers may want
when they consider what to buy or not. But
where do the limits lie?
 
The participants agreed that not only food
consisting of or containing genetically engi-
neered organisms should be labelled, but also
food containing transgenes (and transgenic gene
products). This would, for instance, apply to
potatoes from herbicide-resistant potato culti-
vars. The same would apply if genetic engineer-
ing is used to remove or suppress a gene that
normally occurs in the food. In this case the
product is also ”modified by genetic engineer-
ing”, even though the modification may be
indistinguishable from a natural deletion muta-
tion. There was also consensus that products
should be labelled even if they only contain
substances (enzymes) from recombinant genes.
One example is the use of rennin (chymosin)
from genetically engineered bacteria for cheese
making. Although such rennin may be indistin-
guishable from the one that has been extracted
from calves, it nevertheless remains a ”product
of genetic engineering”. Drugs must be similarly
labelled, and there seems to be no grounds why
this should not apply to foodstuffs as well. The
need to be informed could, of course, disappear
once it becomes generally known that all cheese
is made with chymosin from genetically engi-
neered bacteria.
 
There was no agreement about whether products
should be labelled that contain neither trans-
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genes nor their products, but that have been
derived from transgenic crops. Sugar from
herbicide-resistant sugar beet or oil from herbi-
cide-resistant soybeans are examples. In these
cases genetic modification leaves no trace in the
final product; sugar and oil from transgenic
crops are identical to sugar and oil from non-
transgenic crops. Current labelling procedures
provide only information about product proper-
ties in a narrow sense (the declaration of the
country of origin is an exception in this respect),
but not information on the mode of production if
this does not affect the final product. Some
participants argued, however, that in the case of
genetic engineering the mode of production
should also be labelled since the consumers may
want to opt against the use of this technology in
general.
 
It was pointed out that consumers could also
exercise their sovereignty by choosing products
which are explicitly declared to be not derived
from transgenic crops. While it was not sug-
gested that this option could replace labelling
requirements altogether, it might be considered
for those cases in which the use of genetic
engineering in production has no effect on the
product. Consumers who nevertheless wish to
avoid such products would then have to turn to
organic farming products or other alternatives.
No consensus was reached on this point in the
technology assessment. It seems, however, that
both solutions are compatible with the recog-
nised principle of consumer sovereignty; there is
scope for political compromise here, which can
be determined legitimately by majority decision.
 
It was admitted that labelling requirements
involve pragmatic problems if they are extended
to the entire processing chain of transgenic
products. Would any food products containing
flour or potatoes (or, according to the more
radical proposals, even sugar) from transgenic
crops also have to be labelled? What about
mixtures of products from transgenic and non-
transgenic crops? The critics of genetic engi-
neering pleaded for maximum declaration of all
secondary products. They denied that this would
entail insurmountable practical problems,
pointing to the German system of waste recy-
cling labelled (the green dot) a vast number of
products. Others felt that the pragmatic limits of
labelling and compromises should be accepted.
The idea of labelling will indeed be refuted if it
is carried to the extreme. The larger the range of
products labelled, the sooner it will become a
normal expectation of the consumer that genetic
engineering is somehow involved in food pro-
duction; then one could do without labelling.
Consumers who oppose such food would be
forced to buy on alternative markets.
 
It may be true that widespread labelling re-
quirements would be difficult to enforce in
international trade. This does not mean, how-
ever, that we can dispense with an examination
of whether such labelling is not in fact advisable
in view of the manifest lack of public confidence
in genetically engineered food in most countries.
 F  OUTLOOK: THE POLITICS OFTECHNOLOGICAL
DEVELOPMENT
 
The discussions in our technology assessment
showed that the participants had widely differing
views about the direction in which society
should develop and the role which modern
technology can play. These differences cannot
not be dealt with on the level of risk regulation,
but they may help us to understand why risk
regulation tends to polarise people and involve
them in never-ending controversy. The differ-
ences can be summarised as follows.
 1  Diverging views of the socialrole of technology
 
In our technology assessment, one side saw
technology in modern society as an essential
resource for solving problems. New technologies
offer new opportunities, and the increase in
opportunities must itself be considered a clear
gain (provided the risks are under due control).
From this point of view, the fact that transgenic
herbicide-resistant crops play a pathfinder role,
contributes to their usefulness. While they may
not offer spectacular benefits by themselves,
they help to break the ground for genetic engi-
neering in agriculture and clear the way for other
more important applications.
 
The other side, in contrast, did not see modern
technology as part of the solution but as part of
the problem. They emphasised that current
environmental and social problems were in many
ways attributable to the technological dynamics
unleashed in our society, and that it was time to
halt these dynamics. New high-tech opportuni-
ties will only continue the trends that have got us
into the present mess. On this view transgenic
herbicide-resistant crops were the initial step
down a slippery slope. While they may be
relatively harmless when viewed in isolation,
they herald developments which will make our
problems worse.
 
It is difficult to see how these divergent perspec-
tives could be mediated. In our technology
assessment it was at least possible to get rid of
some of the clichés which abound in the public
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debate over these issues. Consensus was reached
among the participants about the following
points:
• Modern societies face ecological and social
problems which cannot be overcome without
structural reform. Even unambivalent supporters
of modern technology did not claim that the
world is in order or could be put in order by
”business as usual”.
• General goals such as sustainable develop-
ment, fair distribution between North and South,
and responsibility for future generations were
not in dispute. The dispute referred to the strate-
gies needed to reach these goals and the specific
policies that could and should be adopted at
present.
• No advocate of transgenic herbicide-resistant
crop proceeded from the assumption that tech-
nological development would automatically lead
to social progress, or that a technological fix
could be found for every social problem. With
respect to world food supply, for example, there
was general agreement in the discussion that
famine was at present primarily a problem of
distribution, and that therefore the solution could
not simply lie in new technology to increase
production.
• On the other hand, opponents of transgenic
herbicide-resistant crops did not blindly oppose
all new technology. They accepted that new
technologies might be needed to cope with
existing problems. Thus it was clear that famine
would again become a problem of production as
the world population continued to grow, and that
new technology would be needed to increase
productivity—either in conventional or organic
farming.
A key objection by the critics was that new
technologies can never be judged in isolation,
but must be viewed in the context of the social
structures and ways of life in which they are
embedded. It is indeed true that supporters tend
to conceive of new technologies as a relatively
neutral instruments which could be used for
better or worse; they could be abused but, under
suitable conditions, they could also help to solve
our problems. In contrast, critics routinely deny
that new technologies can ever be neutral in any
way. New technologies are bound to have nega-
tive ecological and social effects under the
existing social and economic regime because the
conditions under which the technologies would
really be useful simply cannot be established.
2 ”High tech” as a lifestyle
The point that ”high tech” is not so much an
instrument but more a lifestyle which is part of
the very fabric of industrialised societies was
generally accepted by all participants. What was
not accepted was the negative view of this
lifestyle and the assumption that industrial
societies are inherently unable to achieve re-
forms which would make the use of high tech-
nology ecologically and socially acceptable.
What is wrong with a lifestyle based on ”high
tech”? The pursuit of the domination of nature,
for which genetic engineering represents a
paradigm, cannot be the problem. As was
pointed in the discussions, this pursuit is by no
means unique to recent developments in technol-
ogy. It is already a feature of traditional agri-
cultural techniques and is just as much inherent
in the alternative approaches of organic farming
as in the most advanced strategies of genetic
engineering. This argument was not discussed at
length in the technology assessment, but it seems
that integrated ecological management coordi-
nating the biological feedback mechanisms that
operate in natural systems, using breeding
methods and mechanical agronomic techniques
in order to obtain high yields and optimal control
of environmental impacts, comes much closer to
the Baconian ideal of the domination of nature
than a method which simply transfers single
genes from one organism to another.
It is to be expected that alternatives to current
lifestyles will also be variations of a high-tech
lifestyle. For example, an economy based on
solar energy would hardly be possible without
mobilising the entire repertoire of modern tech-
nology and further innovations. Therefore the
objections to a modern high-tech lifestyle cannot
be based on the degree of control we exert over
natural processes, but only on the ends to which
this control is put—which implicitly recognises
the neutrality of technology. Does this mean that
under different social conditions and with other
goals for its application, genetic engineering
would then also be acceptable for its critics?
The general assumption that new technologies
will always have negative effects as long as they
are embedded in industrial societies can hardly
be defended, as evidenced by advances in
medical technology and plant breeding
techniques that have played a major role in feed-
ing the world population. These are undisputed
technological achievements of the industrial
societies which one would not want to forego
under any alternative social conditions. On the
other hand, critics may still have a point in
claiming that the dynamics of technological
innovation in industrial societies tend to over-
load the environment, deplete natural resources
and widen the gap between the world’s haves
and have-nots. It was not the purpose of our
94 Herbicide-Resistant Crops
technology assessment to discuss basic issues
such as what kind of production and economic
regime we would need to protect the world’s
resources and ensure that available goods were
divided more equitably, whether economic
growth could be maintained much longer, or
how industrial societies can function without
growth. It is certain that opinions were as
divided among the participants of the technology
assessment as they are in the public debates
pursued over these issues.
In the end basic political divisions among the
participants remained unaltered in our technol-
ogy assessment. The critics of genetic engineer-
ing felt that society would gain if it were possi-
ble to halt the further growth of the technology.
They also claimed that organic farming repre-
sented a viable alternative to conventional
agroindustrial techniques. The supporters of
genetic engineering, on the other hand, were
convinced that none of the obvious problems this
society is facing could in any way be alleviated
by suppressing the dynamics of technological
innovation. Nor did they accept, as a rule, that
organic farming was a better alternative for the
environment in all respects or that it could
provide the yields needed to ensure food sup-
plies. Many participants were of the opinion that
an ecologically sustainable agriculture of the
future, that would ensure food supply for a
growing world population, would have to be an
improved version of the present system of high-
tech agriculture, and that new technology,
including genetic engineering, would be neces-
sary to achieve this goal.
3 The compromise oftechnological pluralism
There seems to be no middle ground for mediat-
ing a dispute in which one side argues for more
modern technology because it provides options
to solve pressing problems, while the other side
argues for less modern technology because it
would only make the problems worse. We have
incompatible political visions and strategies
between which we must choose. Voting or
referendum would suggest itself as a legitimate
method to reach a decision in this case.
To a certain extent, it should be possible to have
it both ways by combining some aspects of each
conflicting view of the proper role of technology
in modern agriculture. Society could, for in-
stance, opt to introduce genetic engineering and,
at the same time, provide additional support to
improve organic farming methods. Occasionally
it was argued in the technology assessment that
technology policy should be based on a double
strategy. Since no single technology can be
expected to represent the ”best” solution to a
problem for all times, it is advisable to ensure
pluralism and avoid the emergence of techno-
logical monostructures in society. This would
imply that alternatives to or variations of the
dominant technology must at least be preserved,
so that they can be resumed and further devel-
oped if the need arises in the future.
In the case of weed control, technological plu-
ralism means that sufficiently large niches must
be maintained for the use and innovation of
mechanical methods, even if herbicides represent
a superior technology according to received
criteria. Going one step further, one recommen-
dation was that organic farming as a whole
should receive extensive support to develop it
into a viable alternative, on the assumption that
it is undesirable to be entirely dependent on
chemically based agriculture as the only system
of large-scale food production. In Central
Europe a considerable increase of the area of
organic farming could be achieved if subsidies
were reallocated. This would create a
”laboratory” in which organic farming methods
could be improved and evidence collected to
determine whether organic farming could be
developed into a realistic alternative to conven-
tional farming, producing comparable yields at
reasonable costs.
Such ideas were a concession to the advocates of
organic farming, but required in return the
admission that it is also legitimate to adopt new
technologies, including genetic engineering
(provided risks are properly controlled). Organic
farming is thus regarded as an option in technol-
ogy, not as a way of life. The discussion of these
points was not brought to a conclusion in the
technology assessment, and there was no op-
portunity to establish whether a consensus
would have been reached.
4 The political function ofparticipatory technology
assessment
What was the political significance of our
participatory procedure on transgenic herbicide-
resistant crop plants? Can such procedures serve
as a model for future technology assessment?
Can it resolve conflicts over the acceptance of
new technology? These questions were not
discussed during the procedure itself; they are
still under investigation at the Wissen-
schaftszentrum Berlin (WZB). A few remarks
are given here.
1. A procedure of participatory technology
assessment may be suitable to restore the credi-
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bility of the experts. As an instrument of expert
advice for policy making, it has probably less to
offer. In our case the procedure just repeated
and confirmed the knowledge that was available
in the international discourse. It would probably
have been possible to document this knowledge
without a participatory procedure simply by
commissioning reports from the respective
experts. What would not have been achieved by
such reports is the concurrent public demonstra-
tion of the credibility of experts. Credibility is an
important and scarce resource in expert advice
for policy making. It can be stabilised when
experts are exposed to the critical questions and
objections of ”counter-experts” in a symmetrical
and fair participatory procedure.129
2. Argumentation is a medium for rationalising
conflicts. While conflicts in public arenas are as
a rule ”framed” as battles of arguments, the
conflicting parties are mostly involved in the
political mobilisation of the public rather than in
the examination of arguments. A participatory
technology assessment provides a social model
of how the frame of argumentation can be taken
seriously and how conflicting parties can be
effectively committed to engage in true dis-
course. The procedure ensures that all relevant
points will be brought together, that claims be
substantiated and justified, and that objections
be heard and answered. If there is any room to
”rationalise” political conflicts and explore the
chances for consensus, it should become appar-
ent under these conditions.
3. Participation is a political goal in itself.
Experiments are being conducted in many
modern societies with new participatory and
cooperative forms of politics. To assess these
experiments the question is not only whether
they are necessary in order to resolve conflicts,
but also whether they represent the kind of
political culture one wants to promote in the
society. Discursive models like the participatory
technology assessment are superior (both in
normative and functional terms) to ”one-sided”
forms of participation like the right to be in-
formed or to give comments, or to ob-
serve/testify in hearings. Inclusion in a discourse
has a price, however, because it involves the
conflicting parties in a process of argumentation
which they cannot control and where they can
never be sure that they will ”win” their case.
4. Conflicts over the acceptability of a new
technology are not likely to be resolved in par-
ticipatory procedures. Discursive technology
assessments are social constellations of interac-
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tion which operate under ”ideal” conditions of
symmetry, fairness and mutual respect. It is not
to be expected that political conflicts that are
fought in the public domain could be translated
and transformed fully to the level of argumenta-
tion in such a procedure. Nor can one expect
that the parties involved would really offer to
relinquish their strategic interests in a process of
argumentation. Acceptability conflicts are
therefore not likely to be resolved in a partici-
patory technology assessment; they will at best
be redefined. Many of the rationalising effects of
the procedure will only occur with those who
observe the process of argumentation and not
with the participants who actually pursue that
process.130
5. Participation is not democratisation. Political
disputes about new technologies will seldom be
resolved by consensus. The real question is,
therefore, how legitimate decisions can be taken
despite the conflicting views. Participation in a
technology assessment operates at a distance
from the political decision. It is advice not
decision making. Participation ensures the
inclusion of a plurality of views in a process of
political communication, but it is not a demo-
cratic transformation of political decision mak-
ing. The participants do not need a democratic
mandate, but they also do not have a democratic
mandate. Whether participation will enhance the
legitimacy of decision making and increase the
willingness to accept majority votes remains an
open question. It is a plausible assumption,
however, that the refusal to grant participation
will make it ever more difficult to arrive at
legitimate decisions.131
6. Technology assessment may function as
forum of constitutional debate. Conflicts over
the acceptability of new technology often imply
political demands which simply cannot be
processed by the established procedures of
decision making, such as the demand for politi-
cal planning and democratic control of techno-
logical and social change. The political system
must somehow ”return” such demands to the
society. For that matter social forums of com-
munication are needed which can deal convinc-
ingly with the interests, needs, hopes and fears
reflected in such demands, even if they cannot
translate them into effective regulation. Discur-
sive technology assessment may be one example
of such a forum, if it is extended into an organ-
ised discussion about how useful a new technol-
ogy really is and what direction social develop-
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ment should take.
7. Participatory procedures cannot replace
standard procedures of technology assessment.
The participatory procedure initiated by the
WZB was too costly in terms of time and money
for all those involved to become incorporated in
the routines of giving expert advice to political
decision makers. The procedure would either
have to be simplified drastically or confined to
selected conflicts which are particularly signifi-
cant.
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